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Gender is often seen as one of the fundamental characteristics of a person in many cultures. 
Concepts of gender permeate many aspects of everyday life, including the marketing of 
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products, the name a person may have1, whom a person may marry and what services they 
may access. However despite being so fundamental to people’s lives the dominant 
conceptions of gender in a culture can be challenged by the lived experiences of a variety of 
individuals, particularly transgender people. 
The term gender in this thesis will be used to refer to the social and psychological aspects of a 
person’s identity, including how a person perceives themselves and expresses their gender 
identity2. Gender can be contrasted with sex, which refers to solely the persons physical 
status, which is assigned at birth based on a person’s observed phenotype3, as well as a 
number of other factors4. The relationship between sex and gender can be complex. While 
sex assigned at birth and gender identity appear to correspond with each other in 
approximately 99.25% of the population5 they are best regarded as separate phenomena, 
which, while they may relate to each other and interact in complex ways, need not necessarily 
correspond to each other. The existence of transgender people, who have a different gender 
identity from that assigned based on their sex assigned at birth, demonstrate how sex assigned 
at birth and gender identity do not always match. This can also be demonstrated by observing 
that, while the physical characteristics of sex have remained fairly consistent through human 
history, mental and social aspects of identity which have been perceived as linked to sex have 
varied dramatically over time in various cultures6. This lends itself to the conclusion that 
gender and sex can be usefully understood as separate concepts, although they can often have 
complex interactions with one another, as one’s body often impacts how one perceives 
themselves and is perceived by others7. A full discussion about the nature of sex and gender 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, due to the complex nature of the topic and our continually 
 
1 As was the case in Iceland under the Personal Names Act 1996 until the passage of the Gender Autonomy Act 
2019 
2 World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, Health topics, Gender, Gender: definitions, Located 
at https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-determinants/gender/gender-definitions, accessed 
05/08/2021 
3 Intersex and gender assignment; the third way?, S F Ahmed, S Morrison, I A Hughes, Archives of Disease in 
Childhood 2004;89:847-850. 
4Sex Assignment in Conditions Affecting Sex Development, Markosyan R, Ahmed SF, J Clin Res Pediatr 
Endocrinol. 2017;9(Suppl 2):106-112. 
5 Calculated based on estimates of the size of the population of the uk at 66.65 million and estimates of the 
transgender population of the UK being approximately 500000 as reported in Government Equalities Office, 
Trans people in the UK factsheet, Located at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/721642/GEO-
LGBT-factsheet.pdf, accessed 05/08/2021 
6 A map of gender-diverse cultures, PBS Independent lens, August 2015, Located at 
https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/content/two-spirits_map-html/, accessed 11/01/2021 
7 Clinical intervention and embodied subjectivity: atypically sexed Children and their Parents, Katrina Roen, 




evolving understanding. For the purposes of this thesis it is hoped that it is sufficient to state 
that when the term sex is used in this thesis it refers to one’s physical characteristics, whereas 
gender is used it refers to one’s gender identity, which is constructed in reference to both 
one’s individual characteristics and the interactions of society with those characteristics8. 
Transgender people are those whose gender identity does not match the sex they are assigned 
at birth9. Similarly cisgender refers to those who do identify with the gender identity they are 
assigned at birth10. It should be noted that because issues of personal identity can be hugely 
complex these definitions are not used by everyone, and there are those who would be 
defined as transgender or cisgender under these definitions who would not identify as such. 
These definitions should not be used to challenge or deny any person’s identity, but are used 
in this context to identify groups of persons with shared characteristics relevant to the 
discussion of gender identity and recognition in the law. 
Transgender people have had a variety of different relationships with the law relating to 
gender over the course of history. The identity of transgender itself is relatively new 
originating in the 1960’s11. However despite the word itself being relatively new, there is 
evidence that being transgender is very much not a new phenomenon and has been regarded 
in a variety of different ways by diverse cultures and legal systems. One of the legal 
interactions of transgender people with the law relating to gender is that of legal gender 
recognition. Arguably, gender recognition occurs any time a person is recognised as any 
gender for any purpose. For example being addressed with a gendered title such as sir or miss 
can be regarded as an instance of gender recognition. However the term is often used to refer 
to specific instances of gender recognition, in particular cases of legal gender recognition. 
This refers to cases where the gender a person is recognised is determined by law or has some 
impact which is governed by the law or has some impact on a legal relationship. The 
specifics of how gender recognition works in different jurisdictions and in different situations 
will be discussed in more detail when it becomes relevant, however at this stage it is 
sufficient to note that gender recognition occurs in a variety of situations for a variety of 
reasons. This thesis, however cannot address, in an appropriate amount of detail, every act of 
gender recognition, nor even every act of legal gender recognition. This thesis focuses 
 
8 For a discussion of one possible model of gender and sex see Excluded : Making Feminist and Queer 
Movements More Inclusive, Serano, Julia. Seal Press, 2013, pages 138-168 
9 Glossary of terms, Stonewall, Located at https://www.stonewall.org.uk/help-advice/faqs-and-
glossary/glossary-terms, accessed 11/01/2021 
10 Ibid 
11 The Psychobiology of Transsexualism and Transgenderism, Bevan, Thomas E. (2014). page 42. 
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primarily on gender recognition in official documents, in particular birth certificates and 
passports. These documents are the focus of this thesis primarily due to their use in a broader 
variety of situations, as one’s gender / sex recorded on a passport or birth certificate is more 
commonly seen as / used as one’s authoritative legal gender12. In addition to legal documents 
this this is will also examine legal gender recognition in practice in a number of situations, in 
particular relating to prisons and marriage. These areas of examination were selected as they 
are areas where gender and sex are regarded as having high importance, have been the topic 
of judicial discussion on a number of occasions, and because the male / female estates of 
prisons and the institution of marriage in the jurisdictions examined have historically only 
gendered to two genders / sexes. Because both of these institutions have historically placed 
great importance on binary sex and gender it was decided that examining how these 
institutions accommodate, or fail to accommodate, intersex people and those with non-binary 
genders would be worth particular examination. It is, however worth noting that there are 
other, complex gender recognition situations which will not be addressed in this thesis, in 
particular in cases related to sport. The importance of anti-discrimination legislation will be 
addressed towards the end of this thesis, however the determination of gender / sex for the 
purpose of discrimination legislation is not examined in detail.  
 
For various reasons an increasing number of jurisdictions have adopted legislation for the 
purposes of regulating the progress of gender recognition, which govern what criteria a 
person must meet for their gender to be recognised in certain situations. Because these pieces 
of legislation govern who may be recognised as their gender identity if it differs from their 
sex assigned at birth, these pieces of legislation also represent an attempt by the law to define 
gender categories by defining how rigid or permeable the boundaries between them can be. 
In addition to the inherent complexities of defining gender identities and navigating social 
conceptions relating to gender and sex gender recognition legislation is also faced with the 
reality that the diversity of gender identities that exist is not always accounted for in the law. 
Gender recognition systems are mostly designed with a single function in mind; to allow 
those who wish to “change sex” to be legally recognised as the “opposite sex”13. In practice 
 
12 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 8 
December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 143 
13 This is evident in the many systems which only account for two genders, such as marriage. 
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because most legal systems recognise only two genders (male and female)14 their gender 
recognition systems only permit transition between the two binary genders. This can pose 
problems for those with gender identities which fall outside the male / female binary.  
Gender identities which are outside the male/female binary are referred to as non-binary15. 
Because this category is defined as including every identity other than binary identities it is 
inherently broad and includes a diverse range of identities with a variety of social and 
personal meanings. Again, it is worth noting that the definition of non-binary used here is not 
subscribed to by many who would otherwise fit into the non-binary category. Particularly 
noteworthy is the fact that some object to the use of the term non-binary to describe them, as 
they view the construct as having a western origin and as having colonial overtones in that it 
attempts to categorize identities with non-western origins through a western paradigm16. 
Examples of non-binary identities include those who identify as gender fluid, gender neutral, 
gender queer, twospirit, hijra, fa’afafine and androgynous17. As with transgender people those 
with non-binary identities appear to have existed in a variety of cultures throughout history 
and throughout the globe today. However despite their existence throughout history non-
binary identities are rarely catered to by legal systems. There are a number of possible causes 
of this, among which colonialism is a significant factor18. This is particularly worth keeping 
in mind when reading this thesis, as all of the jurisdictions chosen for discussion are heavily 
influenced by the British legal system due to colonialism.  
Legal systems which only recognise binary genders tend to consider only these options when 
making policy, as they are the only available options, either for legal reasons or because the 
concept of non-binary identities is not present in the minds of policy makers due to the 
culture they live in. This results policy decision being made regarding gender which only 
accommodate binary genders. For example marriage in these jurisdictions may be restricted 
to only one man and one woman, with no contemplation of the possible existence of a person 
who would belong in neither category. Under certain circumstances the negative impacts of 
 
14 For example that present in the UK, discussed at page 123 
15 Glossary of terms, Stonewall, Located at https://www.stonewall.org.uk/help-advice/faqs-and-
glossary/glossary-terms, accessed 11/01/2021 
16 Examples are given at Non-Binary Gender Registration Models in Europe, Report on third gender marker or 
no gender marker options, Holzer, Lena (2018), ILGA-Europe, located at https://www.ilga-
europe.org/sites/default/files/non-binary_gender_registration_models_in_europe_0.pdf, accessed 14/06/2020 
page 32 
17 A community compiled list of non-binary identities can be found at List of non-binary identities, Non-binary 
wiki, Located at https://non-binary.miraheze.org/wiki/List_of_non-binary_identities, accessed 12/01/2021 
18 Transgender warriors, Leslie Feinberg, Beacon press 1996 
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this can be reduced, as those with non-binary gender identities are usually denied gender 
recognition under this system, and assigned to one of the two binary categories. This avoids 
those with non-binary genders being left in a lacuna outside of the available categories.  
Recently a number of jurisdictions which previously recognised only binary gender 
categories have begun recognising non-binary options. There have been an array of reasons 
for this including recognitions that gender recognition should be seen as a right which should 
be afforded to all, including those with non-binary identities19. There have also been a 
number of recent court cases in which those with non-binary identities have argued they are 
entitled to recognition which have prompted jurisdictions to implement non-binary gender 
recognition20. Jurisdictions have also been motivated to recognise identities outside the binary 
in order to recognise the existence of intersex people21, although the intersex community do 
not always regard these measures as appropriate22. 
Despite the positive effects that expanding the scope of gender recognition can have, 
recognising non-binary identities can result in a number of complications. This comes as a 
result of implementing the recognition of these identities in a legal system includes many 
elements which were not designed with them in mind. This can include marriage being 
regarded as between a man and a woman, as well as other situations where gender or sex are 
regarded as having high importance such as the provision of gendered facilities such as 
bathrooms as well as prisons where men and women are housed in separate estates. These 
complications create a need for research on the implementation of non-binary gender 
identities and how legal systems adapt to accommodate them. 
 
Consideration of the legal recognition of gender identities beyond the binary is interlinked 
with the legal status of intersex people in a number of ways. Intersex people are those with 
physical characteristics which can result in difficulties in assigning them to one of the two 
 
19 The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 - Additional Principles and State Obligation on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics 
to Complement the Yogyakarta Principles, International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 10 November 2017, page 
9 
20 For one example see National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 
400 of 2012 
21 For an example see NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 
22 The “Normalization” of Intersex Bodies and “Othering” of Intersex Identities in Australia, Carpenter, M. 
Bioethical Inquiry 15, 487–495 (2018).     
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binary sexes23. There are a number of conditions, sometimes referred to as Disorders of 
Sexual Development (DSD’s) which can cause a person to be intersex24. These conditions are 
diverse and include physical differences to the structure of the genitals, genetic conditions, 
differences in hormone production and metabolism and differences in the structure and 
functioning of gonads25. Intersex conditions have been approached in a variety of ways by the 
law and various cultures over the years, including recognition as a separate sex, regarding 
intersex conditions as evidence of sin on the part of one’s parents and recognition as a 
medical disorder26.  The difficulty in assigning an intersex person to the male or female sexes 
has itself also been approached in a number of ways in those jurisdictions where such 
assignation has been necessary. The details of some of the approaches taken will be 
addressed when discussing historical approaches to sex and gender recognition, however it is 
worth noting that the courts have from time to time faced difficulty in determining the legal 
sex of intersex people27. The most common approach taken in the present day is to assign a 
sex based on the views of an interdisciplinary team of specialists as to what would be best for 
the child28.  Intersex people and their legal status are relevant when discussing non-binary 
genders for a number of reasons. Many jurisdictions do not recognise a difference between 
gender and sex. Because of this the status of intersex people as those who cannot be easily 
placed in binary categories may lend insight as to possible future methods of recognition for 
those with non-binary genders. For example the case of In the marriage of C29, which will be 
discussed in more detail later, demonstrates the difficulties that being “in-between” categories 
can pose when rights are allocated base on belonging to binary sexes, which may be 
analogous to the problems non-binary people may face being outside binary genders.  
Intersex people face their own unique issues separate from non-binary people. Of particular 
concern is the issue of surgeries performed on intersex infants which serve no medical 
purpose other than to ensure they conform to the physical norms of the sex to which they are 
 
23 Glossary of terms, Stonewall, Located at https://www.stonewall.org.uk/help-advice/faqs-and-
glossary/glossary-terms, accessed 11/01/2021 
24 Differences in sex development, Health A to Z, NHS, 2019 Located at 
https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/differences-in-sex-development/, accessed 12/01/2021 
25  Ibid 
26 As will be discussed at page 18 
27 For example W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 
28 Intersex and gender assignment; the third way?, S F Ahmed, S Morrison, I A Hughes, Archives of Disease in 
Childhood 2004;89:847-850. 
29 In the marriage of C and D (falsely called C) (1979) 35 FLR 340 
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assigned30 a practice that is often referred to as “IGM” (Intersex Genital Mutilation)31. These 
surgeries are conducted as medical professionals believe that they are necessary to prevent 
longer term harm including humiliation, ostracization and other mental health issues caused 
by “atypical” sex characteristics32. Historically these surgeries have been conducted without 
parental consent or with consent obtained under deception,33 with an element of “spin” used 
in obtaining consent in a number of modern cases34. It has been suggested that a fundamental 
motivation for these procedures is the social and legal need to assign children to a binary sex, 
and that if the legal need to record a binary sex at birth were removed by the introduction of 
an intersex classification this would at least lessen the pressure to assign a sex which is 
hypothesised to lead to these surgeries35. A number of jurisdictions have introduced intersex 
categories which can be assigned at birth36, however it is more common for jurisdictions to 
simply allow more time for a decision on a binary sex to be made37. Because of this the issue 
of intersex identity is interconnected with the issue of gender recognition, despite the 
situations of transgender and intersex people being different in a number of significant ways.  
It is worth noting that many in the intersex community do not seek recognition as a third sex, 
It has been argued that assigning intersex status at birth will lead to othering of intersex 
children, and that there is no evidence that allowing for intersex options at birth reduces the 
rate of surgeries on intersex infants38. The consensus, so far as one exists, in the intersex 
community appears to favour the removal of sex and gender from identity documents, but, if 
it must remain present on such documents intersex children should be assigned a binary sex, 
rather than a third option and have an option to have one’s gender / sex recognised according 
to the identity of the individual later in life39. 
 
30 The human rights of intersex people: addressing harmful practices and rhetoric of change, Morgan Carpenter 
(2016) , Reproductive Health Matters, 24:47, 74-84,  
31 Intersex Genital Mutilation – A Western Version of fgm, Melinda Jones, The International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 25(2):396-411 
32 "Ambiguous Sex" - Or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Intersexuality, Alice 
Domurat Dreger, 28 Hastings Centre Report 24 (1998) 
33 Intersexuality and the Law : Why Sex Matters, Julie Greenberg, 2012, page 110 paragraph 3 
34 Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law 's Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, Anne Tamar-Mattis, Berkeley 
Journal of Gender, Law & Justice Volume 21 | Issue 1, September 2013, Page 65 
35 Born intersex in Russia: The right to be recognized, Kondratenko, T. Prospekt Magazine, December 21 2016, 
Located at http://www.prospektmag.com/2016/12/intersex/, accessed 12/01/2021 
36 Such as New Zealand, see page 24 
37 See page 169 
38 The “Normalization” of Intersex Bodies and “Othering” of Intersex Identities in Australia, Carpenter, M. 
Bioethical Inquiry 15, 487–495 (2018). 








This thesis originated as an attempt to examine and compare the methods used to grant legal 
gender recognition to those with non-binary gender identities, with a particular focus on how 
aspects of the law which have historically only recognised two genders have adapted or fail 
to adapt to the existence of new gender categories. However as the research on this project 
progressed it became increasingly apparent that despite being different in many ways the 
issues of legal recognition of non-binary identities and the legal treatment of intersex people 
are heavily interlinked. For example the Norrie case in Australia, which represented a starting 
point in that nations recognition of gender identities other than male and female was initiated 
by a person wishing to be identified as intersex on their official documentation40. The desire 
to allow for legal recognition as neither male nor female has been cited as a possible strategy 
for preventing unnecessary surgeries on intersex infants, and has been given as a reason for 
expanding legal recognition in a number of jurisdictions41.  
There is a long history of legal entanglement of the recognition of transgender and intersex 
people, for example in Corbett v Corbett one of the expert witnesses commented that 
transgender people could be regarded as a sub category of intersex people, where the 
variation was in the brain rather than the sexual characteristics42. It is apparent that while 
there are profound differences between the situations of intersex people and those with non-
binary gender identities, although the groups do sometimes overlap, similar issues relating to 
legal recognition impact both groups, who can suffer harm due to their identities or bodies 
being legally unintelligible.  
As such this thesis examines approaches to intersex legal recognition as well as non-binary 
gender recognition, as many jurisdictions conflate sex and gender in their law, and others 
have expanded their legal recognition systems in order to accommodate intersex people, 
making it difficult to fully separate an analysis of the recognition of gender and sex.  
 
40 NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 
41 Born intersex in Russia: The right to be recognized, Kondratenko, T. Prospekt Magazine, December 21 2016, 
Located at http://www.prospektmag.com/2016/12/intersex/, accessed 12/01/2021 




The thesis is a comparative examination of legal gender recognition measures in Australia, 
New Zealand, India and the UK. These jurisdictions were chosen as, when the project began 
in 2016, the first three were among the first jurisdictions to implement the recognition of 
legal categories other than male and female, with the intent of the project to be to compare 
the implementation of this in each jurisdiction to identify strengths and weaknesses which 
could contribute to a future model of best practice. Each of these countries represented 
different context for the legal recognition of non-binary genders or of intersex people. New 
Zealand had been recognising intersex legal status on birth certificates since 1995 due to 
legislation43, whereas recognition of non-binary identities in Australia appeared to progress as 
a result of the Norrie case. India had similarly recently produced a court decision regarding 
gender recognition that appeared to require the recognition of non-binary genders44. While 
India was somewhat similar to Australia, in so much as both appeared to be making progress 
regarding gender recognition due to court decisions, it appeared to be a valuable inclusion in 
this research as its own right, due to the unique cultural history of non-binary genders in 
India, which could render its implementation of gender recognition distinct from that taken in 
other jurisdictions. Other jurisdictions, in particular France and Germany, were also 
considered for inclusion in this research. However the decision was eventually made to focus 
on the other four jurisdictions instead. This decision was made for a number of reasons, in 
particular the fact that, as the project progressed, the scope of what would be required became 
more apparent, which made the inclusion of these jurisdictions less viable due to workload 
and scope considerations. The fact that legal resources from these countries were not likely to 
be readily available in English, and that sufficient resources for translation were not available 
also made their inclusion more difficult. Additionally, the fact that neither France nor 
Germany are common law jurisdictions and have their own distinct legal systems and 
traditions would have made the research and analysis necessary to incorporate them into the 
project much more complex. As research progressed it became apparent that the UK should 
be included amongst the jurisdictions examined. This is because all three of the nations 
originally selected are former UK colonies, and as such inherited a significant amount of its 
original law on gender recognition. This made the jurisdictions more directly comparable, as 
they share a common ancestor. As such a more detailed examination of the UK law appeared 
 
43 Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, Public Act 1995 No.16 
44 National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
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to be called for. Additionally the law in the UK on gender recognition has developed in its 
own distinct direction from the other three jurisdictions, thus providing another point of 
comparison regarding how the issue of legal gender recognition can be addressed. The UK 
also provides a particularly interesting point of comparison as it is the sole jurisdiction in the 
sample not to recognise any non-binary gender or sex category. In 2015 the UK Women and 
Equalities Committee released a report on the legal status of transgender people, which 
recommended a number of changes to the law relating to gender recognition, including a 
recommendation that the possibility of recognising intersex legal status be investigated and 
considered45. This further suggested that the UK should be included as a jurisdiction to be 
examined in this thesis as it is a jurisdiction that may be developing towards legal recognition 
of non-binary gender / sex identities, and thus pay be an example of a jurisdiction either at a 
different “phase of evolution” towards non-binary gender recognition, or one following a 
totally different pathway. The position of the UK as a jurisdiction that provided both the 
foundation of the law in the other jurisdictions, and as one in which the conditions and 
notions regarding non-binary gender recognition are still developing makes it interesting and 
worthwhile to include. 
This thesis was not designed with any particular argument or conclusion in mind. The 
approach taken was to examine the jurisdictions in question and attempt to discern what each 
jurisdiction did to address the issue of gender and sex recognition, how these solutions 
functioned, and whether an solution or set of solutions appear to produce better outcomes 
than others. As “better” can be a fairly ambiguous term, it is best to explain that in this 
context outcomes were considered to be “better” if they respected the wishes of the local 
transgender and intersex communities, produced accessible and consistent results and were in 
keeping with the understanding of gender as a human right.  
The approach taken in this thesis, that of identifying a “problem”, in this case “how should 
the gender identities of those with non-binary genders, be addressed, as well as the identities 
of intersex people?”, and examining how differing jurisdictions address the problem can be 
seen as a form of functional comparative legal approach46. It is hoped that by examining how 
different jurisdictions seek to answer the same questions that their approaches can be 
compared, allowing the identification of situations in which one approach may avoid 
 
45 House of commons Women and Equalities Committee, Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-
2016 HC 390 Published on 14 January 2016, Located at  
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, accessed 07/01/2021 
46 An introduction to comparative law theory and method. Samuel, G., Hart Publishing, (2017), page 65 
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particular problems encountered by another jurisdiction. It is worth noting that the 
jurisdictions selected for examination in this thesis, while they share certain aspects of their 
legal frameworks also differ in a number of significant ways, including differing cultural 
norms, which include differing understandings of gender. This necessarily has an impact on 
the approach taken in each jurisdiction to gender recognition, meaning that any attempt to 
compare the approaches taken to legal gender recognition should take this into account47.  
 
This thesis, although it takes a functional approach, does not take the approach of a case 
study, of comparing the solutions taken in similar cases in different jurisdictions48. While 
there is a component of case examination, this thesis seeks to examine the broader impacts of 
non-binary gender identities and intersex status on those elements of a legal system where 
they are relevant. As such this thesis, as was pointed out during viva, takes an approach in 
some ways akin to a thematic analysis. It does so by treating each legal system of gender 
recognition as a “text” which can be compared to others49 in order to extract common themes 
or differences in their approaches to legal gender recognition. This has enabled the 
identification of both strong and problematic practices in the jurisdictions examined, as well 
as themes which have appeared to emerge which exist in the jurisdictions in question, which 
have been synthesised to result in the creation of the recommendations in the final chapter 
which may assist those contemplating models of best practice in relation to the gender / sex 
recognition of intersex people and those with non-binary gender identities. Due to the legal 
similarities of the jurisdictions examined it should be noted that while some 
recommendations may be more broadly applicable, their application in legal systems outside 
of those discussed in this thesis has not been examined. 
This thesis does not attempt to explain in any detail the existence of transgender or intersex 
people. Other publications are far better suited to this task. While it is recognised that the 
issue of whether transgender identities should be recognised at all, this issue has been 
addressed in other works far more proficiently and in more detail than could be done here. 
This thesis approaches the issue of gender recognition as one of human rights and thus is 
 
47 Introduction to comparative law, (3rd rev. ed.). Zweigert, K., & Kötz, H., Clarendon Press, (1998), page 35 
48 An introduction to comparative law theory and method. Samuel, G., Hart Publishing, (2017), page 71 
49 Similar to the thematic analysis method described in Victoria Clarke & Virginia Braun (2017) Thematic 
analysis, The Journal of Positive Psychology, 12:3, 297-298 
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written from the perspective that gender recognition should be made available to all people, 




Discussing the history of intersex and transgender people is made somewhat complicated by 
the fact that the concepts of sex and gender have been understood in a number of different 
ways in various times and places. As such it is difficult to say “(historical figure x) was non-
binary” when they did not identify as such. In a number of cultures, particularly in western 
Europe, the concepts of gender and sex have historically been largely combined and conflated 
with each other, so the concept of being a person with anatomy that suggests one sex, but an 
identity that does not match that corresponding to the social roles assigned to that society was 
not widely contemplated, thus making identifying as such largely impossible. Even in cases 
where a person assuming a gendered role unrelated to their sex are well documented, such as 
in the case of sworn virgins50, these individuals would not necessarily identify in transgender 
the way many transgender people do, due to the modern western concept of being 
transgender is heavily related to dysphoria (which need not be present but often is) and 
transition, be it medical or social or both51.  
Recognition of gender identities that we would consider non-binary have existed throughout 
time in a number of cultures, including in India, North America, Indonesia and Samoa, which 
have recognised more than two gender categories52. However discussing these identities in 
the context of legal gender recognition is somewhat difficult, as many of them were either 
never legally recognised, or were recognised within an oral tradition. The legal systems 
which have recognised these identities are often very different from the common law systems 
used in the jurisdictions examined in the present day, largely due to the impact of 
colonialism. It is also worth being aware that the term “non-binary” itself is often regarded as 
contributing to cultural imperialism, as it erases specific identities originating in different 
cultural contexts by substituting the specific terms for those identities with that for the 
 
50 The linguistic expression of gender identity: Albania’s “sworn virgins”, Carly Dickerson, International 
Journal of the Sociology of Language, Volume 2019, Issue 256, Pages 57–83 
51 A Case for the Demedicalization of Queer Bodies, Erik Eckhert, Yale J Biol Med. 2016 Jun; 89(2): 239–246. 
52 A map of gender-diverse cultures, PBS Independent lens, August 2015, Located at 
https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/content/two-spirits_map-html/, accessed 11/01/2021 
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umbrella term which is understood within the modern western heavily medicalised 
understanding of sex and gender53. As such the discussion of the history of the treatment of 
transgender people in the chapters that follow will be restricted to legal treatment within the 
modern legal systems of the respective jurisdictions, except for when it is relevant. This 
should not be interpreted as a claim that there was no history of legal recognition of these 
groups before this. Instead this is because the difficulty of that additional research would 
have extended the length of this project beyond viability.  
It is somewhat easier to discuss intersex individuals in history, as individuals with 
“ambiguous” sexual characteristics have been well documented and have been subject to a 
number of court cases and discussion among scholars for as long as the concept of a scholar 
has existed. 
As such the early history of intersex legal and medical treatment will be discussed here, as it 
is much better documented than the early history of transgender people, and includes cases 
from jurisdictions which are not the focus of any of the chapters to follow, as these cases are 
illustrative of the various issues and modes of thinking associated with the legal recognition 
of intersex people. 
Intersex people have been understood to exist throughout human history, with their existence 
being the focus of a number of folk tales or myths. For example the story of Hermaphroditus 
in Ovid’s Metamorphosis describes Hermaphroditus as the original hermaphrodite, who’s 
body exhibited both male and female traits after being merged with the body of the nymph 
Salmacis after she pled to the gods to be merged with Hermaphroditus as he was fending off 
her forcible amorous advancements. Hermaphroditus then cursed the pool he had been 
bathing in at the time, that it would render all who bathed in it “weakened” as he had been54. 
This story contains a number of misapprehensions about what it means to be intersex, as well 
as misogynist overtones, and in that respect resembles a great deal of thinking on the nature 
of intersex people. For example the story imagines intersex people as a literal “merging” of 
man and woman, an idea which resembles later statements on intersex people as having a 
“blending” of male and female characteristics, in which one or the other may predominate. It 
also imagines intersex people as being inherently weakened by their characteristics, an idea 
 
53 Two-Spirit Identity in a Time of Gender Fluidity, Margaret Robinson, Journal of Homosexuality, 2020, 67:12, 
1675-1690 
54 Metamorphoses book 4, Ovid, Located at classics.mit.edu/Ovid/metam.4.fourth.html, accessed 14/01/2021 
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which appears to have persisted into the present day in certain regards, as evidenced by the 
surgical “correction” of intersex children in cases when it has not been medically necessary.  
Pliny the Elder also discussed Intersex people, referring to them as hermaphrodites, a term 
that would be commonly used to refer to intersex people until the first uses of the word 
intersex in 191755. Intersex people are described by Pliny as being once considered portents, 
but now as entertainments56. They are discussed in the same paragraph as stories of a woman 
giving birth to a snake and a centaur being born as a portent heralding the start of the Marsian 
war, later known as the social war57. While Pliny devotes little time to the discussion of 
intersex people, both visions of intersex people that he described have persisted much later 
into history. 
 In particular the notion of intersex people as portents or as having some mystical aspect to 
their nature persisted into the 17th century, with intersex people discussed in Aristotle’s 
Masterpiece58 alongside children born with wings and hooves due to the sins of their mother.  
A particularly notable case from this period of time is that of Thomas/Thomasine Hall in 
162959. Hall found themselves at the attention of the court for "dressing in weoman apperel" 
and for alleged fornication with a maid. When asked if they were a man or a woman, Hall 
responded that they were both60. When faced with the question of determining Halls gender 
their history was no help, as they were christened as Thomasina and raised during their early 
life as female, then served in the military as a man, then, after returning from war, returned to 
living as a woman becoming a seamstress before travelling to Virginia as an indentured 
servant. When faced with this question the court enquired about Halls physical sex, Halls 
anatomy is described as what would now be classified as “ambiguous genitalia” in a manner 
consistent with what one might expect from a number of intersex conditions, with what 
 
55 Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex, Alice Domurat Dreger, Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998, Page 31 paragraph 1 
56 Natural Histories, Pliny the Elder, Located at 
http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:latinLit:phi0978.phi001.perseus-eng1:7.3, accessed 14/01/202, book 7 
chapter 3 
57 Ibid 
58 The Masterpiece and other works, "Aristotle, the Famous Philosopher", Ex-classics Project, 2010, Located at 
https://www.exclassics.com/arist/arist.pdf, accessed 28/12/2020, page 197 
59 From "The Scarlet Letter" to Stonewall: Reading the 1629 Thomas(ine) Hall Case, 1978–2009, WICHELNS, 
K. (2014) Early American Studies, 12(3), 500-523. 
60 Impossible Hermaphrodites: Intersex in America, 1620–1960 Elizabeth Reis September 2005 The Journal of 
American History 411, Located at 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/healarts/studies/alternatives/Alt%20PDFs/Hermaphrodites_Reis.pdf, accessed 
12/01/2021, page 419 paragraph 1 
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seems to be an enlarged clitoris, and “an piece of an hole” which may be a description of a 
partly fused labia61.  
The court in this case reached a particularly interesting conclusion, which is worth being 
mindful of despite the fact that it was not followed in subsequent similar cases. The court 
Reached the conclusion that Hall truly was a mixture of male and female, and mandated that 
they dress in men's clothes, but with a head covering and apron as was expected of women62. 
This stance essentially consigned Hall to a third category, of which they were the sole 
member. By so doing not only did the court refuse to allow Hall to choose their own gender, 
but in consigning them to their own category, with their own dress code they essentially 
stripped hall of their right to conceal their status if they wished, marking Hall out as abnormal 
forever. This case therefore marks one of the first instances of a western legal system 
recognising a person as neither male nor female, and can serve as an example of how 
assigning a person to such a category against their will can be equally oppressive to assigning 
someone to a binary category contrary to their autonomy, arguably even more so.  
Following this legal and medical opinion appeared to converge on a consensus regarding as 
to how the issue of an intersex person’s sex / gender should be addressed. As James Parsons 
wrote in 1741:  
“Predominancy of Sex . . . ought to be regarded; but if the Sexes seem equal, the Choice is 
left to the Hermaphrodite.”63 
As such determining predominancy of sex would become the key issue around which future 
cases would revolve. However it appears though physicians developed a reluctance to ever 
find that a person had equal predominance of both sexes, which would have granted them the 
right to choose how they should be treated64. For example the 1863 case of M.B.H. Who, 
despite being described by the doctor as having a “nearly an equal blending of male and 
female natures” was determined to have a “preponderance of woman”. Amongst the evidence 
 
61 Impossible Hermaphrodites: Intersex in America, 1620–1960 Elizabeth Reis September 2005 The Journal of 
American History 411, Located at 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/healarts/studies/alternatives/Alt%20PDFs/Hermaphrodites_Reis.pdf, accessed 
12/01/2021, page 418 paragraph 2 
62 Ibid 
63  A Mechanical and Critical Enquiry into the Nature of Hermaphrodites, James Parsons, Sagwan Press, 1741 
64 Impossible Hermaphrodites: Intersex in America, 1620–1960 Elizabeth Reis September 2005 The Journal of 
American History 411, Located at 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/healarts/studies/alternatives/Alt%20PDFs/Hermaphrodites_Reis.pdf, accessed 
12/01/2021, page 438 paragraph 2 
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used was the M.B.H. expressed no sexual desire towards either sex, which seems telling of 
the sexual stereotypes at the time and the conflation of gender and sex roles, as well as the 
tenuous grounds on which an individual could be denied autonomy over their own identity65. 
 
This tendency to find a person to be one sex or another came to rely on the use of tools of 
categorization which became more sophisticated along side the development of science. 
Physicians began to characterise individuals as “true hermaphrodites” or “pseudo 
hermaphrodites”, with the requirements to be recognised as a true hermaphrodite becoming 
increasingly restrictive66. Illustrative of this is that the criteria used by a number of physicians 
changed from a mixture of male and female characteristics in more than one “zone” of the 
body67 to the more restrictive requirement of requiring that the person possess ovotestis, an 
organ which is a mixture of ovarian and testicular tissue68 as microscopy technology 
improved and became more widely used. This led to what has been described as the erasure 
of intersex people, as it became increasingly difficult for a person to be recognised as 
genuinely intersex. As this continued the view that “hermaphrodites” did not exist, for 
example John North in 1810 wrote that: 
“Although we see many instances of true hermaphrodism in the animal and 
vegetable kingdoms, no such cases have ever existed in the human subject; no human 
hermaphrodite, in the proper sense of the term, has ever existed; not a single so-called 
hermaphrodite in man has even been capable of performing the sexual functions of both 
sexes.”69 
This serves as an example of how the focus had shifted from determining predominance to a 
focus on “sexual functions” as the functioning of the reproductive system became better 
understood.  
 
65 Impossible Hermaphrodites: Intersex in America, 1620–1960 Elizabeth Reis September 2005 The Journal of 
American History 411, Located at 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/healarts/studies/alternatives/Alt%20PDFs/Hermaphrodites_Reis.pdf, accessed 
12/01/2021, page 435, paragraph 3 
66 Impossible Hermaphrodites: Intersex in America, 1620–1960 Elizabeth Reis September 2005 The Journal of 
American History 411, Located at 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/healarts/studies/alternatives/Alt%20PDFs/Hermaphrodites_Reis.pdf, accessed 
12/01/2021, page 412, paragraph 2 
67 Sexing the body, Anne Fausto-sterling, basic books, 2000. 37 para 2 
68 Sexing the body, Anne Fausto-sterling, basic books, 2000. 38 para 1 
69  A lecture on monstrosities, Delivered at the Middlesex hospital School of medicine Feb 22 1810, John North, 
The Lancet London: A Journal of British and Foreign Medicine, Surgery, Obstetrics, Physiology, Chemistry, 
Pharmacology, Public Health and News, Volume 1, 913-920, Page 912 
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A case from this era which has been widely discussed is that of Herculine Barbin, who was 
classified as male based on medical examinations in 186070. As a result of the medical 
examination a court found that she should be classified as male, and she lived the rest of her 
life as a man, despite being unhappy with this and describing the process as being “doomed 
to abandonment, to cold isolation”71.This acutely demonstrates the harms and injustices 
caused by classifying a person based on medical assessment without taking the autonomy of 
the individual into account, even in the absence of any surgical interference.  
As technology and medical understanding progressed surgery on people with intersex 
characteristics became more common. The first documented surgery of this kind being 
conducted in 1833 by Dr John Warren72, with “corrective” surgeries on intersex people 
becoming more common following Dr Money’s work in the 1950’s73. Dr Warren performed 
his surgery at the request of the patient74, however in contrast to this Dr Money is known for 
the view that if a successful surgery is performed on the patient as an infant they are raised 
correctly, they will adapt to be a happy, typical member of the assigned sex75. Despite the 
high-profile case of David Reimer76 this view appears to have become increasingly common, 
with conducting such surgeries becoming routine practice in the decades to follow77. 
Surgeries conducted on infants without parental consent have been documented, as have a 
number of cases where “spin” is used to obtain parental consent78. A number of medical 
practitioners have commented that careful use of language, which may result in parents not 
being fully and accurately informed, is necessary in order to avoid instilling doubts as to their 
child’s sex in the parents, which would be harmful to the child79. A number of jurisdictions 
have now banned such procedures80, although these measures have also been criticised as 
 
70 Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex, Alice Domurat Dreger, Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998, Page 18 paragraph 3 
71Herculine Barbin. Being the recently discovered memoirs of a nineteenth-century hermaphrodite, introduced 
by Michel Foucault, translated by Richard McDougall, Brighton, Sussex, Harvester Press, 1980, 87 paragraph 2 
72 Non-existence of Vagina, Remedied by an Operation, John C. Warren, American Journal of the Medical 
Sciences, 13 (Nov. 1833), 79–80. 
73 Man and woman, boy and girl: Differentiation and dimorphism of gender identity from conception to 
maturity, Money, J., & Ehrhardt, A. A. (1972) Johns Hopkins U. Press. 
74 Non-existence of Vagina, Remedied by an Operation, John C. Warren, American Journal of the Medical 
Sciences, 13 (Nov. 1833), 79–80. 
75 Managing intersex, Sarah Creighton, Catherine Minto, BMJ. 2001 Dec 1; 323(7324): 1264–1265. 
76 Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law 's Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, Anne Tamar-Mattis, Berkeley 
Journal of Gender, Law & Justice Volume 21 | Issue 1, September 2013, page 59 
77 Managing intersex, Sarah Creighton, Catherine Minto, BMJ. 2001 Dec 1; 323(7324): 1264–1265. 
78 Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law 's Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, Anne Tamar-Mattis, Berkeley 
Journal of Gender, Law & Justice Volume 21 | Issue 1, September 2013, Page 65 
79 Ibid 
80 For example in 2015 Malta passed the Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act 2015 
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being poorly implemented and occasionally not containing sufficient sanctions81. However 
these surgeries are still performed in a number of jurisdictions, including the UK82.  
This leads to the modern status quo in most jurisdictions, where intersex identities are not 
consistently recognised and the determination of the sex of intersex people is directly linked 
to surgical procedures which are regarded by many intersex people as genital mutilation83. 
Because these surgeries are performed to enable a person to better fit into the male/female 
sexual binary a number of intersex people have sought to have their identities recognised 
outside the binary, both due to their own personal identities, but also in the hope that this will 
remove the necessity for a person to be classified as male or female84. It is hoped that this 
will eliminate the need for surgeries to be conducted on intersex infants, however this is 
disputed due to a lack of evidence85.  
Specifics about the recent legal history in each jurisdiction will be discussed in their 
individual chapters. There is one chapter for each of the jurisdictions examined which will 
detail the substantive law and relevant issues in those jurisdictions. This will then be followed 
by a concluding chapter, which will analyse the differences in the jurisdictions and then 
provide recommendations based on this examination for the use of those considering the legal 







81 Intersex Genital Mutilations, NGO Report to the 3rd to 6th Report of Malta to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, Compiled by StopIGM.org, Markus Bauer, Daniela Truffer, 2019, Located at 
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CRC/Shared%20Documents/MLT/INT_CRC_NGO_MLT_34709_E.pdf, 
accessed 14/01/2021 
82 Intersex Genital Mutilations, NGO Report to the 8th Report of the United Kingdom on the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Compiled by StopIGM.org, Markus Bauer, Daniela 
Truffer, 2018, Located at 
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/GBR/INT_CEDAW_ICO_GBR_31475_E
.pdf, accessed 14/01/2021 
83 Intersex Genital Mutilation – A Western Version of fgm, Melinda Jones, The International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 25(2):396-411 
84 Born intersex in Russia: The right to be recognized, Kondratenko, T. Prospekt Magazine, December 21 2016, 
Located at http://www.prospektmag.com/2016/12/intersex/, accessed 12/01/2021 
85 The “Normalization” of Intersex Bodies and “Othering” of Intersex Identities in Australia, Carpenter, M. 





















While New Zealand recognises non-binary sexes and genders it cannot be said to do so 
consistently. This is because while the two concepts do not seem to be treated as legally 
distinct86, the process of having one’s gender or sex recognised is not consistent among the 
various different documents which recognise gender or sex, or contain it as a mandatory 
field87. This is the case because New Zealand, does not have a statutory definition of either 
sex or gender or any way of having one’s gender recognised for all purposes88. This lack of a 
definitive definition or method of recognition has resulted in a status-quo in which different 
 
86As can be seen by the apparent use of the terms interchangeably in the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and 
Relationships Registration Act 1995 
87As can be seen by the differences in requirements for the various documents as outlined later. 
88 Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf, accessed 17/12/2020 at 8.5 
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identity documents have different gender recognition criteria, and each document is 
authoritative only in its own area89. 
 
Because of the patchwork nature of this system of gender recognition, each part must be 
addressed separately in turn, as the procedures for amending each of the relevant official 
documents which recognise gender are all equally authoritative parts of the gender 
recognition system. Birth certificates shall be addressed first, followed by citizenship 
certificates, passports and driver’s licenses. Following an examination of these systems it is 
also necessary to see how these systems impact people in practice and interact with different 
areas of the law. The areas of marriage and prisons are of particular interest due to substantial 
role played by gender in these systems, as gender can impact who a person may marry, and 
can have substantial impacts if a person must spend time in prison, particularly as it 




Birth certificates are governed by the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships 
Registration Act 199590. All births must be registered, and sex must be recorded. At birth sex 
may be recorded as male, female or indeterminate. Alterations to the birth certificate after 
birth with regards to sex are addressed primarily by section 28. Section 28 contains within it 
two paths to recognition, one for those who can demonstrate that their sex on their birth 
certificate was recorded in error, and one for those who were assigned the “correct” sex at 
birth and wish to have their sex on their birth certificate amended to reflect either their gender 
identity or current physical sex following surgery. 
 
The first criteria, for those who can demonstrate error in the original certificate are fairly 
simple. Section 28 (a) states that a family court declaration may be made to amend the birth 
certificate if: 
 
89For example birth certificates are not authoritative in all areas. 
90Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, Public Act 1995 No.16 
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“It is satisfied either that the applicant's birth is registrable under this Act but is not yet 
registered, or that there is included in the record of the applicant's birth— 
Information that the applicant is a person of the sex opposite to the nominated sex; or 
Information that the applicant is a person of indeterminate sex”91 
 
This process allows for people to have their birth certificate corrected if there was, at time of 
birth, reason to suspect that they may be the sex other than recorded. This process seems to 
exist to correct the sex recorded in instances where there was medical uncertainty, rather than 
a clerical error, which is dealt with by section 84 of the act92. It is worth noting that this does 
not allow a person to have their sex registered as indeterminate if it was not recorded as such 
originally. While it is possible for a person’s sex to be recorded as indeterminate at birth it is 
not possible to have it amended from being registered as male or female to indeterminate 
using section 2893. It is however possible to have one’s sex amended to be indeterminate 
using section 84. This requires that there was evidence that this was the case at birth. As such 
it cannot be used if the “indeterminate state” arose after birth, as the process under section 84 
is for correcting clerical errors94, and no error would have been made if there was no 
indeterminacy at birth. This section is interesting as it seems to treat indeterminacy as 
something undesirable, which may be resolved and transitioned out of, but which is not a 
state one may enter voluntarily or willingly later in life. In this way it can be seen as less 
liberal than other systems of recognition which recognise an “indeterminate” sex, as it only 
permits passage out of it this state. It is possible that the original drafters of this legislation 
saw “indeterminacy” as an unfortunate physical state, not an identity one could embrace. 
Because this legislation does not include any provision to recognise an intersex person if their 
physical state was not recorded at birth, and relies on physical characteristics, it seems that 
the purpose of this legislation is not to recognise an intersex person’s identity. While they 
may choose to be recognised as male or female at a later point in time, and that may reflect 
 
91Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, Public Act 1995 No.16 s.28 
92Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, Public Act 1995 No.16 s.84 
93Department of Internal Affairs, General information regarding Declarations of Family Court as to sex to be 
shown on birth certificates, located at 
https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/GeninfoDeclarationsofFamilyCourt/$file/GeninfoDeclarationso
fFamilyCourt.pdf, accessed 17/12/2020 page 4 para 7 which is an explanation of section 28 (a) ii 
94Department of Internal Affairs, General information regarding Declarations of Family Court as to sex to be 
shown on birth certificates, located at 
https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/GeninfoDeclarationsofFamilyCourt/$file/GeninfoDeclarationso
fFamilyCourt.pdf, accessed 17/12/2020, page 4 para 6 
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their gender identity, there seems to be no mechanism for recognising an intersex identity, as 
the determination is made based on physical characteristics at birth95. As such the recognition 
of an indeterminate state seems not to be to recognise a person’s identity and make it easier 
for them to function within society, instead it may well exist solely to take pressure off of 
parents to allocate their child a gender at birth, as it, and the issue of sex, can be resolved 
later. 
 
The second process is usually used for gender recognition of transgender people, the 
applicable subsection being (3)(b), which reads: 
The Court shall issue the declaration if, and only if,— 
(b) It is satisfied that the applicant is not a person of the nominated sex, but— 
(i) Has assumed and intends to maintain, or has always had and intends to maintain, the 
gender identity of a person of the nominated sex; and 
 (ii) Wishes the nominated sex to appear on birth certificates issued in respect of the 
applicant; and 
(c) Either— 
(i) It is satisfied, on the basis of expert medical evidence, that the applicant— 
(A) Has assumed (or has always had) the gender identity of a person of the nominated sex; 
and 
(B) Has undergone such medical treatment as is usually regarded by medical experts as 
desirable to enable persons of the genetic and physical conformation of the 
applicant at birth to acquire a physical conformation that accords with the gender identity of a 
person of the nominated sex; and 
(C) Will, as a result of the medical treatment undertaken, maintain a gender identity of a 
person of the nominated sex; or 
 (ii) It is satisfied that the applicant's sexual assignment or reassignment as a person of the 
nominated sex has been recorded or recognised in accordance with the laws of a state for the 
 
95 "Change can never be ‘complete’”: the legal right to self-identification and incongruous bodies, Easterbrook-
Smith, G, (2020) 1 International Journal of Gender, Sexuality and Law 134, page 145 
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This section, inserted into the Act in 200997 allows a person to change the sex recorded on 
their birth certificate if they have assumed, or have always had, the gender identity “of a 
person of the nominated sex” and intend to maintain it98. They must also demonstrate that 
they have had medical treatment, which medical experts consider desirable to enable them to 
“acquire a physical conformation that accords with the gender identity of a person of the 
nominated sex”99. 
 
The meaning of this section is somewhat uncertain, as mentioned by the recent report by the 
Human Rights Commission on transgender people and the law100. The source of the 
uncertainty stems from the meaning of: 
 
“such medical treatment as is usually regarded by medical experts as desirable to enable 
persons of the genetic and physical conformation of the applicant at birth to acquire a 
physical conformation that accords with the gender identity of a person of the nominated 
sex”101 
 
This section has been applied inconsistently. As reported by the Human Rights Commission 
(HRC) many transgender people believed that this wording meant that they had to undergo 
“complete” surgical transition, involving genital surgery as well as hormonal treatment102. 
 
96 Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, Public Act 1995 No.16 s.28 Section 3 
97 Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Amendment Act 2008 (2008 No 48) Section 16(3) 
98Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, Public Act 1995 No.16 s.28 (3) b (i) 
99Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, Public Act 1995 No.16 s.28 (3) c (i) C 
100Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf, accessed 17/12/2020, at 8.28 
101The wording of the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, Public Act 1995 
No.16 s.28 (3) c (i) C 
102Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf, accessed 17/12/2020,  at 8.28 
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This interpretation was the most commonly used, although the advice given to those seeking 
a declaration varied103. This is not only a problem of a lack of consistency, but it also fails to 
acknowledge the realities of transgender people’s lives104.  Medical science is limited and as 
such it is not currently possible to produce consistently positive results, positive in this case 
meaning a desirable and functional physical state, especially in the case of those transitioning 
from female to male105. Of course this could be seen as being accounted for by the 
requirement for medical experts to find the treatment desirable, but it is not always106, which 
can pose a problem for consistency. Not only do the limits of medicine often prevent people 
from obtaining surgery, but people often choose not to get surgery for personal reasons. This 
was acknowledged in the HRC report, where it was suggested that the medical treatment 
requirement be removed.107. 
 
This uncertainty became the basis of "Michael' v Registrar - General of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages108. Michael had been assigned the gender of female at birth and had changed his 
name and begun hormonal treatment in accordance with the international standards of care109, 
but had not had genital surgery. This was not only because positive surgical outcomes are 
much more difficult to achieve for those individuals transitioning from female to male, and at 
the time this procedure was not available in New Zealand and the cost of having the 
procedure elsewhere was prohibitive110. The question at hand was to what degree surgery is 
 
103 Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf, accessed 17/12/2020,  at 6.21 
104Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf, accessed 17/12/2020, at 8.23 and 6.21 
105 Patient reported outcome measures and quality of life assessment in genital gender confirming surgery, 
Geolani W. Dy, Ian T. Nolan, James Hotaling, Jeremy B. Myers, Transl Androl Urol. 2019 Jun; 8(3): 228–240, 
Located at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6626309/, accessed 28/12/2020 
106As shown by the advice people were given which failed to consider this, mentioned in Human rights 
commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by transgender 
people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf, accessed 17/12/2020,  at 6.21 
107 Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf , accessed 17/12/2020, at 8.44 
108"Michael" v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages Family court Auckland fam-2006004 2325 
9th June 2008m 28 FRNZ58 
109The standards of care are internationally agreed upon protocols for the treatment of gender dysphoria 
published by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health located at 
http://www.wpath.org/site_page.cfm?pk_association_webpage_menu=1351&pk_association_webpage=4655 
110 "Michael" v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages Family court aukland fam-2006004 2325 9th 
June 2008m 28 FRNZ58 at 15 
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necessary for subsection 3(c)(i)(B). In considering this question the court addressed two 
aspects, that of the opinions of medical experts and that of the intent of Parliament. 
 
In addressing the intent of Parliament, the court referred to the original bill, which contained 
different wording for the relevant section. The original111 read “all medical procedures 
usually regarded by medical experts as necessary”, which is significantly different from the 
current version, which reads “such medical treatment as is usually regarded by medical 
experts as desirable”. This, according to the court, represents a significant relaxation of the 
criteria, with the change from “all” to “such”, meaning that the medical transition need not be 
“complete”, particularly when coupled with the change in wording from necessary to 
desirable112. While these sentences could be seen as being largely similar, it may better reflect 
how doctors and patients see medical treatment for gender dysphoria and the medical process 
of gender transition. While many conditions are treated by administering the “necessary” 
treatment, gender dysphoria may be more complex. There is no one universal path which all 
transgender persons follow, with some seeking surgical procedures that others do not require, 
as their dysphoria is sufficiently addressed without them. As such there may be no one 
“necessary” treatment, merely “desirable” procedures and treatments which allow the patient 
to achieve a state where they are more able to live with their body and able to live within 
their gender to their satisfaction. The court also found that the use of the phrase “a physical 
conformation” rather than the use of “the physical conformation” suggests that surgery 
should not be seen as necessary, as the use of the word “a” suggests that Parliament 
acknowledged that complete conformity with the typical bodily template of the nominated 
sex was not necessary. It could also be seen as an acknowledgement that there is no single 
physical state that corresponds to a gender or sex, with multiple states still being valid. 
 
In addition to this the court also heard from medical experts, in particular the applicant’s 
psychiatrist, who said that the applicant had had all necessary treatment due to a combination 
of psychotherapy and hormonal treatments and that this would enabled him to pass as male. 
Other procedures, such as a hysterectomy, would be unnecessary and undesirable as 
 
111The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Bill No 193-1, 5/11/89. cl 29. 
112 Case Comment: "Michael" v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, Professor Nan 
Seuffert[2009] WkoLawRw 7; (2009) 17 Waikato Law Review 115 www.nzlii.org/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/nz/journals/WkoLawRw/2009/7.html?query=Michael%20v%20Registrar-
General%20of%20Births,%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages 118 para 1 
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unnecessary surgery should be avoided113. The court found that ‘the combination of the 
ongoing testosterone hormone therapy, and the surgery, mean that Michael will never exhibit 
the secondary sexual characteristics of breasts in future, and therefore will continue to 
physically conform in that respect to the nominated gender.’114 The court used an 
individualised test of what should be seen as necessary, stating  that “the applicant’s degree 
of comfort with, or physical conformity to their nominated gender identity is the proper focus 
of treatment decisions”115. 
 
While this ruling has been said to have clarified the issue, resulting in the government 
advising that genital surgery is not necessary116, this individualized approach could mean that 
in some cases genital surgery could be considered necessary based on individual 
circumstances. So while this judgement has been hailed as eliminating the uncertainty with 
regards to the medical treatment criteria, it may well be that this uncertainty still exists, but 
has been moved from the courts to medical professionals. It may now be medical 
professionals, rather than the courts, determining what should be considered necessary to 
attain gender recognition, and this may vary dramatically based on the circumstances of the 
individual. 
 
While section 28 does allow transgender and intersex people some degree of recognition, it is 
far from perfect. Despite Michael’s case large numbers of transgender people report 
uncertainty about the legal requirements for recognition117 and the changes recommended by 
 
113 Case Comment: "Michael" v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, Professor Nan 
Seuffert[2009] WkoLawRw 7; (2009) 17 Waikato Law Review 115 www.nzlii.org/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/nz/journals/WkoLawRw/2009/7.html?query=Michael%20v%20Registrar-
General%20of%20Births,%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages 119 para 1 
114"Michael" v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages Family court aukland fam-2006004 2325 9th 
June 2008m 28 FRNZ58 at 89 
115"Michael" v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages Family court aukland fam-2006004 2325 9th 
June 2008m 28 FRNZ58 at 69 
116 Case Comment: "Michael" v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, Professor Nan 
Seuffert[2009] WkoLawRw 7; (2009) 17 Waikato Law Review 115, Located at www.nzlii.org/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/nz/journals/WkoLawRw/2009/7.html?query=Michael%20v%20Registrar-
General%20of%20Births,%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages, Accessed 15/12/2020 119 para 3  
117 Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf , accessed 17/12/2020, at 8.44 
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the 2007 report have not been implemented, perhaps as they are perceived to have been made 
redundant by the Michael judgement118. 
 
This issue was particularly relevant, as starting in 2014 access to relevant surgical procedures 
became highly restricted in New Zealand due to the retirement of the only specialist surgeon 
in the country119. This resulted in an increase in prices which led the government to only fund 
three procedures for persons assigned female at birth and one for those assigned male at birth 
every two years, which resulted in an expected time on a waiting list of over 30 years120. 
This, while concerning of itself, represents a dramatic scarcity of medical procedures which 
could have been regarded as necessary for particular patients which would render the reliance 
on medical procedures problematic. Fortunately there seems to have been no instance of 
surgery being seen as necessary since the Michael case, however the amount of confusion on 
the issue mentioned by the 2007 report121  may mean that some people erroneously believed 
that they could not access legal gender recognition because they could not access surgery. 
This issue was addressed in 2018 when the government announced that the cap on the public 
funding of these procedures would be eliminated and replaced with a minimum number that 
will be funded122. 
 
In 2016 a bill was introduced to amend a number of aspects of the Births, Deaths, Marriages, 
and Relationships Registration Act, including gender recognition on birth certificates123. This 
bill would allow a person over the age of 16 to apply to change the sex on their birth 
 
118Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf at 9.33 
119 New Zealand reduces 30-year wait for gender reassignment surgery, Eleanor Ainge Roy, 19/10/2018, Located 
at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/oct/19/new-zealand-reduces-30-year-wait-for-gender-
reassignment-surgery, accessed 07/09/2019 
120 New Zealand reduces 30-year wait for gender reassignment surgery, Eleanor Ainge Roy, 19/10/2018, Located 
at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/oct/19/new-zealand-reduces-30-year-wait-for-gender-
reassignment-surgery, accessed 07/09/2019 
121Michael" v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages Family court aukland fam-2006004 2325 9th 
June 2008m 28 FRNZ58 at 69 
122 New Zealand reduces 30-year wait for gender reassignment surgery, Eleanor Ainge Roy, 19/10/2018, Located 
at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/oct/19/new-zealand-reduces-30-year-wait-for-gender-
reassignment-surgery, accessed 07/09/2019 
123 New Zealand Parliament, Parliamentary Business, Bills and laws, Bills (proposed laws), Births, Deaths, 





certificate to “Male, Female, Intersex or X (unspecified)”124, with Intersex and X being 
options not available under the current law.  Such an application would require a statutory 
declaration stating that the applicant is aware of the legal consequences of the application, 
that they identify as the nominated sex and that they intend to continue identifying as a 
member of that sex125.  If the applicant is aged 16-17 the application would also require a 
recommendation from a health professional confirming that the applicant identifies as the 
nominated sex and that registration of this is in their best interests126. Such an application 
would not be successfully if such an application was granted previously unless there are 
special reasons for granting the new application, meaning a person could only change their 
registered sex once in most circumstances127.  The “Special reasons” that would be required 
are not defined in the bill. At the time of writing this bill has made no progress since August 
2018128, with news reports suggesting that the passage of the bill is no longer being actively 
pursued129. 
 
Despite the lack of legislative progress despite multiple calls for reform, the law in New 
Zealand on this issue is far from static, with much of the change coming from various 
executive departments amending their procedures and requirements. While this is most 
notable with the other identity documents discussed in the following paragraphs, this practice 
has also impacted birth certificates, with the Minister for Internal Affairs announcing in 
August 2019 that the 95 NZD fee to change ones gender on their birth certificate would be 
abolished, as would the fee for having a new birth certificate issued130. 
 
124 Births, Deaths, Marriages and Relationships Registration Bill, Government Bill 296-2, Section 22B (1) and 
(2), Located at www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2017/0296/latest/DLM7273502.html, accessed 
07/09/2019 
125 Births, Deaths, Marriages and Relationships Registration Bill, Government Bill 296-2, Section 22B (2) (b), 
Located at www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2017/0296/latest/DLM7273502.html, accessed 
07/09/2019 
126 Births, Deaths, Marriages and Relationships Registration Bill, Government Bill 296-2, Section 22B (3), 
Located at www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2017/0296/latest/DLM7273502.html, accessed 
07/09/2019 
127 Births, Deaths, Marriages and Relationships Registration Bill, Government Bill 296-2, Section 22B (4), 
Located at www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2017/0296/latest/DLM7273502.html, accessed 
07/09/2019 
128 New Zealand Parliament, Parliamentary Business, Bills and laws, Bills (proposed laws), Births, Deaths, 
Marriages and Relationships Registration Bill, Located at https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-
laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_74854/births-deaths-marriages-and-relationships-registration, 
accessed 04/09/2019 
129 NZ Herald, Bill making it easier for trans people to update birth certificate deferred, 25/02/2019, Located at 
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12207173, accessed 03/09/2019 











Citizenship certificates, which serve as proof of citizenship for those who become New 
Zealand citizens after having originally been citizens elsewhere, used a similar procedure to 
the one for amending birth certificates. A citizenship certificate could be re-issued with a 
different sex if the applicant has had their gender recognised from another country, if there 
had been a family court declaration already issued in accordance with section 28131. A 
somewhat lesser standard was used for those who were already recognised as being intersex 
if they wished to have their citizenship certificate reflect another sex. For this a person was 
required to have a name which is either unisex or suitable for the nominated sex (the standard 
for this is unclear) and must be living “as a member of the nominated sex” and must complete 
a statutory declaration132. An intersex person was also able to opt to have no gender marked 
on their citizenship certificate, this option was also available to transgender people who are 
able to demonstrate they have been living as their nominated gender and have changed their 
name, but do not have a family court declaration133. An intersex person may also have had 
their gender recorded as indeterminate or intersex if they have a birth certificate that reflects 
this or can produce medical evidence134. These requirements may indicate that there may 
have been some conflation between sex and gender, as is also seen in section 28, as both 
 
certificate, accessed 07/09/2019 
131 Citizenship office policy for transgender and intersex applicants, The Department of Internal Affairs, Located 
at 
https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Citpol15Transgenderandintersexcitapp/$file/Citpol15Transgend
erandintersexcitapp.pdf  accessed 04/2017, page 2 para 1 
132 Citizenship office policy for transgender and intersex applicants, The Department of Internal Affairs, Located 
at 
https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Citpol15Transgenderandintersexcitapp/$file/Citpol15Transgend
erandintersexcitapp.pdf page 2 para 1 
133 Citizenship office policy for transgender and intersex applicants, The Department of Internal Affairs, Located 
at 
https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Citpol15Transgenderandintersexcitapp/$file/Citpol15Transgend
erandintersexcitapp.pdf page 2 para 2 
134Citizenship office policy for transgender and intersex applicants, The Department of Internal Affairs, Located 
at 
https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Citpol15Transgenderandintersexcitapp/$file/Citpol15Transgend
erandintersexcitapp.pdf page 2 para 3 
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assumed that there is a way of living which corresponds to having a certain sex. Citizenship 
certificates largely relied on Family Court declarations and the procedure for altering ones 
recorded sex if one is intersex is slightly more rigorous than that required by section 28 as it 
also requires a name change. The name change is an interesting requirement, as it seems odd 
that there would be sufficient public interest in preventing a person from having a sex 
recorded that did not “match” their name. In addition to this it seems as though it would be 
difficult to judge, as New Zealand does not have a list of permitted names divided by gender, 
instead requiring names to be confirmed135, with some names such as Messiah being 
routinely refused authorization136. The lack of such a list means that there is no definitive 
source for masculine and feminine names. This may mean that such determinations may rest 
on whether a particular judge happens to find a particular name to be gendered appropriately 
or sufficiently neutral. 
 
Since the original draft of this section the requirements to change ones gender on a 
citizenship certificate have changed, although the exact date of the change is not known, 
however use of the internet archive reveals that the policy was updated between January 
2016137 and April 2017138. Currently, as of September 2019, the requirements to change ones 
gender on their citizenship certificate are that an applicant fill in the required form for 
confirmation of citizenship and attach a statutory declaration which must include the gender 
the applicant wishes to be recognised on their citizenship certificate and how long they have 
been “living with” that gender identity139. This requires the payment of a fee of 112.40 
NZD140. 
 
135Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, Public Act 1995 No.16 section 18 
136 First it was justice, now it's Messiah: the rejected New Zealand baby names of 2015, located at 
www.stuff.co.nz/life-style/parenting/baby/79042121/First-it-was-Justice-now-its-Messiah-The-rejected-
New-Zealand-baby-names-of-2015 
137Internet Archive, Capture of 
http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Citpol15Transgenderandintersexcitapp/$file/Citpol15Transgend
erandintersexcitapp.pdf, January 26 2016, Located at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160126085320/http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Citpol15Transgen
derandintersexcitapp/$file/Citpol15Transgenderandintersexcitapp.pdf, accessed12/09/2019 
138Internet Archive, Capture of 
http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Citpol15Transgenderandintersexcitapp/$file/Citpol15Transgend
erandintersexcitapp.pdf, April 15 2017, Located at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160126085320/http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Citpol15Transgen
derandintersexcitapp/$file/Citpol15Transgenderandintersexcitapp.pdf, accessed12/09/2019 
139 Passports; citizenship and identity, Changing your gender, Choosing the gender on your citizenship record, 
New Zealand Government, Located at, https://www.govt.nz/browse/passports-citizenship-and-
identity/changing-your-gender/choosing-the-gender-on-your-citizenship-record/, accessed 10/09/2019 







In contrast to citizenship certificates, the altering of passports seems to have a less rigorous 
procedure for gender recognition. As well as allowing for identification as a third gender (X) 
a person’s gender can be altered on a passport simply by applying for a new passport and 
accompanying the passport with a statutory declaration141. It is worth noting that while a 
person can apply to have their gender on their passport as “M, F or X”142 the form for a new 
passport which must be filled in to change ones gender on their passport presents options 
only to be recognised as male or female.143 The application for a new passport has a required 
fee of 191 New Zealand Dollars, or more if the application is filed overseas144. There is no 
requirement for an additional fee for change of gender. The declaration does require some 
evidence as to how long a person has lived as the gender they wish recognised on the 
passport145, although no guidance is given as to what “maintaining” a gender means in this 
context. Aside from the requirement for evidence of “maintaining” one’s gender, this is 
somewhat similar to the self-identification model of gender recognition. This model, 
currently seen in Ireland146 and Malta147, allows a person to change their legal gender through 
a similar declaration. However these states use the self-identification model for sex on birth 
certificates, rather than solely for gender on passports. 
 
 
Zealand Government, Located at https://www.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7520~Application-for-confirmation-of-
NZ-citizenship-by-grant.pdf, accessed 10/09/2019 
141 The Department of Internal Affairs, Information about Changing Sex/Gender Identity, The Department of 
Internal Affairs, Located at https://www.passports.govt.nz/Transgender-applicants, accessed 04/09/2019 
142 Identity and passports, What you need to renew or apply for a passport, Information about changing sex / 
Gender Identity, Located at https://www.passports.govt.nz/what-you-need-to-renew-or-apply-for-a-
passport/information/, accessed 04/09/2019 
143 Application for a New Zealand Passport, PAS310 03/19, Page 1, Located at 
https://www.passports.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Forms/3db38de86c/Adult-new.pdf, accessed 04/09/2019 
144 Application for a New Zealand Passport, PAS310 03/19, Page 11, Located at 
https://www.passports.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Forms/3db38de86c/Adult-new.pdf, accessed 04/09/2019 
145 Identity and passports, What you need to renew or apply for a passport, Information about changing sex / 
Gender Identity, Located at https://www.passports.govt.nz/what-you-need-to-renew-or-apply-for-a-
passport/information/, accessed 04/09/2019 
146 Gender Recognition Act 2015 , Number 25 of 2015 
147 Gender Identity, Gender Short title. Expression and Sex Characteristics Act, 2015, Act No. 11 of 2015 
36 
 
Drivers’ licenses, similar to passports, can be amended simply through the completion of a 
statutory declaration which is available as a standard form148. The statutory declaration 
requires that the applicant state the gender they wish to be recognised as and how long they 
have “maintained” that gender149. However despite the requirement that the statutory 
declaration state how long a person has “maintained” that gender, there is no requirement that 
this be any particular minimum amount of time150.  This has a number of advantages over the 
procedure for passports. Particularly noticeable is that the use of a readily available standard 
form allows the procedure to be done by those with no legal knowledge fairly easily and that 
the omission of a requirement that someone be maintaining the nominated gender for a period 
of time avoids the possibly thorny issue of having to decide what counts as “maintaining” a 
gender. Jurisdictions with similar requirements typically avoid attempting to determine what 
“living as” a given gender means, instead assuming that doctors and other professionals will 
know it when they see it or by simply taking a change of name to be sufficient evidence, as 
can be seen in the UK, which as a part of its gender recognition process requires a person be 
“living in the other gender”151, but has no guidelines as to what that means. It is worth noting 
that gender is not recorded on the driver’s license physical document, so this process has no 
bearing on anything that appears on the actual document itself, but rather amends the 
corresponding record which is kept digitally152. 
 
As such it seems as though any confusion regarding to what the requirements for legal gender 
recognition are may have been justified, as there were four different regimes relating to 
different documents, none of which were considered any more authoritative than the other. 
This resulted in a system where a person seeking gender recognition may well have to 
navigate multiple procedures, all with different standards and requirements. Not only does 
this seem inefficient, but it may well have caused confusion if a person has identity 
documents with differing genders recorded on them. 
 
148 Updating your licence, NZ Transport Agency, Located at https://www.nzta.govt.nz/driver-licences/renewing-
replacing-and-updating/updating-your-licence/, accessed 07/09/2019 
149 DL25, Statutory declaration for change of gender for driver licensing and motor vehicle registration 
purposes, New Zealand Transport Agency, Located at https://nzta.govt.nz/assets/resources/statutory-
declaration-for-change-of-gender/docs/statutory-declaration-for-change-of-gender-dl25.pdf, accessed 
07/09/2019 
150 Updating your licence, New Zealand Transport Agency, Located at https://www.nzta.govt.nz/driver-
licences/renewing-replacing-and-updating/updating-your-licence/, accessed 07/09/2019 
151Gender Recognition Act 2004, Section 1 (1) 
152, Updating your licence, New Zealand Transport Agency, Located at https://www.nzta.govt.nz/driver-
licences/renewing-replacing-and-updating/updating-your-licence/, accessed 07/09/2019 
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However over time the various ways in which gender is recognised on official documents 
have been  somewhat harmonized, with the most common requirement now being simply for 
a statutory declaration and some indication as to how long a person has “maintained” their 
gender identity153. The requirements for amending one’s gender on their birth certificate 








Besides identity documents, another area where a person’s sex frequently becomes relevant is 
when interacting with the criminal justice system, particularly when it comes to 
imprisonment. New Zealand Police policy requires that any searches which require the 
person being searched to be unclothed or covered only by underwear (strip searches) to be 
conducted by a person of the same gender as the person being searched154. The policy 
specifically requires that the person conducting the search have the same “gender identity” 
155as the person being searched, while the policy does not explicitly mention transgender 
people, the use of such a term may imply that it refers to a transgender-inclusive 
understanding of gender, and is not conflating gender and sex. There is no specific guidance 
on searching intersex individuals or people whose sex and gender are recorded as 
indeterminate, however the lack of an explicit mention may mean that there is no exception 
made, and the general rule requiring searches to be conducted by a person of the same gender 
identity applies. 
 
For housing purposes prisoners are separated based on sex, with the only two options being 
male and female156. In the governing policy document on transgender and intersex prisoners, 
 
153This being the case at the time of writing for passports, citizenship certificates and driver’s licenses. 
154 Policies, Guidelines for Conducting Strip Searches, New Zealand Police, 03/2018, Located at 
https://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/publication/guidelines-conducting-strip-searches, accessed 10/09/2019 
155 Policies, Guidelines for Conducting Strip Searches, New Zealand Police, 03/2018, Located at 
https://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/publication/guidelines-conducting-strip-searches, accessed 10/09/2019 




the concepts of gender and sex are conflated, with gender being used to mean physical sex157. 
As such only physical sex is considered. 
 
If there is a question about a prisoner’s sex, either due to claims the prisoner makes or 
documentation causing confusion, a determination must be made by the custodial systems 
manager or on-call manager158. This determination must take into account relevant 
documentation and evidence from medical experts. However, regardless of other information, 
the birth certificate of the prisoner, if it is available, is regarded as authoritative159. This 
means that regardless of other circumstances a person’s sex is deemed to be the one on their 
birth certificate, despite the process to amend the certificate, as shown above, being 
somewhat difficult to navigate. A 2016 equal justice project research paper found a number 
of problems with the reliance on biological sex, including that those from lower socio-
economic backgrounds may be unable to undergo the recognition process and thus would 
never be able to be rehoused in prison  160. The 2008 report also found that this policy may be 
discriminatory, as it disproportionately disadvantages Maori people and those transgender 
people who are assigned female at birth, as both groups are less likely to be able to have 
surgery and are less likely to amend their birth certificates161. 
 
If the initial determination is not correct, an appeal may be made. This requires a report from 
the prison director as well as the health centre manager, The Chief Custodial Officer and the 
Director of Offender Health. This review is done by the Chief executive162. 
 
Specified-gender-and-age-movements/M.03-4.html, accessed 10/09/2019 
157 This occurs throughout M.03.05.01 
158 Prison operations manual, M.03.05 transgender and intersex prisoner, Department of Corrections, Located at 
www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/policy_and_legislation/Prison-Operations-Manual/Movement/M.03-
Specified-gender-and-age-movements/M.03-4.html, accessed 10/09/2019l at M.03.05.01 paragraph 1 
159 Prison operations manual, M.03.05 transgender and intersex prisoner, Department of Corrections, Located at 
www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/policy_and_legislation/Prison-Operations-Manual/Movement/M.03-
Specified-gender-and-age-movements/M.03-4.html, accessed 10/09/2019 at M.03.05.01 paragraph 2 
160 The rights of Transgender people in prisons, Research paper prepared for the equal justice project symposium 
11 may 2016, Maree Cassaidy and Linda Lim, located at  equaljusticeproject.co.nz/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/Transgender-People-in-Prisons-Research-Paper-final2.pdf page 8 para 3 
161Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf at 8.38 
162Prison operations manual, M.03.05 transgender and intersex prisoner, Department of Corrections, Located at 
www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/policy_and_legislation/Prison-Operations-Manual/Movement/M.03-




In the event that the prisoner produces a birth certificate which lists their sex as 
indeterminate, the evaluation is immediately escalated to the office of the National 
Commissioner of the Department of Corrections who will receive reports from the Chief 
Custodial Officer and the Director of Offender Health163. Beyond the fact that this escalation 
occurs there is no other guidance available on how the decisions relating to these inmates are 
made. It seems as though there is no set standard for dealing with indeterminate sex, with 
each case being dealt with individually. While this may be logistically possible due to the 




The treatment of transgender prisoners has also been criticised due to the lack of appropriate 
medical care164. This is relevant, as the standard to have one’s birth certificate amended, as 
mentioned previously165, requires at least some medical treatment. Transgender prisoners 
who began taking hormones without a prescription, a practice known as self-medicating, are 
not permitted to continue taking them in prison. It is also not possible for any transgender 
prisoner to acquire a prescription while in custody, under rule M.03.05.02(h)166. This 
situation has been criticised by the New Zealand law society167as it may violate the New 





163Prison operations manual, M.03.05 transgender and intersex prisoner, Department of Corrections, Located at 
www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/policy_and_legislation/Prison-Operations-Manual/Movement/M.03-
Specified-gender-and-age-movements/M.03-4.html, accessed 10/09/2019 at M.03.05.04 paragraph 5 
164  Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf at 4.84 
165 Page 24 
166Prison operations manual, M.03.05 transgender and intersex prisoner, Department of Corrections, Located 
atwww.corrections.govt.nz/resources/policy_and_legislation/Prison-Operations-Manual/Movement/M.03-
Specified-gender-and-age-movements/M.03-4.html at M.03.05.02(h) 
167 Policy changes on transgender prisoners, a step forward? LawTalk, New Zealand Law Society, 22 November 








Other than prisons and the criminal justice system the second major area where sex is often 
relevant is marriage. Sex often becomes an issue when it comes to marriage due to the 
traditional notion in many cultures that marriage should be restricted to being between men 
and women, with people only permitted to marry the “opposite” sex to themselves168, with 23 
countries allowing marriage regardless of the sex or gender of the participants169. 
 
When it comes to transgender, people with non-binary genders and intersex people, the legal 
rules surrounding marriage can often be complex. Many jurisdictions which have common 
law systems were heavily influenced by the decision in Corbett v Corbett170, which  defined 
gender as sex for the purposes of marriage, this restricting transgender people to marrying the 
“opposite” sex to the one they were assigned at birth171. That case concerned whether a 
marriage between a man and a post-operative male to female transsexual was void as 
marriage was only possible between a man and a woman. That court found not only was 
marriage dependent on physical sex but also that surgery was not sufficient to alter one’s 
biological sex as it did not alter a person’s sex chromosomes.  This case heavily influenced 
the legal systems in a large number of jurisdictions172. While influenced by Corbett, New 
Zealand diverted from it with the case of M v M in 1993173. The court chose to depart from 
the biologically deterministic view of Corbett stating that: 
 
 “In the absence of any binding authority which requires me to accept biological structure as 
decisive, and indeed any medical evidence that it ought to be, I incline to the view that 
 
168 Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P & D 130, 133 
169 Religion and public life, polling and analysis, Gay marriage around the world, Pew Research Center, June 26 
2015, located at www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/gay-marriage-around-the-world-2013/, accessed 
17/01/2021 
170 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306   
171 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306 at 107 para 1 
172 SOGI casebook introduction, chapter nine: transgender marriage, International Commission of Jurists,  
Located at www.icj.org/sogi-casebook-introduction/chapter-nine-transgender-marriage/, accessed 
10/09/2019, Para 7 
173M v. M, [1991] NZFLR 337 
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however elusive the definition of “woman” may be, the applicant came within it for the 
purposes of and at the time of the ceremony of marriage” 174 
 
While this Judgement acknowledged the complex nature of gender and sex, it also created a 
situation where there was no certain rule for determining sex for the purposes of marriage. As 
a result the Attorney General sought a declaratory judgement as to what the law on 
transgender marriage is in general, rather than in a specific case175. This judgement came in 
Attorney-General v. Family Court at Otahuhu176. While still rejecting the notion in Corbett 
that sex is chromosomal and cannot be changed by surgery177, the court in this case did not go 
as far as the statement in M v M that the definition of “woman” may be somewhat elusive. 
Instead the court opted for a somewhat more practical approach. They did not opt for an 
approach reflective of the complexity of gender and sex, and instead opted for an approach 
based on binary biological sex. As such the court ruled that physical sex was still the 
determining factor in eligibility for marriage, and only addressed male and female as possible 
sexes. However the court did find that surgical procedures were sufficient to allow a person 
to be considered to be a sex not assigned to them at birth178. The court also dismissed 
arguments relating to the safety of children and other policy concerns raised in opposition to 
allowing a person to change their sex for the purposes of marriage stating that “no social 
advantage in the law not recognising the validity of the marriage of a transsexual in the sex of 
reassignment. It would merely confirm the factual reality.”179 
 
Following this New Zealand implemented civil unions in 2004180, allowing couples of the 
same sex to have a legal relationship similar to marriage but different in name. Unlike some 
implementations, such as the Civil Partnership Act 2014 in the United Kingdom,181 in New 
Zealand the implementation of civil unions allowed both same sex and opposite sex couples 
to enter into civil unions.182. This avoids the possible complication that could be caused when 
 
174M v. M, [1991] NZFLR 337 para 35 
175 SOGI casebook introduction, chapter nine: transgender marriage, International Commission of Jurists,  
Located at www.icj.org/sogi-casebook-introduction/chapter-nine-transgender-marriage/  para 9 
176Attorney General v Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603   
177Attorney General v Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603, at 606 para 3 
178 Attorney General v Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603, at 615 line 1 
179 Attorney General v Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603, at 607 para 4 
180 Civil Union Act 2004, Public Act 2004 No102 
181 Civil Partnership Act 2014 c.33 
182 Civil Union Act 2004, public act 2004 No102, Section 4 (1) 
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the legal gender of a person is uncertain, as they would still be able to enter into a civil union 
no matter their gender. 
 
Following the Civil Unions Act the government of New Zealand passed the Marriage 
(Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act in 2013183. Section 4 of the Act explicitly states 
that the sex of those involved is no longer relevant with regards to marriage184. As such there 
should be no complications with regards to sex or gender, be they binary or non-binary with 
regards to marriage in New Zealand so long as this law remains in force. Particularly notable 
was that the  Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act repealed section 30 of the 
Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995185, which had prevented 
persons in a marriage from having the sex on their birth certificate amended until their 





Overall the law in New Zealand with regards to gender recognition can be characterised as 
having four distinguishing features: The unusual approach to recognising indeterminate sex, 
the use of family court declarations for gender/sex recognition, the reliance by elements of 
the system on recorded sex and the adaptations in other areas such as drivers licenses, 
citizenship certificates and passports that grant recognition despite the peculiarities of how 
birth certificates are addressed. 
 
 
The approach taken to recognising indeterminate sex at birth has a few interesting features. 
As discussed above a person may be recorded as having indeterminate sex at birth, but may 
not amend their birth certificate to reflect that later in life unless some note was made of their 
 
183Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, Public Act 2013 No 20 
184Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, Public Act 2013 No 20 section 4 
185Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, Public act 2013 No 20 Section 9 
186As mentioned in NZ Human rights commission, summary of human rights in New Zealand 2010., The rights 
of sexual and gender minorities, located at 




indeterminacy at birth187. It is also easier to have ones recorded sex changed from 
indeterminate to one of the binary genders (male or female) than it is to move from one 
binary position to the other. It is also not possible to be registered as of indeterminate sex if 
the indeterminacy arises later in life. In recognising intersex status in such a way the system 
acknowledges that intersex people exist, and may avoid the difficulties stemming from 
pressure to identify an infant’s sex as one of the binary options. However this approach, 
while it may potentially remove a legal pressure to sex someone as male or female, which 
may reduce the impetus to perform “corrective” surgery on intersex infants, this notion has 
been criticised as lacking in evidential basis188. This method of recognition, particularly how 
indeterminate status is implemented in such a way that it exists seemingly with the hope that 
a person can end their indeterminacy through the easier method for altering their birth 
certificate. Not only does it exist as a status to be escaped, but it also cannot be entered later 
in life, regardless of a person’s physical status unless a record is made at birth. Also the use 
of the term indeterminacy is interesting, as it reflects an understanding of intersex status as 
perhaps some sort of desolate and hostile no-man’s land in-between sexes, in which ones 
“true” sex cannot be determined. It may reflect an understanding in which intersex is seen not 
as a part on a natural spectrum of sexual variation, but as an unfortunate gap of ambiguity in-
between the two binary sexes, which a person would not want to be voluntarily recognised as 
a part of, but would want to one day be able to escape from. 
 
The use of family court declarations is fairly simple, although it is interesting to note that it 
forms a part of a trend often seen in gender recognition legislation in which a person’s status 
must be confirmed by some authority, and that a person must have met certain criteria so that 
the sexual binary may be kept as intact as possible. Since the removal of a requirement to 
have surgery189, and thus the removal of a key measure to ensure all persons recognised as 
being a given sex had certain features in common, it may be interesting to see if New Zealand 
moves towards a gender recognition system reliant on self-identification, such as that in 
 
187 Department of Internal Affairs, General information regarding Declarations of Family Court as to sex to be 
shown on birth certificates, located at 
https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/GeninfoDeclarationsofFamilyCourt/$file/GeninfoDeclarationso
fFamilyCourt.pdf page 4 para 7 which is an explanation of section 28 (a) ii 
188 The “Normalization” of Intersex Bodies and “Othering” of Intersex Identities in Australia 
Carpenter, M. Bioethical Inquiry (2018) 15: 487. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-018-9855-8 
189In the Michael case 
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Malta190 and Ireland191. This may well be the case, as aspects of gender recognition, such as 
those relating to passports, citizenship certificates and driver’s licenses have changed to rely 
solely on a statutory declaration, with birth certificates being the exception. 
 
The use of family court declarations does have a key difference in feature to other methods of 
gender recognition which involve meeting set criteria which is then confirmed by an 
authority. This is in contrast to a gender recognition panel system, such as the one currently 
in use in the United Kingdom192. A family court declaration system has the advantage of 
using existing infrastructure and systems, so far as any system to amend birth certificates can. 
In this style of system there is no need to create a separate body with new members, 
procedures and hierarchies, as the existing family court system is used as much as possible. 
However, it does have a major disadvantage, one mentioned in the 2008 report, namely that 
of consistency. This was mentioned in the report specifically in the context of the uncertainty 
surrounding the requirement for surgery prior to the ruling that it was not necessary193. As in 
this system there is no one body making the decision, different judges reached different 
conclusions on what the requirement was, which led to a person’s ability to obtain gender 
recognition being unpredictable. This consistency issue is probably the greatest difference 
between the panel based system and the family court declaration system. 
 
 
The next major distinguishing feature of gender recognition in New Zealand is the reliance on 
sex. This is mainly evident with regards to birth certificates and the prison system. Birth 
certificates only record sex, the prison system houses inmates by sex and regards birth 
certificates as authoritative194. Gender is recorded on passports195, but while sex on a birth 
 
190 Gender Identity Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act 2015, ACT No. XI of 2015 
191Gender Recognition Act 2015, Number 25 of 2015 
192 As set out in the Gender Recognition Act 2004 
193 Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf , accessed 17/12/2020, at 8.44 
194As set out in Department of Corrections, prison operations manual, M.03.05 transgender and intersex 
prisoner, located atwww.corrections.govt.nz/resources/policy_and_legislation/Prison-Operations-
Manual/Movement/M.03-Specified-gender-and-age-movements/M.03-4.html 
195While the ICAO standards refer to gender, as shown in Doc 9303, Machine readable Travel Documents, 
seventh edition, 2015, part 4: specifications for machine readable passports (MRPs) and other TD3 Size 
MRTDs, the  International Civil Aviation Organisation, Located at 
www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p4_cons_en.pdf page 7, the New Zealand government advice 
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certificate may be used as evidence of gender, it is not solely authoritative, and it is much 
easier to change one’s gender on one’s passport than it is to change sex on a birth certificate. 
Gender and sex are often used interchangeably, and when a person’s gender becomes legally 
relevant the deciding factor, as was the case both in prisons and in marriage prior to 2013 
(when the gender requirement for marriage was removed196), seems to be physical sex. As 
such the system is largely reliant on sex, rather than gender which is while it is recorded does 
not seem to be used in the way sex is. Unfortunately, when sex does become relevant it is 
usually in the context of determining if a person is male or female, or to be treated as male or 
female, which can create difficulty when a person’s sex is recorded as indeterminate. 
However it is worth noting that the reliance on sex has diminished over time, with the 
passport and citizenship certificate systems both moving towards a statutory declaration 
based model with no other evidence required. 
 
This leads to the final major interesting feature of gender recognition in New Zealand, that 
because there is no one authoritative mode of gender recognition, the “gender recognition 
system” is made of numerous independent sub systems, each authoritative only in their own 
domain. The result of this is that different aspects of the system have changed at different 
rates, and in some cases have adopted different methods of recognition and evidential 
requirements. 
 
An interesting example of this is the prison system and its interaction with the system of 
recognition related to birth certificates. While the prison system itself has come under some 
scrutiny and criticism for its various gender related polices and reliance on sex recorded on 
birth certificates197, is not totally reliant on the rules and limitations of the birth certificate 
system. If it were to rely totally on the birth certificate system then it would be unable to 
address intersex persons who were not assigned such at birth or did not have a note 
 
refers to both sex and gender as though they are interchangeable or the same Passports.govt.nz, The 
Department of Internal Affairs, Information about Changing Sex / Gender Identity located at 
https://www.passports.govt.nz/Transgender-applicants 
196Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, Public act 2013 No 20 section 4 
197For example  The rights of Transgender people in prisons, Research paper prepared for the equal justice 
project symposium 11 may 2016, Maree Cassaidy and Linda Lim, located at  equaljusticeproject.co.nz/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/Transgender-People-in-Prisons-Research-Paper-final2.pdf page 8 para 3 and  
Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf at 8.38 
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demonstrating this made at their time of birth, and would have to rely solely on the binary sex 
noted on the birth certificate. However  if an inmates sex is recorded as indeterminate the 
case is immediately escalated to the appeal stage where the case will be examined on an 
individual basis198 This avoids the problem of the birth certificate system accommodating  
only a binary model of sex without requiring any alterations to be made to the Births, Deaths, 
Marriages and Relationships Registration Act. It does however run the risk of being 
inconsistent  and unpredictable, but it may represent a viable model for how intersex 
prisoners can be dealt with in those systems that only allow consideration of sex and that in 
all other aspects only cater to binary sex. 
 
The requirements for gender/sex relating to marriage have also changed in such a way that 
has eliminated a number of problems for transgender and intersex people due to the 
introduction of “gender blind” marriage in Marriage (definition of Marriage) Amendment 
Act199. This can be contrasted with certain implementations of same-sex marriage which still 
require a differentiation between homosexual and heterosexual relationships, such as the UK, 
which has resulted in a complex series of rules and requirements for gender recognition 
which vary based on one’s marital / civil union status200. This is an example of a situation in 
which, rather than changing gender / sex recognition rules to accommodate the existence of 
transgender and intersex people, a social change occurred which allowed for a distinction 
between genders in the law to be removed entirely. As such, while it achieves the same end 
of equal access to legal rights, this is accomplished through a different sort of legal change, 
where rather than altering the requirements under the law for gender recognition in the 
“relevant but not essential” zone discussed in Corbett v Corbett201, the law is moved from the 





198 Prison operations manual, M.03.05 transgender and intersex prisoner, Department of Corrections, Located 
atwww.corrections.govt.nz/resources/policy_and_legislation/Prison-Operations-Manual/Movement/M.03-
Specified-gender-and-age-movements/M.03-4.html at M.03.05.04 paragraph 5 
199Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, Public act 2013 No 20 
200 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 11 




Because the lack of one definitive “legal gender” allows the gender recognition rules for each 
document to be altered independently the relativity high evidential requirements of the birth 
certificate amendment procedure need not necessarily need to impact the passport, driver’s 
license and  citizenship certificate rules. All three of these identity documents recognise non-
binary genders in addition to the “indeterminate” sex recognised by birth certificates and 
allow those categories to be entered later in life. They also all have less rigorous criteria for 
change of gender/sex than birth certificates. These three identity documents, unlike birth 
certificates, do not have their gender/sex recognition procedures set out in statute. As such it 
appears that they are able to provide not only more recognition in terms of non-binary gender 
identities, but also less rigorous criteria because their rules are easier to amend and alter. 
However this is far from certain, as there may be valid reasons to why the rules regarding 
birth certificates have not been amended other than that there is difficulty in altering or 
replacing the statute, including lack of political will or other practical concerns. However as 
demonstrated by statements made relating to the Births, Deaths, Marriages and Relationships 
Registration Bill202 the level of debate, scrutiny and controversy inherent in such amendments 




An interesting possibility is that it may not be desirable to make altering a birth certificate 
easier as it has an additional purpose other than as an identity document. Birth certificates 
may also function as historical documents, recording who was born and their status at that 
time. As such easy amendment may not be desirable, as it essentially alters the historical 
record. It may well be that the gender recognition system in New Zealand may, for all of its 
inconsistencies, form the beginning of a model in which the birth certificate is unalterable, as 
it is a historical document, and other documents are used for identity purposes. However it its 
current form, with multiple forms of identification and the birth certificate being authoritative 
in so many situations it is probable that the gender recognition system still has quite some 
way to go to improve. Its transition into such a model would only be complete once no other 
 
202 Bill making it easier for trans people to update birth certificate deferred, NZ Herald, 25/02/2019, Located at 
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12207173, accessed 03/09/2019 
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part of the system relies on sex recorded on birth certificates, as is currently done in the 
prison system. However it is worth noting that even such a system may have significant 
drawbacks. As discussed in cases at the ECHR regarding gender recognition, a transgender 
person can suffer stigma, discrimination or humiliation if they are “outed” by having 
documentation which is incongruent with their identity203. This, while other factors may have 
been more decisive204, formed a crucial part of the Goodwin v UK judgement which required 
the UK to introduce more centralized gender recognition in the form of the Gender 
Recognition Act. As shown in that case the UK at the time did allow a transgender person in 
individual cases to have their gender recognised for specific purposes205. Because of this it 
should be considered that while system with diverse methods of gender recognition for 
various official purpose may be desirable, having any mismatch between a person’s identity 
and a document with more onerous recognition criteria may have a strong negative impact on 
















203 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 77 
204 Such as the development of perceived international consensus. As shown in   Goodwin v United Kingdom 
(2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraphs 84-85 











The legal situation in Australia. 
 
 
The approach taken by Australia to legal gender and sex recognition has a number of 
interesting aspects. Like a number of jurisdictions, Australia does not recognise legal gender 
or sex in any one unified way. While the most common way to recognise sex is through a 
birth certificate, there is a separate standard of evidence for having one’s sex recognised on a 
passport. While this is a trait shared by other systems, Australia adds to the multiple methods 
of legal recognition by the nature of its legal system. Because Australia has a federal legal 
system every state and territory has its own method of recognising legal sex and having sex 
altered on birth certificates. This may not be a problem for residents of those states and 
territories, as any one person will only have to alter their birth certificate in the one state or 
territory of their birth. However it does add a layer of complexity to any attempt to evaluate 
how Australia approaches non-binary/intersex recognition, as in some aspects, such as 
passports, it is one jurisdiction, with regards to others, such as birth certificates, it becomes 8 
jurisdictions. Australia also distinguishes itself from other jurisdictions by recognising the 
difference between gender and sex, and is thus far the only jurisdiction to do so. However, as 
will be shown later in this chapter, that recognition is now always acted upon in practice. 
 
For ease of reading this chapter shall be subdivided into sections, the first addressing birth 
certificates, the second addressing passports. Following these the ways recognition interacts 
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In many jurisdictions the alteration of birth certificates to recognise sex/gender is a core part 
of that jurisdictions system of legal gender recognition. This is also the case in Australia, with 
a number of states/territories stating that the sex recognised on a birth certificate is that 
persons legal sex. 
 
Because each state and territory addresses sex recognition on birth certificates separately, 
each jurisdiction shall be examined in turn, followed by a section comparing the various 
systems. For the sake of brevity the focus shall be on the procedures for adults, although it is 




Australian Capital Territory 
 
In the Australian capital territory the rules governing the change of sex on birth certificates 
can be found in part 4 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997206. Section 
24 of the act allows anyone who’s birth is registered in the ACT(Australian capital territory) 
and who is over 18 to have the register of births altered, if they have received some 
“appropriate clinical treatment for change of sex”207, or if they are intersex. Section 25 
requires evidence in the form of a statement from a doctor or psychologist verifying that they 
 
206 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 A1997-112, Accessed from Republication No 28 
Effective: 27 February 2019, Located at https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/1997-112/default.asp, accessed 
14/08/2019 
207 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 A1997-112, Section 24 (c) (I), Accessed from  
Republication No 28 Effective: 27 February 2019, Located at https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/1997-
112/default.asp  accessed 14/08/2019 
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have received some treatment or are intersex208. Once the register is altered a new birth 
certificate may be issued, which shall have no evidence of having been altered. A copy of the 
birth certificate as it would have been prior to alteration of the register may also be issued209, 
and section 28 states that it is an offence to use such a certificate to deceive210. Section 4.2 of 
the act also allows residents of the ACT whose births are registered elsewhere to apply for a 
registered details certificate, which does not alter the register but can serve as proof of a 
person’s name and sex211.  
 
Due to amendments introduced by the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Amendment 
Act 2014212 a person may change their birth certificate to recognise them as intersex as well 
as male or female213. The Amendment Act also amended the Legislation Act 2001214 to 
include a statutory definition of intersex which defines an intersex person as: 
 
“An intersex person is a person who has physical, hormonal or 
genetic features that are— 
(a) not fully female or fully male; or 
(b) a combination of male or female; or 
(c) not female or male.”215 
 
 
208 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 A1997-112, Accessed from Republication No 28 
Effective: 27 February 2019, Located at https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/1997-112/default.asp, accessed 
14/08/2019, Section 25 
209 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 A1997-112, , Accessed from  Republication No 28 
Effective: 27 February 2019, Located at https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/1997-112/default.asp, accessed 
14/08/2019, Section 27 
210 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 A1997-112, , Accessed from  Republication No 28 
Effective: 27 February 2019, Located at https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/1997-112/default.asp  accessed 
14/08/2019, Section 28 
211 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 A1997-112, Accessed from Republication No 28 
Effective: 27 February 2019, Located at https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/1997-112/default.asp, accessed 
14/08/2019, Section 29A 
212 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Amendment Act 2014 A2014-8 
213 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Amendment Act 2014 A2014-8, Section 8 (c) (ii) 
214 Legislation Act 2001 A2001-14 Section 169B 
215 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Amendment Act 2014 A2014-8  Schedule 1 Part 1.2 
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The ACT also includes information on change of sex on birth certificates in their births, 
deaths and marriages practice manual216. The manual also notes that in addition to changing 
one’s birth certificate to recognise their intersex status, it is also possible for a person to be 
registered as intersex from birth due to a policy change217. It states that “This category can be 
nominated by individuals who are intersex or who identify as having an indeterminate or 
unspecified sex.”218. This use of the phrase “intersex or who identify as having an 
indeterminate or unspecified sex” is interesting, as it demonstrates that in addition to 
recognising physical characteristics that may be regarded as intersex, in this case “intersex” is 
also recognised as a form of identity, which is similar to how it is addressed with regards to 
passports and as such this notion will be discussed more in depth in that section.  
 
 
All of the applications under the act relating to change of sex can be done using a 
standardised form available through the access Canberra website219. There is a fee of 48 




New South Wales 
 
 
216 Justice and Community Safety, Births, Deaths and Marriages Practice Manual, ACT Government, April 
2014,  Located at 
https://www.accesscanberra.act.gov.au/ci/fattach/get/45848/1433984222/redirect/1/filename/Births%20deaths%
20and%20marriages%20practice%20manual.pdf, accessed 14/08/2019 
217 Justice and Community Safety, Births, Deaths and Marriages Practice Manual, April 2014, ACT 
Government, Located at 
https://www.accesscanberra.act.gov.au/ci/fattach/get/45848/1433984222/redirect/1/filename/Births%20deaths%
20and%20marriages%20practice%20manual.pdf accessed 14/08/2019, Page 49 
218 Ibid 
219 Form 204 – ACS, available from ACT Government, Recording a change of sex on the birth register, Apply 
to change your sex on the birth register, Located at 
https://www.accesscanberra.act.gov.au/app/answers/detail/a_id/1691/~/recording-a-change-of-sex-on-the-birth-
register#!tabs-3 accessed 18/08/2019 
220 Births, deaths and marriages forms and fees, ACT Government, Located at 
https://www.accesscanberra.act.gov.au/app/answers/detail/a_id/2214, accessed 18/08/2019 
53 
 
In New South Wales the relevant statute is part 5 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages 
Registration Act 1995221. Section 32B allowed a person whose birth is registered in New 
South Wales and who is over 18 to request that the register be altered, provided that they are 
unmarried and have “undergone a sex affirmation procedure”222. The application must be 
accompanied by statements from two doctors or other medical professionals in order to verify 
that the applicant has undergone a “sex affirmation procedure”, and such other documents 
and information as may be prescribed by the regulations223. A person who lives in NSW but 
whose birth was not registered there may apply, after meeting the same evidential criteria and 
pre requisites as mentioned previously, for their change of sex to be registered224. This does 
not change the details currently in the register, as their birth is registered outside New South 
Wales, it does allow a person’s to be treated as their recognised sex for all purposes in 
NSW225. After a person’s new sex has been recognised by section 32B a new birth certificate 
may be issues reflecting the recognised sex which must contain no evidence of the previous 
registered sex226. Section 32F also allows for a certificate with the originally registered sex to 
be issued on request227. 
 
There are standardised forms for applications under part 5 of the Act available from the NSW 





221 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 62 of 1995, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/conysol_act/bdamra1995383/, accessed 20/08/2019 
222 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 62 of 1995, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/conysol_act/bdamra1995383/ accessed 20/08/2019, Section 32B 
223 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 62 of 1995, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/conysol_act/bdamra1995383/ accessed 20/08/2019, Section 32DB 
224 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 62 of 1995, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/conysol_act/bdamra1995383/ accessed 20/08/2019, Section 32DA 
225 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 62 of 1995, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/conysol_act/bdamra1995383/ accessed 20/08/2019, Section 32I (1) 
226 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 62 of 1995, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/conysol_act/bdamra1995383/ accessed 20/08/2019, Section 32E 
227 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 62 of 1995, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/conysol_act/bdamra1995383/ accessed 20/08/2019, Section 32F 
228 NSW Government, Registry of Births Deaths & Marriages, Changes and corrections, Change of sex, Located 






The relevant statute in the Northern Territory is the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration 
Act 1996229. Section 28B allowed a person to apply to have the register altered if their birth is 
registered in the northern territory, they were unmarried, and have undergone sexual 
reassignment surgery230. This application required evidence to confirm that they have 
undergone sexual reassignment surgery, this may take the form of statutory declarations from 
two medical practitioners, as well as any other evidence prescribed by regulations231. Section 
28E then allows for a new birth certificate to be issued with no indication of the sex noted 
prior to the alteration of the registry232. A birth certificate reflecting the prior sex may also be 
issued, section 28G makes it an offence to use such a certificate with intent to deceive233. 
 
In 2018 the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration and Other Legislation Amendment Act 
repealed sections 28A, 28B, 28C and 28D of the Births Deaths and Marriages Registration 
Act234. 
These sections are replaced with new versions introduced in the 2018 Act. The amended 
1996 Act now allows a person to apply to have the register amended if they are an intersex 
person or have received appropriate medical treatment regarding their sex or gender, with the 
only evidence required being a letter from a psychologist or medical practitioner that this is 
the case235.  
 
229 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, No.26 of 1996, Located at 
https://legislation.nt.gov.au/en/Bills/Births-Deaths-and-Marriages-Registration-Bill-1996?format=assented, 
accessed 22/08/2019 
230 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, No.26 of 1996, Located at 
https://legislation.nt.gov.au/en/Bills/Births-Deaths-and-Marriages-Registration-Bill-1996?format=assented, 
accessed 22/08/2019, Section 28B 
231 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, No.26 of 1996, Located at 
https://legislation.nt.gov.au/en/Bills/Births-Deaths-and-Marriages-Registration-Bill-1996?format=assented, 
accessed 22/08/2019, Section 28C 
232 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, No.26 of 1996, Located at 
https://legislation.nt.gov.au/en/Bills/Births-Deaths-and-Marriages-Registration-Bill-1996?format=assented, 
accessed 22/08/2019, Section 28E 
233 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, No.26 of 1996, Located at 
https://legislation.nt.gov.au/en/Bills/Births-Deaths-and-Marriages-Registration-Bill-1996?format=assented, 
accessed 22/08/2019, Section 28G 
234 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2018, Act No. 30 of 2018, 
Located at https://legislation.nt.gov.au/en/Bills/Births-Deaths-and-Marriages-Registration-and-Other-





Applications under section 28B may be made in person or through the post, and must be done 






In Queensland the relevant statute is the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 
2003237. Section 22 allowed a person to make an application to alter the registry provided that 
they have had sexual reassignment surgery and were unmarried238. Such an application must 
be done in the standard form, available from the Queensland Government website, and must 
be accompanied by statutory declarations from two doctors confirming that the applicant has 
undergone sexual reassignment surgery239.  
 
The 2003 Act was amended in 2018 by the Births, Deaths and Marriages, Registration 







236 Register a change of sex or gender on a birth certificate, NTGOV.AU, Located at 
https://nt.gov.au/law/bdm/register-a-change-of-sex-or-gender-on-a-birth-certificate, accessed 22/08/2019 
237 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003, Located at 
https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-2003-031, accessed 22/08/2019 
238 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003, Located at 
https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-2003-031, accessed 22/08/2019, Section 22 
239 Note a change of sex in a birth or adoption register, Queensland Government, Located at 
https://www.qld.gov.au/law/births-deaths-marriages-and-divorces/birth-registration-and-adoption-records/note-
a-change-of-sex-in-a-birth-or-adoption-register accessed 22/08/2019 
240 Births, Deaths and Marriages, Registration Amendment Act 2018, Located at 
https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2018-011, accessed 22/08/2019, Section 3 
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In South Australia the alteration of birth certificates was governed by the Sexual 
Reassignment Act 1988241. In order to have their legal sex altered on the registry a person 
was required to make an application to a magistrate authorized by the governor for a 
recognition certificate242. A person making an application must have had some form of sexual 
reassignment procedure243. An applicant was required to either have had their birth registered 
in South Australia or have had a sexual reassignment procedure in that state244. An applicant 
was required to believe that the sex they are applying to be recognised as is their true sex, and 
must  have “adopted the lifestyle and has the sexual characteristics of a person of the sex to 
which the person has been reassigned” and was required to have “received proper counselling 
in relation to his or her sexual identity”245. A copy of the application was required to be 
served to the minister as well as any “other person who should, in the magistrate's opinion, be 
served with notice of the application”. Anyone served with a copy of the application was 
entitled to attend the hearing of the application and make submissions to the magistrate246. As 
per section 8 of the act a recognition certificate was evidence that a person has undergone a 
reassignment procedure and was of the sex stated on the certificate247. 
 
The Sexual Reassignment Act was repealed in 2016 by the Births, Deaths and Marriages 
Registration (Gender Identity) Amendment Act248 which introduced new law governing the 
 
241 Sexual Reassignment Act 1988, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/SEXUAL%20REASSIGNMENT%20ACT%201988.aspx, accessed 
22/08/2019 
242 Sexual Reassignment Act 1988, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/SEXUAL%20REASSIGNMENT%20ACT%201988.aspx, accessed 
22/08/2019, Section 7 (2) 
243 Ibid 
244 Sexual Reassignment Act 1988, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/SEXUAL%20REASSIGNMENT%20ACT%201988.aspx, accessed 
22/08/2019, Section 7 (8) 
245 Sexual Reassignment Act 1988, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/SEXUAL%20REASSIGNMENT%20ACT%201988.aspx, accessed 
22/08/2019, Section 7 (8) (b) 
246 Sexual Reassignment Act 1988, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/SEXUAL%20REASSIGNMENT%20ACT%201988.aspx, accessed 
22/08/2019, Section 7 (6) 
247 Sexual Reassignment Act 1988, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/SEXUAL%20REASSIGNMENT%20ACT%201988.aspx, accessed 
22/08/2019, Section 8 
248 Births, Deaths and Marriage s Registration (Gender Identity) Amendment Act 2016, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/V/A/2016/Births%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages%20Registration%20(
Gender%20Identity)%20Amendment%20Act%202016_65.aspx, accessed 22/08/2019 
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alteration of birth certificates by amending the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 
1996249. 
 
Under the amended act a person may apply to the registrar to have their sex on their birth 
certificate amended if they are over 18, were born in South Australia, have lived in South 
Australia for at least 12 consecutive months and specify a sex or gender identify which is 
recognised by the regulations and also provide the required evidence250. The genders /sexes 
currently recognised are Male, Female, Non-binary and Indeterminate/intersex/unspecified251. 
The required evidence is: 
 
 “a statement by a medical practitioner or psychologist certifying that the person has 
undertaken a sufficient amount of appropriate clinical treatment in relation to the person's sex 
or gender identity (including in the case of a person whose sex or gender identity has now 
become determinate)”252  
 
Under the definitions listed in section 29H “clinical treatment” is specified to not necessarily 
require medical treatment and may include counselling or be only counselling253. The 
“sufficient amount of appropriate clinical treatment” is clarified to mean treatment of at least 
the proscribed duration254, which is “at least three separate counselling sessions totalling 135 
 
249 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Births%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages%20Registration%20Act%2
01996.aspx, accessed 22/08/2019 
250 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Births%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages%20Registration%20Act%2
01996.aspx, accessed 22/08/2019, Section 29I 
251 Consumer and Business Services, Record a change of sex or gender identity - application, Government of 






252 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Births%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages%20Registration%20Act%2
01996.aspx, accessed 22/08/2019, Section 29K 
253 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Births%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages%20Registration%20Act%2
01996.aspx, accessed 22/08/2019, Section 29H (1) 
254 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Births%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages%20Registration%20Act%2
01996.aspx, accessed 22/08/2019, Section 29H (3) 
58 
 
minutes or counselling sessions occurring over a period of at least 6 months or medical 
treatment other than counselling.”255 
A person born in another state or territory who lives in South Australia may apply with the 
same requirements and evidence to receive an identity acknowledgement certificate256. This 
certificate does not amend the register but has the effect of rendering a person’s sex or gender 
identity that which is recognised on the certificate257.  
 
Section 29N creates an offence of using an old birth certificate to deceive which carries a 
maximum penalty 10,000 dollars or a 2 year custodial sentence258.  





The relevant statute in Tasmania is part 4A of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration 
Act 1999260. Section 28A allowed a person whose birth is registered in Tasmania and is 
unmarried and has undergone sexual reassignment surgery to make an application to have the 
 
255 Consumer and Business Services, Record a change of sex or gender identity - application, Government of 






256 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Births%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages%20Registration%20Act%2
01996.aspx, accessed 22/08/2019, Section 29O 
257 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Births%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages%20Registration%20Act%2
01996.aspx, accessed 22/08/2019, Section 29R 
258 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Births%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages%20Registration%20Act%2
01996.aspx, accessed 22/08/2019, Section 29N 
259 Births, deaths and marriages, Corrections to certificates, South Australia.gov, Located at 
https://www.sa.gov.au/topics/family-and-community/births-deaths-and-marriages/corrections-to-certificates, 
accessed 22/08/2019 
260 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, Version from 1 July 2010 - present, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1999-058, accessed 23/08/2019 
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register altered261. This application was required to be accompanied by statutory declarations 
from two medical practitioners to confirm that the applicant has undergone sexual 
reassignment surgery262. If the application was successful a new birth certificate may have 
been issued, with the sex as per the alteration of the register, with a note that their sex was 
previously registered as “the other sex”263. Section 28E allowed for a birth certificate 
reflecting the sex on the register prior to alteration264, and section 28F made it an offence to 
use this certificate with the intent to deceive265. 
 
On the 8th of May 2019 the Tasmanian legislature passed the Justice and Related Legislation 
(Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act266 which introduced a number of amendments to 
part 4A of the 1999 Act. This introduced a number of changes in how birth certificates are 
dealt with, including expanding the definition of gender to include  
 
“gender means – 
(a) male; or 
(b) female; or 
(c) indeterminate gender; or 
(d) non-binary; or 
(e) a word, or a phrase, that is used to indicate a person's perception 
of the person's self as being neither entirely male nor entirely female 
and that is prescribed; or 
 
261 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, Version from 1 July 2010 – present, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1999-058, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 28A 
262 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, Version from 1 July 2010 – present, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1999-058, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 28B 
263 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, Version from 1 July 2010 – present, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1999-058, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 28D 
264 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, Version from 1 July 2010 – present, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1999-058, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 28E 
265 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, Version from 1 July 2010 – present, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1999-058, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 28F 
266 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019 
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(f) a word or phrase that is used to indicate a person's perception of 
the person's self as being neither entirely male nor entirely female.”267 
 
As well as this fairly significant change the Amendment Act also permits registration of birth 
to be delayed up to 120 days if a child has ambiguous sexual characteristics268 while still 
requiring infants to be registered as either male or female269. It also removes the requirement 
for the mother and father to be listed on the register, instead simply referring them both as 
parents270, which may be useful to parents in same sex relationships as well as parents who 
identify with anon-binary gender identity or are otherwise trans.  
The 2019 Act also changed the process and requirements for gender recognition after the 
initial registration of the birth. The new process does not require the two medical 
practitioners letter and instead allows a person over 16 to have their gender registered if they 
sign a “gender declaration” and produce “any other document or information that the 
Registrar reasonably requires, other than a medical certificate, or other medical document, in 
relation to the sex, sexual characteristics or gender of the person”271. Applications must also 
be done in a standard form which is not yet available272. If the applicant is between the ages 
of 16 and 18 they can be required to provide evidence of counselling273. A new birth 
certificate may be requested either with or without notation of previous recognised sexes274. It 
is worth noting that despite allowing a larger variety of genders to be registered due to 
allowing any word or phrase expressing ones identity as neither entirely male or female the 
amended legislation still states that a person’s gender is the registered one for the purposes of 
any law in force in the state275. This may pose problems for gendered laws that denote only 
male or female genders, however other measures in the Amendment Act seem to indicate a 
 
267 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 14 
268 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 15 
269 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 16 
270 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019 Section 17 
271 271 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 21 
272 Ibid 
273 Ibid 
274 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 22 
275 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 21 
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commitment to de-gendering the law in virtually all respects, including stating that any 
reference to the mother of a child means the person regardless of gender who carried the child 
in their reproductive tract and gave birth to them276.  
 
In order to make an application under section 28B  before the 1999 act was amended a person 
was required to use a 'Statutory Declaration Application for Registration of Change of Sex' 
form, which was not available online but was available from the registry office upon 
request277. As of August 23 2019 the website has not been updated to reflect the changes in 
the legislation, however a banner on the website states that new forms etc will be available by 
the 5th of September 2019278. 
There does seem to have been some level of negative community response to the 2019 Act, 
although this may only be indicative of feelings among those already disposed to post in 
news article comment sections279. These negative responses do not appear to be from the 
trans or intersex communities, instead from those who believe that sex and gender are 






The relevant statute in Victoria is the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996281. 
Section 30A282 allows a person to apply for an amendment to the registry if their birth is 
 
276 Ibid 
277 Tasmanian Government, Births, Deaths and Marriages, Change of sex, Located at 23/08/2019, Located at 
https://www.justice.tas.gov.au/bdm/gender-registration, accessed 23/08/2019 
278 Ibid 
279 “There are only two genders – male and female…” An Analysis of Online Responses to Tasmania Removing 
‘Gender’ from Birth Certificates’, Richardson-Self, L, (2020) 1 International Journal of Gender, Sexuality and 
Law 295 
280 “There are only two genders – male and female…” An Analysis of Online Responses to Tasmania Removing 
‘Gender’ from Birth Certificates’, Richardson-Self, L, (2020) 1 International Journal of Gender, Sexuality and 
Law 295, page 313 
281 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/bdamra1996383/, accessed 23/08/2019 
282 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/bdamra1996383/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 30A 
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registered in Victoria and they have undergone sexual reassignment surgery, section 30C also 
requires that the applicant be unmarried283. Section 30B requires that the application be 
accompanied by statutory declarations from two doctors or other medical practitioners to 
confirm that the applicant has undergone sexual reassignment surgery284. A new birth 
certificate may be issued under section 30D to reflect the alteration285. A similar procedure 
exists under section 30E for residents of Victoria whose birth is registered elsewhere to 
receive a document acknowledging their name and sex286. 
 
A standard form for applications under section 30 is available online and requires a fee of 76 
dollars (Australian)287. 
 
In 2016 the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Amendment Bill 2016288 was 
introduced, which would have altered the requirements to alter ones birth certificate in such a 
way that the requirements would be that a person be over the age of 18, that they have not 
changed their registered gender in the last 12 months and that they produce a supporting 
statement from someone who has known them for at least 12 months289. However the bill was 
not successfully passed by the legislature290.  
 
283 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/bdamra1996383/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 30C 
284 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/bdamra1996383/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 30B 
285 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/bdamra1996383/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 30D 
286 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/bdamra1996383/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 30E 
287 Births Deaths and Marriages Victoria, Changes and Corrections, Change your recorded sex, Located at 
https://www.bdm.vic.gov.au/changes-and-corrections/change-your-recorded-sex, accessed 23/08/2019 
288 Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Amendment Bill 2016, Located at, 
www.legislation.vic.gov.au/domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubPDocs_Arch.nsf/5da7442d8f61e92bca256de50013
d008/ca257cca00177a46ca25801300117077/$FILE/581166bi1.pdf#targetText=30%20Page%2015%20Part%20
2,the%20name%20of%20the%20person., accessed 23/08/2019 
289 Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Amendment Bill 2016, Located at, 
www.legislation.vic.gov.au/domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubPDocs_Arch.nsf/5da7442d8f61e92bca256de50013
d008/ca257cca00177a46ca25801300117077/$FILE/581166bi1.pdf#targetText=30%20Page%2015%20Part%20
2,the%20name%20of%20the%20person., accessed 23/08/2019, Section 8 
290 Victorian MPs to debate bill to let transgender people change birth certificate without surgery, Josh Taylor, 
The Guardian, 11/08/2019, Located at https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/aug/11/victorian-mps-
to-debate-bill-to-let-transgender-people-change-birth-certificate-without-surgery, accessed 23/08/2019 
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As of August 2019 the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Amendment Bill 2019 is 
under consideration, which if passed will introduce measures similar to the 2016 bill291.  
 
 
Western Australia  
 
In Western Australia the alteration of birth certificates and the registry is governed by the 
Gender Reassignment Act 2000292. Under sections 14 and 15 of that Act a person who has 
“undergone a reassignment procedure” may make an application to the gender reassignment 
board for a recognition certificate293. In order to make an application a person’s birth must 
have been registered in Western Australia, or they must have been resident in Western 
Australia for 12 months or more, or must have undergone their reassignment procedure in 
Western Australia294. The applicant must also believe that the gender they are applying to be 
reassigned to is their true gender, have “adopted the lifestyle” and have “the gender 
characteristics of a person of the gender to which the person has been reassigned”295. The 
applicant must also produce evidence that they have received counselling in relation to their 
gender identity296. Once a recognition certificate has been granted the registrar should amend 
the register accordingly if the persons birth was registered in Western Australia297. The 
certificate itself is considered to be evidence that a person is of the sex stated on it and that 
they have undergone sexual reassignment surgery298. A recognition certificate may be 
cancelled if it is discovered to have been obtained through fraud299. Once the register has 
 
291 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Amendment Bill 2019, Located at 
www.legislation.vic.gov.au/domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubPDocs.nsf/ee665e366dcb6cb0ca256da400837f6b/F
667B734DE4F601BCA25841D000E43C1/$FILE/591082bi1.pdf, accessed 23/08/2019 
292 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Located at www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 23/08/2019 
293 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Located at www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 23/08/2019, Sections 14-15 
294 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Located at www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 15 
295 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Located at www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 15 (b) (ii) 
296 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Located at www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 15 (b) (iii) 
297 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Located at www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 17 
298 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Located at www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 16 
299 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Located at www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 19 
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been altered a new birth certificate reflecting the sex on the register following alteration can 
be issued, it must not have any indication that it has been amended300. The Act originally 
contained a provision that required that an applicant be unmarried301, this was removed by the 
Gender Reassignment Amendment Act 2019302. 
 
The forms to apply for a recognition certificate are available online and require an applicant 





Birth certificates Summary: 
 
As can be seen from the descriptions above, none of the states and territories approach 
altering birth certificates in the same way. Every state or territory differs from the others in at 
least one way. There are however trends and commonalities. For example every state or 
territory requires some form of evidence, be that a statutory declaration to confirm identity, 
or, most often, declarations or letter from doctors. While there are no other features which are 
shared by every jurisdiction, there are characteristics shared by most jurisdictions. 
 
 
300 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Located at www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 18 
301 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Original Act as passed, Located at, 
https://www.legislation.wa.gov.au/legislation/prod/filestore.nsf/FileURL/mrdoc_4921.pdf/$FILE/Gender%20Re
assignment%20Act%202000%20-%20%5B00-00-03%5D.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 
15(3) 




303 Department of Justice, Births, Deaths and Marriages, Gender Reassignment, Government of Western 




Two out of eight of the jurisdictions require the applicant to be unmarried and to have had 
surgery of some description. Three out of eight of the jurisdictions also require evidence from 
multiple medical professionals.  
 
Six out of eight of the jurisdictions require an application to the registrar to alter the registry, 
have a standard form for the application and require the new birth certificate to contain no 
evidence of alteration. 
 
Every jurisdiction also charges a fee for altering a birth certificate. This may pose a problem, 
as these amendments are, in every jurisdiction, linked to a person’s legal status. Once a birth 
certificate is amended that person is legally of that sex. This means that a person is essentially 
unable to obtain this legal status unless they can afford to pay this fee. While this fee may be 
necessary to cover genuine costs of the system, such as paying for the existence of gender 
recognition panels or other elements of the system. However it may cause concern that a 
percentage of the population will be unable to pay for their correct legal status to be 
recognised. Because a person whose gender matches their gender assigned at birth has no 
need to pay such a fee, this creates a situation where trans people with binary genders and 
cisgender people are both entitled to recognition under the law, but the transgender person 
must pay. This may be an example of indirect discrimination, as there is a universal 
entitlement that only members of a minority group must pay for, although it may be justified, 











There is a fair amount of case law on gender recognition in Australia, particularly as it relates 
to transexuals. While an exploration of this history would no doubt be interesting, this has 
been done in other publications, so this section will be fairly brief, mentioning only a few key 
cases. 
 
Up until recently the prevailing case law was based very much on the notion that surgery was 
required, but that someone who had had surgery would be considered to be the corresponding 
sex. This includes situations such as R v Harris304 where Lee Harris was found to be a woman 
under the law and thus not liable for procuring “another” male person to commit an act of 
indecency. Key to the reasoning in this case was the idea of bringing one’s psychological 
gender and physical characteristics into “harmony”. It was concluded that one’s 
chromosomes or the idea of an unchangeable biological sex at birth should not be decisive, 
rather, a person’s gender should be legally recognised once there is sufficient change that 
there is “harmony” between ones gender and physical appearance305. This is interesting given 
the particular facts of the case, as arguably there was not full “harmony” between physical 
and mental, as Lee Harris was unable to have vaginal intercourse due to a closing up of her 
vagina following surgery306. This complication was deemed irrelevant by the court as it was 
“temporary” despite the fact that this condition would not fix itself and would require surgery 
to remedy307. The case has been criticised not only as it seems strange that the capacity for 
heterosexual sex be the deciding factor in the criminal law in general, but also particularly in 
this case as the incident in question was one of oral sex with a cisgender man, which did not 
involve any vaginas of any kind308.  
 
This state of affairs, with a focus on physical sex, and specificity the ability to participate in 
specific heterosexual sex acts. Continued with the case of Secretary, Department of Social 
Security v. SRA309. This case concerned a pre-operative trans woman who wished to be 
recognised as female to qualify for a wife’s pension. Despite qualifying for surgery, she had 
 
304 R v Harris and McGuiness [1989] 17 NSWLR 158 
305 R v Harris and McGuiness [1989] 17 NSWLR 158 at 193 
306 R v Harris and McGuiness [1989] 17 NSWLR 158 at 173 
307 R v Harris and McGuiness [1989] 17 NSWLR 158 at 193 
308 From Functionality to Aesthetics: the Architecture of Transgender Jurisprudence, Andrew N Sharpe LLB 
(Hons), [2001] MurUEJL 4, Paragraph 8, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2001/4.html#t20, accessed 01/09/2019 
309 Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA [1993] FCA 573 
67 
 
decided not to undergo it for financial reasons310. Under the precedent set in Harris the prime 
factor to be considered would have to have been physical sex, particularly with regard to the 
ability to engage in penetrative heterosexual intercourse. However it was argued that this case 
should be distinguished from Harris as Harris was a criminal case, and that pensions do not 
require the same understanding of sex as criminal law. This argument was, however, rejected. 
The court stated that to be recognised as their “new” gender a transgender person must have 
“harmonized their social and anatomical sex”, and that without that harmonization a person 
could not be considered to be male or female311. Lockhart J justifies the requirement for 
surgery despite that the individual in this case was not able to afford it by stating: 
“Nevertheless the interests of society and the individual must be balanced in the 
determination of the ordinary meaning of the words with which this case is concerned and the 
application of the facts to those meanings. The requirement of reassignment surgery also has 
the benefit of society acknowledging that an irreversible medical decision has been made, 
confirming the person's psychological attitude.”312 
He then goes on to state that sex is not solely a matter of chromosomes but is partly 
psychological and social313 and that the terms man or woman refer to someone who has 
harmonized their physical sex with their mental one. He acknowledges that such a person 
cannot reproduce, but they are functionally a member of their new sex, as they can have 
intercourse, and that they appear to be physically, as they have acquired the secondary traits 
of their sex. He states that “A transsexual who has undergone successful sex reassignment 
has an apparently normal female anatomy and she will feel convinced that she belongs to her 
new sex and that she has achieved an integrated identity by adopting the physical 
characteristics of the female to her psychological nature.”314 
 
This case has been referred to as the start of a move away from requiring a person to have the 
physical “function” of their “acquired sex” and towards the aesthetics of their new sex315, as 
while function is mentioned it is clear that that is not a key requirement, particularly has 
 
310 Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA [1993] FCA 573, at para 2 
311 Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA [1993] FCA 573 at para 98 
312 Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA [1993] FCA 573 at para 98 
313 Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA [1993] FCA 573 at para 94 
314 Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA [1993] FCA 573 at para 95 
315 From Functionality to Aesthetics: The Architecture of Transgender Jurisprudence, Andrew N Sharpe LLB 
(Hons), [2001] MurUEJL 4, Paragraph 15, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2001/4.html#t20, accessed 01/09/2019 
68 
 
Lockheart J states that it is not possible for a female to male trangender person to acquire 
such “functionality” but this does not preclude them from recognition as a man316. While it 
will be discussed in more detail in the concluding chapters of this thesis it is interesting to 
note this at this stage, particularly as Lockheart J discusses this in terms of balancing the 
needs of the individual and those of society, and states that societies interest is in ensuring 
that the words “male and female” persist in their meaning, which he then goes on to discuss 
in terms of “feeling convinced” that a person belongs to their new sex by adopting certain 
physical characteristics. As the purpose of recognition is key to any discussion of its function, 
the reasoning here is particularly noteworthy as it implies that the purpose of recognition is to 
apply labels based on physical appearances, as no change in label can be made with only a 
mental difference, the physical aspect being the deciding factor.  
It is also interesting to note the Lockheart J adds that there is a benefit from society in 
withholding recognition unless an irreversible medical decision has been made. This seems to 
indicate a view that society has an interest in withholding recognition unless it is irreversible, 
perhaps also requiring a person to demonstrate their authenticity.  
 
The most recent case on binary gender recognition from Australia is AB v Western 
Australia317. This case concerned two FTM (Female to Male) transsexuals who sought to be 
recognised as men. They had applied to the gender recognition panel of western Australia as 
per the Gender Reassignment Act 2000318, but their application had been declined as they had 
not received genital surgery. Thus the case hinged on whether or not the act permitted a pre- 
operative trans person to be recognised, which relied on the wording in section 15 (b) which 
requires that: 
 
“(b) The Board is satisfied that the person— 
 (i) believes that his or her true gender is the gender to which the person has been reassigned; 
and 
 
316 Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA [1993] FCA 573 at para 95 
317 AB v Western Australia [2011] HCA 42 




(ii) has adopted the lifestyle and has the gender characteristics of a person of the gender to 
which the person has been reassigned; and 
(iii)has received proper counselling in relation to his or her gender identity.”319 
 
In particular the wording in 15(b)(ii), requiring a person to have “the gender characteristics” 
of the gender they wish to be recognised as were at issue. The gender recognition board 
stated that having a female reproductive system was inconsistent with being male and with 
being identified as such , and that there would be adverse social consequences if it were 
possible to be recognised as male while retaining the ability to bear children320. This 
argument however did not find favour with the high court which instead followed the 
reasoning that because section 3 of the act defines gender characteristics as “the physical 
characteristics by virtue of which a person is identified as male or female”, and that a person 
is primarily identified by their external characteristics, that section 15(b)(ii) is only concerned 
with external characteristics. It was argued that if the act wished to refer to all characteristics, 
then it would have referred to the characteristics of the sex that a person “is or will be” rather 
than the sexual characteristics by which a person is identified as a member of a sex321. 
 
Finally the most recent case in this area, and of particular importance in the cases of intersex 
people and those with non-binary genders is the case of NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages v Norrie322. Norrie May-Welby was born in Scotland with “ambiguous genitalia” 
and underwent a surgical procedure in 1989 to rectify this. It did not, in her view, resolve her 
“ambiguous” status, and in 2009 applied to be recognised as “non-specific” under the Births, 
Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995323.The registrar submitted that this application 
should not be granted, as the act assumed the existence of only two sexes, which are referred 
to as being “opposite” each other324.  
 
 
319 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Section 15 (b), Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 03/09/2019 
320 AB v Western Australia [2011] HCA 42 at Para 12 
321 AB v Western Australia [2011] HCA 42 at Para 22 
322 NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 
323 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/bdamra1995383/ 
324 NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 at para 28 
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The court rejected this argument, pointing out that the act itself recognises that a person’s sex 
may be ambiguous, in its definition of sex affirmation procedure325. The court also pointed 
out the mention in AB v Western Australia that "the sex of a person is not ... in every case 
unequivocally male or female."326. The court also stated that the act ought not to be 
interpreted in such a way that it would force a person who is neither male nor female to be 
recognised as such erroneously327. The court also responded to the argument presented by the 
registrar that to permit people to be recognised as male or female would cause confusion in 
other legal areas and leave people in a “legal no-man’s land” by stating that this issue only 
really arose in regards to marriage, and that the argument ought not to be considered as it is 
merely an argument from inconvenience328.  
 
This judgement could represent an “opening up” of sex categories to expand beyond the 
binary, and following this case states and territories did begin to allow registration as non-
binary or intersex, particularly following the introduction of marriage equality in 2018329. 
However this “opening up” of sex categories may have been due more to the Australian 
government issuing guidelines on sex and gender in 2013330, or a combination of these 
events. However following the judgement Joanna Davidson wrote in the journal of the New 
South Wales Bar Association that “The decision removes the prospect that the potential 
categories of registration of sex under the Act are indeterminate. Registrable classifications of 
sex under Pt 5A are confined to male, female and non-specific.”331  
This demonstrates an alternate perspective, that rather than opening up the scope of legally 
recognised gender, such cases “lock down” the available options to male, female and “non-
specific” rather than allowing scope for our understandings of sex or gender to expand 
beyond these categories. A similar perspective can be seen in the concerns of intersex groups, 
that such classification may reinforce the gender/sex binary by creating a definitive “other” 
 
325 NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 at para 1 
326 NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 at para 37 
327 NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 at para 32 
328 NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 At paras 43 and 44 
329 Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious Freedoms) Act 2017 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018C00423 accessed 06/08/2019 
330 Australian Government Guidelines on the Recognition of Sex and Gender, Australian Government, July 
2013, Updated November 2015, Paragraph 2, Located at 
https://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Documents/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGe
nder/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGender.pdf accessed 11/08/2019 
331 "Non-specific gender" Davidson, Joanna [2014] NSWBarAssocNews 24, page 12.  
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category rather than acknowledging the flawed nature of a strict male/female distinction332, as 
well as concerns that such classification may undermine the efforts of transgender people 







One of the main areas where gender identification can have a prominent role is in prisons. 
Australia is no exception to this. As with birth certificates, how people are housed in prisons 
based on their gender or sex is a matter for each of the states or territories to decide, and, as is 
also the case with recognition on birth certificates, no two jurisdictions have taken the same 
approach. As such the approach taken by each jurisdiction will be discussed in turn, followed 
by trends in these policies. 
 
 
Australian Capital Territory: 
 
The capital territory has one of the longer and more detailed policies on this matter. The 
policy requires that a prisoner’s self-identified identity be recorded when they are received by 
a correctional centre334. While the decision as to how a transgender or intersex person is to be 
made by the superintendent, there are guidelines as to what factors should be considered. 
These are: the self-identified identity of the prisoner, the nature of their offence and criminal 
 
332 Intersex Human Rights Australia, On Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages, Gina Wilson, 
22/06/2013, Located at https://ihra.org.au/22681/norrie-v-nsw-registrar-of-births-deaths-and-marriages/, 
accessed 26/08/2019 
333 "No Man's Land': Non-binary Sex Identification in Australian Law and Policy", Bennett, Theodore,(2014) 37 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 847 
334 Australian Capital Territory Corrections Management (Reception and Management of Transgender 
Prisoners) Policy 2007* Notifiable instrument NI2007-469 located at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/ni/2007-
469/20071219-35655/pdf/2007-469.pdf at 2.5 
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history, their correctional history and any risks to the safety of the prisoner or to others335. 
The policy states that “Ideally, the prisoner should be placed in single cell accommodation, or 
with other prisoners who self-identify as transgender/intersex, and given access to a private 
toilet and shower facilities”336 and that, unless there is some concern for safety, a transgender 
or intersex person should be housed in a facility appropriate to their self-identified gender337. 
 
 
New South Wales 
 
In New South Wales the policy divides those to whom it applies into three groups: recognised 
transgender, transgender and intersex. Recognised transgender people are those who have 
sought formal recognition on a birth certificate or other document. Recognised transgender 
people are to be housed according to the sex recognised on their documentation338. 
Transgender people who do not fall into the category of recognised transgender need only 
express their self-identified gender and should be treated as a member of that gender339. 
Similarly intersex people are to be treated as members of the gender they identify as. While a 
recognised transgender person is always to be treated as the sex identified on their 
documentation, intersex and transgender people who do not fall into this category are treated 
slightly differently. While they are, by default, to be treated as members of the gender to 
which they identify, they can, if it is deemed more appropriate, be housed in a facility based 
on their biological sex. This decision is to be made based on the nature of a person’s offence, 
 
335 Australian Capital Territory Corrections Management (Reception and Management of Transgender 
Prisoners) Policy 2007* Notifiable instrument NI2007-469 located at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/ni/2007-
469/20071219-35655/pdf/2007-469.pdf at 3.1 
336 Australian Capital Territory Corrections Management (Reception and Management of Transgender 
Prisoners) Policy 2007* Notifiable instrument NI2007-469 located at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/ni/2007-
469/20071219-35655/pdf/2007-469.pdf at 3.2 
337 Australian Capital Territory Corrections Management (Reception and Management of Transgender 
Prisoners) Policy 2007* Notifiable instrument NI2007-469 located at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/ni/2007-
469/20071219-35655/pdf/2007-469.pdf at 3.3 
338 Corrective Services NSW Operations Procedures Manual Section 7.23 Management of Transgender and 
Intersex Inmates. Located at http://www.correctiveservices.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/custodial-op-proc-
manual/OPM%20Sec%207.23%20Management%20of%20Transgender%20and%20Intersex%20inmates%20v2
.0.pdf at 7.23.2 paragraph 1 
339 Corrective Services NSW Operations Procedures Manual Section 7.23 Management of Transgender and 
Intersex Inmates. Located at http://www.correctiveservices.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/custodial-op-proc-
manual/OPM%20Sec%207.23%20Management%20of%20Transgender%20and%20Intersex%20inmates%20v2
.0.pdf at 7.23.2 paragraph 2 
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their custodial history and any relevant safety concerns340. It is also worth noting that the 
policy requires that if a transgender or intersex person identifies in such a way that they 
should, under the policy, be housed in a women's prison a member of staff from the women's 
prison must be present at their assessment. No such requirement exists for those who are 





The Northern Territory does not currently appear to have a policy on the housing of 







Queensland does not currently have a specific policy on intersex or transgender people in 
prison341. However a 2006 Anti-discrimination Commission report recommended that an 
approach based on self-identification be adopted342. 
 
In its response to the report the Department of Corrective Services stated that: 
 
340 Corrective Services NSW Operations Procedures Manual Section 7.23 Management of Transgender and 
Intersex Inmates. Located at http://www.correctiveservices.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/custodial-op-proc-
manual/OPM%20Sec%207.23%20Management%20of%20Transgender%20and%20Intersex%20inmates%20v2
.0.pdf at 7.23.2 paragraph 5 
341 Women in prison report 2006 10.5 Transgender female prisoners Anti Discrimination Commission 
Queensland , Located athttps://www.adcq.qld.gov.au/human-rights/women-in-prison-report/women-in-prison-
contents/groups-with-special-needs/transgender located at https://www.adcq.qld.gov.au/human-rights/women-
in-prison-report/women-in-prison-contents/groups-with-special-needs/transgender, accessed 17/01/2021, at 
paragraph 3 
342 Queensland Women in prison report 2006 10.5 Transgender female prisoners, Anti Discrimination 
Commission Queensland, Located at https://www.adcq.qld.gov.au/human-rights/women-in-prison-




“The Department’s approach to the placement and accommodation of transgender prisoners 
is to deal with each matter on a case by case basis and weight up the various considerations 
which may include such factors as: • the risk the offender may pose to the safety and security 
of the placement facility; • whether the offender has been convicted of a sexual offence, 
involving a child, in Queensland or elsewhere; • the risk to the offender or to other offenders 
at the placement facility; and the offender's preference for accommodation in a male or 
female facility.”343 
 
It is worth noting that this approach referred to in the response to the report does not offer any 
order in which the relevant factors should be considered, unlike many jurisdictions with 
policies which consider similar factors, but also say that by default a person should be housed 





South Australia does, according to at least one article available online, have a policy. It relies 
on a person’s biological sex and the sex recorded on official document344, However I have 







343 Department of Corrective Services response to The Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland Women in 
Prison Report march 2006, located at 
www.correctiveservices.qld.gov.au/Publications/Corporate_Publications/Reviews_and_Reports/ADCQ/Respons
eFINALlowres.pdf at page 56 paragraph 2 
344 Trends and Issues in crime and criminal justice, Transgender Inmates, Jake Blight, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, September 2000 No168, Located at aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi168.pdf, 
accessed 17/01/2021 page 4 para 7 
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In Victoria prisoners are initially housed according to the gender on their warrant. If that 
person makes it known that they are transgender or intersex then the prison medical officer 
must be informed immediately346. As soon as possible after the arrival of such a prisoner a 
Sentence Management panel must be convened. The placement of the transgender or intersex 
prisoner will be determined by the panel which will consider the following factors: 
confirmation of the prisoners gender in consultation with the prisoners general practitioner 
when possible, the safety and well-being of the prisoner, the prisoner’s preference as to where 
they are to be housed and the safety and welfare of other prisoners347. The safety of the 





Western Australia does not have a policy that specifically mentions transgender or intersex 
people. It does however have a general policy which states that the gender of a prisoner for 
the purpose of placement is to be determined by their warrant or whatever instrument 
authorised their imprisonment349. 
 
 
345 Department of Justice prison service, Policies and procedures, Directors Standing Orders, Tasmanian 
Government, Located at www.justice.tas.gov.au/prisonservice/Policies_and_Procedures 
346 Commissioner’s Requirement – Management of Prisoners with Intersex Conditions or Transsexualism  
march 2016 CR Number 2.4.1, at 6.2.1 
347 Commissioner’s Requirement – Management of Prisoners with Intersex Conditions or Transsexualism  
march 2016 CR Number 2.4.1 at 6.3.6 
348 Commissioner’s Requirement – Management of Prisoners with Intersex Conditions or Transsexualism  
march 2016 CR Number 2.4.1 at 6.3.7 
349 Policy Directive 85 Prisoner Reception – procedures, Government of Western Australia Department of 
corrective services, Located at http://www.correctiveservices.wa.gov.au/_files/prisons/adult-custodial-








There are a number of trends that can be observed from these policies. Most policies allow 
for a consideration of multiple factors, with safety and the self-identification of the individual 
in question being the most commonly emphasised factors. While a number of policies 
recognise the existence of intersex people and those with non-binary genders, none of the 
policies in Australia have any specific measures for intersex people or those with non-binary 
genders, they are instead mentioned as a part of policies relating more broadly to transgender 
people. 
 
It should be noted that the federal system, while it makes legal research more time consuming 
may have advantages. The main beneficial feature of a federal system is that it allows the 
states and territories to function as “laboratories of democracy”. Having many different 
policies provides a unique opportunity to observe how variations in law can cause different 
outcomes, allowing us to evaluate which policy paths are the most productive. However, in 
Australia, particularly with regards to prisons, some problems exist which serve to minimise 
this beneficial feature of a federal system. Firstly some jurisdictions do not have their policies 
available to the public. While there may be reasons for this such as security concerns 
particularly where prisons are concerned, it does make any research regarding those policies 
significantly more difficult. Secondly, in order to make evaluations about the efficacy of 
these policies it would be necessary to collect and make available data about the outcomes of 
these policies. Such data does not seem to be available to the public in most cases, and would 
likely take an effort beyond the scope of this thesis to obtain.  
 
It is worth noting that every policy that I have located in Australia allows for judgements to 
be made on a case by case basis. This allows for flexibility on individual cases, but does open 
the system up to accusations of inconsistency. More data would be needed to say that that is 
the case in these cases, but it is a weakness often encountered by systems that rely heavily on 
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case by case judgements. It is also worth noting that some jurisdictions have attempted to 
retain the flexibility of a case by case system while also guiding outcomes by either having a 
default state, deviation from which must be justified, or by making clear the importance of 








Marriage in Australia is governed by the marriage act 1961350. Section 5 of the act defines 
marriage as: 
“The union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for 
life.” 
This wording was added by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004351 and was intended to 
prevent the possibility of same-sex marriage352.  
 
The earliest case on the issue of marriage and intersex people in Australia was In the 
marriage of C and D (falsely called C)353. This case concerned a marriage in which the 
husband “had been diagnosed as a hermaphrodite”. This case used the definition of marriage 
found in the British case of Hyde v Hyde354 that marriage is “the voluntary union for life of 
one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others”355 and that, as the husband in the case 
 
350 Marriage Act 1961 
351 The Marriage Amendment Act 2004, Schedule 1 (1) 
352 House of representatives, explanatory memorandum Marriage Amendment Bill 2004, The parliament of the 
commonwealth of Australia, Located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/mab2004175/memo1.html 
353 In the marriage of C and D (falsely called C) (1979) 35 FLR 340 
354 Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee. [L.R.] 1 P. & D. 130 (1886) 
355 Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee. [L.R.] 1 P. & D. 130 (1886) at para 13 
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could not be considered a man, and was instead a mixture of male and female, a valid 
marriage could not have taken place356. 
 
This would seem to suggest that, under this case law, an intersex person could not marry in 
Australia. However, the later case of Re Kevin357 would address this issue in a different 
context and may shed light as to how a similar case to C and D would be decided today. 
 
Re Kevin concerned a post-operative female to male transsexual who, having married a 
woman, sought a declaration of the validity of the marriage358. The court ultimately decided 
to follow the reasoning in R v Harris359 and Secretary, Department of Social Security v 
SRA360, that a post-operative transsexual should be considered to be of the gender of their 
“reassignment”. But Re Kevin is particularly of note because of some of the other arguments 
made and the mentions of in the marriage of C and D.  
 
One of the particularly interesting arguments made in that case was that transsexualism 
should be considered to be a form of intersex condition. The argument was specifically that 
an intersex condition is when a person’s physical state is “between” male and female in some 
way. The argument continues that because there is some data to suggest that the brain of a 
transsexual is more similar to their true gender than the one assigned at birth, that this can be 
considered a physical state which is in-between male and female, and should therefore be 
considered an intersex condition361. As such it was argued that this case should be considered 
to be more similar to WvW362 than the Corbett363 case that C and D was based on364. WvW 
concerned an intersex person, who had gender confirmation surgery and lived as a woman. In 
that case it was found that she should be considered female for the purposes of marriage365. 
Because the court found the approach in WvW to be more compelling than that of Corbett, 
 
356 In the marriage of C and D (falsely called C) (1979) 35 FLR 340 
357 Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual)[2003] FamCA 94 
358 Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual)[2003] FamCA 94 paragraph 3 
359 R v Harris and McGuiness [1989] 17 NSWLR 158 
360 Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA [1993] FCA 573 
361 Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual)[2003] FamCA 94 paragraphs 183 - 186 
362 W v W (Physical inter-sex) [2001] Fam 111 
363 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8 
364 Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual)[2003] FamCA 94 paragraph 291 
365 W v W (Physical inter-sex) [2001] Fam 111 At 147 para 1 
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partly due to new evidence on the nature of transsexualism, and partly due to Corbett 
seeming inconsistent with other Australian cases366, the court decided that Kevin, for the 
purposes of marriage, should be considered a man. 
 
The court, because it found that Kevin's case was similar to an intersex person, also discussed 
“In the marriage of C”. The court stated that “In the marriage of C” was:  “wrongly decided 
and should not be regarded as expressing the law in this country.”367  
 
While it is possible to argue that this statement in Re Kevin is obiter dicta, and therefore non-
binding, this may not be the case. Because one of the key points in Re Kevin was that the 
court regarded the case as being similar to an intersex case, due to the notion of “brain sex” it 
could be possible to argue that Re Kevin could in fact be regarded as a case about a type of 
intersex person, even if Kevin did not identify as such. It is also possible that it may not in 
fact matter if this statement in Re Kevin is strictly binding, as it may still be representative of 
the feelings of the judiciary about In the marriage of C. As such it may be that while Re 
Kevin may not be binding on the topic of intersex marriage, it may still be indicative of how 
such a case would be decided today. 
 
It is also worth noting that Kevin was post-operative, and as such the decision in this case 
should only be interpreted as referring to those who have had some form of gender 
confirmation surgery368. However while previous courts have stated that the status of pre-
operative transgender persons is a matter for parliament to decide, the court in Re Kevin 
pointed out that it seems inconsistent that parliament be required to act to establish the legal 
status of people based solely on if they have had surgery. The court also pointed out that, due 
to the notion of “brain sex” that it mentioned earlier in its judgement, if that is to be the 
decisive factor, as it was in this case, then requiring a person to have surgery to count as their 
true gender for the purposes of marriage seems strange, as their brain sex is the same 
regardless of if they have had surgery369.  
 
366 Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual)[2003] FamCA 94 paragraphs 291 and 374 
367 Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual)[2003] FamCA 94 paragraphs 205 and 231 
368 Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual)[2003] FamCA 94 paragraph 382 




Because the legal status of those with non-binary genders and intersex people was not clear 
when it comes to marriage, partly due to the lack of a case specifically on that matter which is 
more recent than In the marriage of C, Intersex advocacy groups advocated for the explicit 
inclusion of intersex people in a possible future marriage bill which would permit same-sex 
marriage370. 
 
The issue of transgender and intersex people having their marriage rights denied or restricted 
was largely based on the fact that only heterosexual marriages were recognised, which caused 
difficulties when determining what the law should recognise a person’s sex to be in those 
cases. However starting in 2016 the Australian government and legislature began to move 
towards expanding marriage to include homosexual unions371. This is relevant for the 
purposes of this thesis as certain implementations of this can allow for marriage to be opened 
to all couples, regardless of the genders or sexes of the participants, which can remove the 




In September 2016 the national government introduced the Plebiscite (Same-Sex Marriage) 
Bill 2016372 which would allow for a plebiscite on the question of “Should the law be 
changed to allow same-sex couples to marry?”373. This was defeated in a vote on the 7th of 
November 2016374. Following this the government announced their intention to gather data 
on the wishes of the population regarding same-sex marriage using a survey through the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, which would then inform subsequent legislation, rather than 
 
370 Marriage and people with intersex variations, a submission, Olli Australia, Located at 
https://oii.org.au/31139/submission-marriage-amendment-2017/#d20Parts 4 and 6 
371 With the induction of the Plebiscite (Same-Sex Marriage) Bill 2016, Located at  
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r5728_first-
reps/toc_pdf/16133b01.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf  accessed 05/08 2019 
372 Ibid 
373 Ibid 
374 Bills and Legislation, Plebiscite (Same-Sex Marriage) Bill 2016, Parliamentary Business, Parliament of 





requiring a plebiscite375. This was the implemented by an order from the treasurer, Scott, 
John Morrison, to the Australian Statistician, and by extension the Bureau of Statistics, under 
section 9(1)b of the Census and Statistics Act376 which allows for a notice in writing 
requiring the statistician377 to collect data for a specific purpose378. This notice was dated 
9/08/2017379. 
 
The survey was subject to two legal challenges in the High Court, one concerning the 
legitimacy of the funds for the survey under the Appropriation Act380381, the other relating to 
matters under the Appropriation Act as well as a claim that the Statistics Direction was not 
authorized under the Statistics Act382. These cases were heard together on the 5th, 6th and 7th 
of September 2017, with the Ruling issued on the 7th383 and the reasons being published on 
the 28th384. The applications were dismissed in both cases, allowing the survey to proceed385. 
As the relevance of this case for this thesis is as a matter of historical context, rather than as 
precedent, a full analysis of the legal reasoning is beyond the scope of this thesis. Additional 
safeguards were introduced in an additional piece of legislation, which created specific 
offences of bribing a person regarding their response on the survey and of accepting such a 
 
375 Same-Sex Marriage: Peter Dutton confirms push for a postal vote plebiscite, Matthew Knott, Amy Remeikis, 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 23/04/2016, Located at https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/samesex-
marriage-peter-dutton-confirms-push-for-a-postal-vote-plebiscite-20170323-gv4h1m.html accessed 05/08/2019 
376 Census and Statistics Act 1905, located at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/dnss/docViewer.aspx?docID=1993 , 
accessed 05/08/2019 
377 An office defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics Act 1975, Section 5 (2), located at  
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2012C00137, accessed 05/08/2019 
378 Census and Statistics Act 1905, Section 9 (1) (b) located at 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/dnss/docViewer.aspx?docID=1993 , accessed 05/08/2019 
379 Census and Statistics (statistical Information) Direction 2017, 09/08/2017, located at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170810014829/https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2017L01006 accessed 
05/08/2019 
380 Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2017-2018 No. 60, 2017, Section 10, located at 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017A00060 accessed 06/08/2019 
381 Wilkie v The Commonwealth;  Australian Marriage Equality Ltd v Cormann [2017] HCA 40, Located at 
eresources.hcourt.gov.au/downloadPdf/2017/HCA/40, accessed 06/08/2019, paragraph 54 
382 Wilkie v The Commonwealth;  Australian Marriage Equality Ltd v Cormann [2017] HCA 40, Located at 
eresources.hcourt.gov.au/downloadPdf/2017/HCA/40, accessed 06/08/2019, Paragraph 51 
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bribe386, as well a civil penalty for vilifying a person for their view regarding the survey387 
and introduced a number of other safeguards such as those relating to the production and 
retention of documents relating to the survey388 and the actions of broadcasters regarding the 
survey389.  
 
The survey collection was open between 12 September 2017 and 7 November 2017390 to 
anyone  “on, or had made a valid application to join, the Commonwealth electoral roll at 
close of business 24 August 2017”391. A total of 12,727,920 people participated, 
approximately 79.5% of those eligible392. The results were published on the 15th of November 
2017393, with 61% of those surveyed responding that the law should be changed to allow 
same-sex couples to marry394. 
 
Following the postal survey the government introduced the Marriage Amendment Act395. 
This act amends the Marriage Act 1961 in a number of ways, most notably by replacing the 
 
386 Marriage Law Survey (Additional Safeguards) Act 2017, Located at 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017A00096 accessed 05/08/2019, Section 13 
387 Marriage Law Survey (Additional Safeguards) Act 2017, Located at 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017A00096 accessed 05/08/2019, Section 15 
388 Marriage Law Survey (Additional Safeguards) Act 2017, Located at 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017A00096 accessed 05/08/2019, Sections 2-9 
389 Marriage Law Survey (Additional Safeguards) Act 2017, Located at 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017A00096 accessed 05/08/2019, Sections 11-12 
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393 1088.0 Australian Marriage Law Postal Survey, 2017, Media Release, Australia supports changing the law to 
allow same-sex couples to marry, Australian Bureau of statistics, 15 November 2017, Located at 
https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbyReleaseDate/C2DA40601247126DCA2582240
0106775?OpenDocument, accessed 06/08/2019 
394 1088.0 Australian Marriage Law Postal Survey, 2017, National Results, Australian Bureau of statistics, 
https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1800.0~2017~Main%20Features~Results~1 
accessed 06/08/2019 
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words “a man and a woman”396 with the words “2 People”397. It also introduces other changes 
to render the legislation more gender neutral including replacing the words “A brother and 
sister”398 with “2 siblings”399 when addressing the types of pre-existing relationships that 
render a marriage void. The Amendment Act also introduced a right for ministers of a 
religion to refuse to solemnize a marriage if to do so would be contrary to their beliefs or the 
doctrine of their religion400. It is worth noting that this applies to any marriage, rather than 
only granting a right to refuse same-sex marriages. The applicability of this right to all 
marriages means that there is no need for a legal category of “same-sex marriages” and thus 
no need to identify which marriages are “same-sex” which eliminates any need to determine 
the sex of the participants which is the core of the marriage based issues faced by intersex 
and transgender people.  
 
This implementation of same-sex marriage may perhaps be more aptly called “marriage 
equality”. This is because rather than creating a new category of permitted marriages which 
may occur between persons of the same sex, it instead universalizes marriage regardless of 
sex, gender or sexual orientation. This implementation removes the requirement to determine 
the sex or gender of the participants and does not apportion rights based on the sex or gender 
of the participants, resulting in a situation where there is highly unlikely to be any difficulty 
in accessing marriage among transgender or intersex people, regardless of their gender 
identity or physical characteristics in Australia unless the legislation is changed. It is 
interesting to note that despite the impact of the Marriage Amendment Act on trans and 
intersex people that there were no intersex or transgender people represented on the campaign 
materials during the 2017 survey401. As such this may be an example of how legislation 
intended to remedy injustice experienced by one group, in this case the predominantly LGB 
 
396 Marriage Act 1961, Located at https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00938 accessed 06/08/2019, 
Section 5 (1) 
397 Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious Freedoms) Act 2017, 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018C00423 accessed 06/08/2019, Section 3 
398 Marriage Act 1961, Located at https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00938 accessed 06/08/2019, 
Section 23 (2) (b) 
399 Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious Freedoms) Act 2017, 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018C00423 accessed 06/08/2019, Section 7 
400 Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious Freedoms) Act 2017, 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018C00423 accessed 06/08/2019, Section 20 
401 Media@LSE Working Paper Series, Straightening out Same Sex Marriage for 'all' Australians, Tate Soller, 
Page 21 Located at www.lse.ac.uk/media-and-communications/assets/documents/research/msc-
dissertations/2018/soller.pdf accessed 07/08/2019 
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people featured in materials produced by the yes campaign, can benefit another section of the 
population.  
 
It is worth noting that while this document addresses the implementation of marriage equality 
in Australia beginning with the 2016 Plebiscite Bill there have been a number of previous 
attempts to amend the Marriage Act to produce such a result, beginning in 2004402. However 
to recount the entire history would constitute a lengthy aside and is better addressed by 






Australian passports are managed on a federal level by the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade. Australian passports contain a field in which a person can be recognised as Male (M) 
Female (F) or “indeterminate/intersex/unspecified”404 (X). While the form required to amend 
this field on one’s passport refers to gender405, as do example images of Australian 
passports406, international standards refer to this field as denoting sex407.  
 
 
402 Same Sex Relationships (Ensuring Equality) Bill 2004, Located at 
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r2057_first/toc_pdf/04079b01.pdf;fileType=appli
cation%2Fpdf accessed 07/08/2019 
403, Parliamentary Library Quick Guide, Research paper series, 2017-2018, Chronology of Same-sex marriage 
bills introduced into the federal parliament: a quick guide, Deirdre McKeown, Parliament of Australia 
Department of Parliamentary Services, Updated 24 November 2017, Located at 
https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2017/11/apo-nid121006-1122106.pdf accessed 07/08/2019 
404 Passports explained, Sex and gender diverse passport applicants, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Australian Government, Located at https://www.passports.gov.au/passports-explained/how-apply/eligibility-
citizenship-and-identity/sex-and-gender-diverse-passport accessed 07/08/2019 
405 Application for an Australian Travel Document, Form B-14, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,  
Australian Government, Located at https://www.passports.gov.au/file/52/download?token=9gaPS9Bn accessed 
07/08/2019 
406 Unique Student Identifier, Forms of ID, Australian Passport, Australian Government, Located at 
https://www.usi.gov.au/about/forms-id/australian-passport accessed 07/08/2019 
407 Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition 2015, Page 3, International Civil Aviation 




In order to change their gender recognised on the passport an applicant must apply for a new 
passport, with the new passport being issued free of charge if their current passport will be 
valid for at least 2 more years408. This process requires one of the following forms of 
evidence: 
 
“a gender recognition certificate issued by the Gender Reassignment Board, or a revised birth 
certificate showing the new sex issued by an RBDM, or a recognised details certificate, 
which records your new sex and current name, issued by an RBDM. Alternatively, or if you 
are transitioning to another sex, you can obtain a statement from a registered medical 
practitioner or psychologist that you have had or are receiving appropriate clinical treatment 
for gender transition. The nature of the treatment does not have to be specified.”409 
 
The form required to alter ones recognised gender on their passport requires a statement from 
a professional who has a registration number with the Medical Board of Australia or the 
Psychology Board of Australia410. This professional must have either treated the applicant or 
reviewed their history and the form requires them to confirm that the applicant is either 
receiving clinical treatment for a sex/gender transition, is unable to undergo such treatment 
but is transgender and identifies as the gender to be recognised or that the applicant is 
intersex or of indeterminate sex411.   
 
As the form requires either evidence from a doctor or from a psychologist, an intersex person 
choosing recognition may choose to use evidence from a psychologist, who need not be a 
doctor. As it is possible for a psychologist to have no expertise on anatomy, and there is no 
requirement for a physical examination of any kind it is possible for a person to be recognised 
as intersex despite the person providing evidence from a psychologist who has not gathered 
any medical data about a person’s physical state. While this is unlikely, as a psychologist will 
 
408 Passports explained, Sex and gender diverse passport applicants, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Australian Government, Located at https://www.passports.gov.au/passports-explained/how-apply/eligibility-
citizenship-and-identity/sex-and-gender-diverse-passport accessed 07/08/2019 
409 Ibid 
410 Application for an Australian Travel Document, Form B-14, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 





most likely at the very least ask the applicant for their history, they may still be capable of 
providing valid evidence despite possibly being ill equipped to verify anything a patient tells 
them or conduct any further exploration of the issue. This, when combined with the fact that 
the B-14 form refers to gender, suggests that the intersex status being recognised, while using 
a word that traditionally refers to sex, is in fact recognising a kind of gender identity, rather 
than anything about a person’s biology.  
 
The idea of “intersex” being used as a term for a gender identity has been commented on by a 
number of intersex organisations and academics. Intersex Human Rights Australia, one of the 
major intersex advocacy organisations in Australia has stated  
 
“We do not support the creation of sex or gender classifications using the term intersex. 
However, IHRA and other intersex-led organisations support new categories in certain 
circumstances: where they are open to all, irrespective of whether or not an individual has an 
intersex variation, and where they are not named or associated with the term intersex. We 
support multiple and alternative sex classifications. We support such classifications as an 
interim measure: we would prefer that, like with race and religion, identification documents 
do not classify individuals by sex or gender.”412 
 
In line with this the Darlington Statement, which was issued jointly by a number of 
Australian intersex organisations states: 
 
“Regarding sex/gender classifications, sex and gender binaries are upheld by structural 
violence. Additionally, attempts to classify intersex people as a third sex/gender do not 
respect our diversity or right to self-determination. These can inflict wide-ranging harm 
regardless of whether an intersex person identifies with binary legal sex assigned at birth or 
not. 
 
Undue emphasis on how to classify intersex people rather than how we are treated is also a 
 
412 Identification documents, Morgan Carpenter, 4/01/2019, Intersex Human Rights Australia, Located at 
https://ihra.org.au/identities/ accessed 08/08/2019 
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form of structural violence. The larger goal is not to seek new classifications but to end legal 
classification systems and the hierarchies that lie behind them. Therefore: 
 
a.As with race or religion, sex/gender should not be a legal category on birth certificates or 
identification documents for anybody. 
b.While sex/gender classifications remain legally required, sex/gender assignments must be 
regarded as provisional. Given existing social conditions, we do not support the imposition of 
a third sex classification when births are initially registered. 
c.Recognising that any child may grow up to identify with a different sex/gender, and that the 
decision about the sex of rearing of an intersex child may have been incorrect, sex/gender 
classifications must be legally correctable through a simple administrative procedure at the 
request of the individual concerned. 
d.Individuals able to consent should be able to choose between female (F), male (M), non-
binary, alternative gender markers, or multiple options.”413 
 
From this statement and the position of Intersex Human Rights Australia it seems evident that 
a consensus exists among intersex advocates in Australia that in general sex and gender 
identifiers on official documents should be eliminated, but while such identifiers do exist 
there should be no barriers as to which marker an individual uses. Additionally, if such 
markers are used they should not treat intersex as a separate category as this may contribute 
to the stigmatization of intersex people or the misassumption that intersex and non-binary 
identities are the same thing414.  
 
In addition to being regarded as problematic by the intersex community, the recognition of 
intersex specifically as a gender identity as is done in Australia by the passport system has 
been criticised in of itself. Morgan Carpenter points out that intersex identity is polymorphic, 
meaning that it means different things to different people415. However this diversity of 
meanings does not necessarily render recognition of it meaningless as it “asserts the dignity 
 
413 The Darlington Statement, 10 March 2017, Located at darlington.org.au/statement/ accessed 08/08/2019 
414 The “Normalization” of Intersex Bodies and “Othering” of Intersex Identities in Australia 
 Carpenter, M. Bioethical Inquiry (2018) 15: 487. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-018-9855-8  
415 The human rights of intersex people: addressing harmful practices and rhetoric of change, Morgan Carpenter 
(2016) , Reproductive Health Matters, 24:47, 74-84, DOI: 10.1016/ j.rhm.2016.06.003, page 76 paragraph 2 
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of stigmatized embodiment”416, as recognition of an identity in this way demonstrates that 
there is a place for its existence and dignity within society. However many intersex people 
identify within binary genders and not as a separate intersex identity category417, and the 
recognition of intersex as a separate category may minimize the experiences and identities of 
these individuals. There is also a concern that recognition of intersex identity as a “third sex” 
homogenizes intersex experiences in a non-representational way and others intersex people 
outside of the “normal” binary sex categories, rather than widening the scope of what is 
normal418.  
 
The recognition of intersex status in this way, as a gender identity raises a number of 
questions. Is this a recognition of the flexibility of identities and that what is normally seen as 
a set of sexual characteristics can be a crucial part of someone's identity, or does it harken 
back to more essentialist ideas, that a person’s sex and gender identity are essentially the 
same? It may be a way of acknowledging the identities and existences of some intersex 
people while retaining the ability for them to identify with one of the other categories, which 
recognising intersex as a sex category may not have done. While the “true” meaning or intent 
of this measure is unclear, it has been criticised by the intersex community, although the 
Darlington statement sets out a fairly clear guide as to forms of recognition that would be 




The Australian government also has general guidance for the recognition and handling of 
information regarding gender and sex. These guidelines recognise a separation from gender, 
and that intersex people have a variety of gender identities419. The guidelines state that the 
Australian Government is primarily interested in a person’s identity and social footprint, and 
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417 Intersex: Stories and Statistics from Australia. Jones T, Hart B, Carpenter M, et al Cambridge, UK: Open 
Book Publishers, 2016. 
418 The “Normalization” of Intersex Bodies and “Othering” of Intersex Identities in Australia 
 Carpenter, M. Bioethical Inquiry (2018) 15: 487. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-018-9855-8  
419 Australian Government Guidelines on the Recognition of Sex and Gender, Australian Government, July 
2013, Updated November 2015, Located at 
https://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Documents/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGe
nder/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGender.pdf accessed 11/08/2019, Paragraph 2 
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as such information about sex is unlikely to ever be collected, however they also say that 
“Where sex and/or gender information is collected and recorded in a personal record, 
individuals should be given the option to select M (male), F (female) or X 
(Indeterminate/Intersex/Unspecified).”420 which refers to the third category as denoting 
intersex, which, similar to the situation regarding passports seems to refer to intersex as a 
gender identity. However it is worth noting that in both the case of passports and these 
guidelines the X may denote identities other than intersex, in fact the guidelines explicitly 
state that the X category is intended for use by anyone who does not identify as exclusively 
male or female, regardless of what term they use to describe themselves421.  
 
The guidelines also set out a procedure for amending one’s records regarding gender and sex. 
Once a person requests that their record be changed the relevant agencies must respond 
within 30 days422. Sexual reassignment surgery or other medical intervention are not 
required423. However one of the three possible forms of evidence is a statement from a doctor 
or psychologist. The other two are either a valid Australian Government travel document 
such as a passport, or a valid birth certificate from one of the states or territories denoting the 
gender to be recognised424. The third of these forms of evidence is somewhat interesting, as it 
seems to suggest that while the guidelines recognise a difference between sex and gender that 
 
420 Australian Government Guidelines on the Recognition of Sex and Gender, Australian Government, July 
2013, Updated November 2015, Located at 
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the sex field on a birth certificate can be sufficient. This may be an acknowledgement that the 
procedures for amending ones birth certificate in many of the states and territories do not 
recognise a separation between gender and sex and allow an applicant to amend their “sex” 
on the form without changing any of their physical attributes, although some do require 
surgery.  These guidelines were well received by Intersex advocacy groups, including IHRA, 
which particularly praised the acknowledgement that intersex people may want to use the M 
or F categories instead of X, the acknowledgement of gender diversity among intersex people 




Overall the gender recognition systems in Australia are characterised by its diversity as a 
federal jurisdiction and a significant amount of progress on trans and intersex equality in 
recent years. Australia contains both some of the most and least progressive gender 
recognition systems examined in this thesis, however the number of changes in the law that 
have occurred while writing this chapter, and the fact that they seem to trend towards less 
rigorous evidential requirements and more recognition of individual autonomy appears to be 
an indication of progress. This may be due to the fact that Australia is home to some of the 
more active intersex organisations, which may explain the shift in methods of recognition 
used since the Norrie case. The Norrie case concerned the recognition of an intersex person 
via a non-binary marker on their birth certificate426. This initially appeared to be the direction 
that would be taken by Australia as a whole, that of recognising intersex status as a “third 
category”. However it appears that, apart from some purposes such as passports, this 
approach did not become widely favoured, perhaps in part due to the expressions of concern 
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The legal situation in India. 
 
 
The legal situation in India with regards to gender recognition can currently be regarded as 
very much in flux. Following a supreme court ruling in 2014427 the country has been 
attempting to form a national legal gender recognition system where previously none existed. 
This makes it distinct from the UK, which may be reforming its gender recognition system to 
recognise non-binary gender and sex identities, as India has had no recognition system to 
revamp, but it can also be seen as distinct from other jurisdictions which are introducing 
recognition measures which previously had none. This is primarily because the cultural 
history surrounding the existence of non-binary gender identities in India is different to a 
 
427National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
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number of other jurisdictions considering implementing legal recognitions for such persons. 
As such the dialogue surrounding such measures, and the means of implementation are 
approached from a unique perspective, and in a few cases seem to have led to unique 
outcomes. 
 
It is at this stage worth noting that India is a diverse country and is home to many diverse 
cultures, and while I will attempt to note that whenever it is relevant, some generalizations 
may occur. In addition it is worth noting that India is also diverse in terms of legal 
jurisdictions, with 29 states and 7 union territories, which each have responsibility for various 
matters involving transgender and intersex people. Due to the workload that examining each 
state or territory individually in detail would present, this piece will instead focus on a few 
states, where the legal provisions for persons with non-binary gender or sex identities are of 
particular interest. Additionally it is worth noting that documentation for each state or 
territory is not equally accessible, which has impacted my ability to provide information 
about them. 
 
Indian law regarding transgender people can be seen as occurring in four phases. The pre-
colonial phase, the colonial phase, the post-colonial phase and the current phase. 
 
The pre-colonial period appears to have been characterized by a greater acceptance of 
transgender and intersex people, although this varied dramatically over time and varied from 
region to region. There is some inconsistency as to whether texts from this period are 
referring to transgender or intersex people, as the word hijra is often used interchangeably for 
both. The term hijra is often translated into English as eunuch, due to the usage of the term to 
refer to eunuchs amongst nobles in the region, particularly during the Mughal empire428. 
However the term now is used to refer to a number of identities, including transgender and 
intersex people, although the terms used and the meanings of those terms can vary based on 
region and culture,  For example the Transgender community in Tamil Nadu refer to 
 
428Historical Evolution of Transgender Community in India, M. Michelraj, Asian Review of Social Sciences 
ISSN: 2249-6319 Vol. 4 No. 1, 2015, pp. 17-19, located at http://www.trp.org.in/wp-




themselves as Aravanis due to identifying with the story of Aravan in the Mahabharata 429.  
Reference to Hijras can be found in the Ramayama, when Rama, after being exiled, bids the 
men and women following him to return to their homes, the hijra among his followers 
remain, and were blessed as a result430. Reference to intersex people can also be found in the 
Manusmriti, a text of Hindu religious law, where they are referred to as being produced when 
an equal amount of male and female seed are present during conception431. However it should 
be noted that the presence an explanation for the existence of intersex people does not 
necessarily correspond to them being treated well, although the nature of the explanation as 
being due to natural phenomena could be regarded as positive, especially when compared to 
early explanations of intersex people in Europe which portrayed intersex people as being the 
product of sins of the mother during pregnancy432. A later passage of the Manusmriti states 
that a pious man should not accept food from a hermaphrodite, which places intersex people 
in the same category as unchaste women and those who have committed mortal sins433. As 
such it may be somewhat of an oversimplification to state that transgender and intersex 
people were universally respected in the pre-colonial period, when their treatment seems to 
vary based on region, culture and time. However their existence was recognised, and they 
could be said for much of the pre-colonial period to have a defined position in society, which 
while it may have varied, may still be regarded as generally better than the position of 
transgender and intersex people in those jurisdictions where they were regarded as sinful, 
perverse or medical curiosities. 
 
During British control over the region the treatment of transgender and intersex people 
worsened significantly434. Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code which criminalized “carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal” was enforced against 
 
429Quality Of Life among Transgenders in Kerala, IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-
JHSS) Volume 22, Issue 7, Ver. 9 (July. 2017) PP 19-24 Aneesh M S located at 
http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol.%2022%20Issue7/Version-9/B2207091924.pdf, accessed 
28/12/2020 
430Cited in National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
paragraph 13 
431 Manusmriti, The Laws of Manu, Translated by George Bühler, located at  
www.hinduwebsite.com/sacredscripts/hinduism/dharma/manusmriti_1.asp Chapter 3 verse 49 
432The Masterpiece and other works, "Aristotle, the Famous Philosopher", Ex-classics Project, 2010, Located at 
https://www.exclassics.com/arist/arist.pdf, accessed 28/12/2020 
433 Manusmriti, The Laws of Manu, Translated by George Bühler, located at  
www.hinduwebsite.com/sacredscripts/hinduism/dharma/manusmriti_1.asp Chapter 4 verse 229 
434As mentioned in National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 
of 2012 paragraph 16 
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the hijra community, as they were often perceived as being homosexual435. In addition to this 
the Criminal Tribes Act436 specifically mandates the creation of registers of those identified 
as eunuchs437, who are defined in the act as those who self-identify as such or any male who 
is found to be impotent after inspection by a medical professional438. While the word eunuch 
is used in the act, not only is this Act cited as impacting hijra communities439, but it is also 
seems reasonable that given the translation of the words hijra and eunuch that when the act 
was enforced the two terms would have been used interchangeably despite not having 
identical meanings. This act required anyone registered in this manner to give a full 
accounting of their property and any held in trust for them and forbade them from making a 
will, acting as a guardian to any minor, making gifts or adopting a son440. The act also 
permits for “Any eunuch so registered who appears, dressed or ornamented like a woman, in 
a public street or in any other place, with the intention of being seen from a public street or 
place, or who dances or plays music or takes part in any public exhibition in a public street or 
place or for hire in a private house” to be arrested without warrant and a to be given a fine of 
an unspecified amount or imprisoned for up to two years441. The act provided no process for a 
person who finds themselves registered under the act, except that they were permitted to 
complain to an officer appointed by the local government, who could decide to keep the entry 
or erase it “as he sees fit”, with no guidance as to how this discretion should be exercised. 
Such decisions could be reviewed by the commissioner, but this review was again solely 
discretionary442. The act was repealed, first in various regions as early as 1947443, and then 
nationally in 1952444. 
 
Following British rule, while the treatment of transgender people could be said to have 
improved somewhat, they were still discriminated against significantly, which left them often 
 
435For example Queen Empress v. Khairati (1884) ILR 6 All 204 
436Criminal Tribes Act 1871 
437Criminal Tribes Act 1871 part 2 
438Criminal Tribes Act 1871 section 24 (b) 
439National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
paragraph 16 
440Criminal Tribes Act 1871 section 29 
441Criminal Tribes Act 1871 section 26 
442Criminal Tribes Act 1871 section 25 
443 Postcolonial penalty: Liberty and repression in the shadow of independence, India c. 1947, Mark Brown, 
Theor Criminol. 2017 May; 21(2): 186–208, Paragraph 28 
444 Postcolonial penality: Liberty and repression in the shadow of independence, India c. 1947, Mark Brown, 
Theor Criminol. 2017 May; 21(2): 186–208, Paragraph 57 
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unable to secure housing and education445. The lack of legislation regarding transgender or 
intersex people posed significant problems for those communities, not only due to lack of 
recognition or legal status, but also due to the lack of clarification on the legality of 
transgender medical procedures, which made a number of practitioners hesitant to treat 
transgender people446. In addition to this some pieces of legislation which posed an issue for 
transgender people during British rule still remained until very recently, particularly section 
377 which remained the law of the land until it was found unconstitutional in 2018447.   
 
The ruling in NLSA v Union India is hoped to bring a close to this period, mandating legal 
recognition and other legal protections for transgender and intersex people in India. Due to its 
scope and possible future impact, as well as the changes already in place due to the ruling, it 
is worth examining in some detail. This case arose from two petitions, addressed together due 
to relating to similar issue relating to the violation of the rights of transgender and intersex 
people in India due to the lack of legal recognition. These petitions, brought by the National 
Legal Services Authority and the Poojaya Mata Nasib Kaur Ji Women Welfare Society, 
alleged that the lack of legal recognition for transgender and intersex people, including the 
various non-binary identities present in India including hijra, results in a violation of their 
rights under sections 14, 16 and 21 of the Indian constitution448. These articles concern 
equality under the law449, equality of opportunity regarding employment by the state or 
appointment to public office450 and protection from deprivation of life or liberty except 
through due process of law451. 
 
The court found that section 14 was violated, with justice K.S. Radhakrishnan noting that 
“Article 14 does not restrict the word ‘person’ and its application only to male or female.”452 
 
445 National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
paragraph 112 
446 Treating transsexuals in India: History, prerequisites for surgery and legal issues, Richie Gupta and Anil 
Murarka, Indian J Plast Surg. 2009 Jul-Dec; 42(2): 226–233, paragraph 1 
447Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India W. P. (Crl.) No. 76 of 2016 D. No. 14961/2016 
448 National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
paragraph 5 
449The Constitution of India, 1949, located at 
https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf section 14 
450The Constitution of India, 1949, located at 
https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf section 16 
451 The Constitution of India, 1949, located at 
https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf section 21 
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The court also found that sufficient evidence had been produced that transgender people did 
face significant discrimination and difficulties, not only in general but also specifically due to 
the lack of legal recognition, particularly in the cases of public bathrooms, interactions with 
the police and education. The court found that this amounted to discrimination on the grounds 
of gender identity or sexual orientation and this was contrary to the equal protections granted 
by article 14453. 
 
Justice Radhakrishnan addresses section 15 together with section 16, section 15 being 
somewhat related to 16, as it prohibits discrimination by the state on a number of grounds, 
including that of sex454. Section 15 also permits the state to take measures to remedy the 
situation of “socially and educationally backward classes”455. The court found that the 
wording of these sections, when they refer to sex, refer to both sex and gender, as the court 
found gender to be a part of sex saying that: 
 
“Both gender and biological attributes constitute distinct components of sex. Biological 
characteristics, of course, include genitals, chromosomes and secondary sexual features, but 
gender attributes include one’s self image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of 
sexual identity and character. The discrimination on the ground of ‘sex’ under Articles 15 and 
16, therefore, includes discrimination on the ground of gender identity. The expression ‘sex’ 
used in Articles 15 and 16 is not just limited to biological sex of male or female, but intended 
to include people who consider themselves to be neither male or female.”456 
 
The court also points out that one of the purposes behind sections 15 and 16 was to prevent 
people from being punished or treated differently because they did not conform to 
stereotypical generalizations of binary genders457. As such even if the court had not found 
 
paragraph 54 
453 National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
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454 The Constitution of India, 1949, located at 
https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf section 15 
455The Constitution of India, 1949, located at 
https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf section 15(4) 





that gender can be considered a part of sex, it is possible that they may stay have found that 
the word sex in these sections intends to include sex because of the intention of those who 
wrote the constitution that protection from discrimination based on sex necessarily must 
mean protection from discrimination due to adopting or failing to adopt gendered behaviours 
or signifiers stereotypically expected of any particular binary sex. 
 
The court found that transgender people had been discriminated against with regards to 
access to public spaces, and to public office, and that this discrimination was contrary to the 
relevant sections of the constitution458. Furthermore the court found that transgender and 
intersex people should be considered a “socially backward class” and that the government 
should take action under section 15 (4)  “so that the injustice done to them for centuries could 
be remedied.”459 
 
The court also found that the legal situation of transgender people engaged the right to 
freedom of expression under section 19 of the constitution460. The court referred to cases in 
the United States which refereed to a law which had prohibited cross-dressing461 and a case 
where students had been prohibited from dressing in accordance with their gender identity462. 
In these cases it had been found that the right to determine ones appearance is a fundamental 
part of freedom of expression and that the right to express ones gender is a necessary symbol 
of identity. The court used these cases to show that “Gender identity, therefore, lies at the 
core of one’s personal identity, gender expression and presentation and, therefore, it will have 
to be protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.”463 
 
The court found that legal recognition of one’s gender identity is essential in realizing the 
right to dignity464, which is a part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed under section 
 
458National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
paragraph 60 
459Ibid 
460 The Constitution of India, 1949, located at 
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461City of Chicago v. Wilson et al, 75 III.2d 525(1978) 
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463National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
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21465. The court also pointed out that it had previously found that another part of the right to 
life and liberty is the right to personal autonomy466 and stated that such a right includes the 
right to self-determination of gender467. 
 
The court offers numerous other justifications for legal recognition of transgender people, 
including that enabling each member of society to reach their potential ultimately results on 
good for society in general468, and that granting such legal recognition is necessary for India 
to meet its obligations under international law469. 
 
It is worth noting that the approach taken in this case may not be applicable to other 
jurisdictions, not only because of the basis of parts of it in the cultural history of India and the 
gender diversity already culturally recognised in that country, but also because it does rely on 
the nature of the constitution as a “living document”470, which can be interpreted to reach 
conclusions which, while they may be consistent with the original document, would not have 
been contemplated by the original creators of the document. While other jurisdictions do 
make use of this concept, in others its use has attracted some controversy, as such the route to 
reform represented by this ruling will only be applicable to jurisdictions where the 
constitution is regarded as a living document. 
 
It is worth noting that throughout the ruling the terms “transgender/hijra” are used to refer to 
both intersex and transgender person and that these terms are often used interchangeable 
within the judgement, as shown when the terms hijra and eunuch are defined as being types 
of transgender identity471. The ruling also uses a number of other terms in unusual ways, in 
particular this is noticeable when the court refers to gender as being a part of sex and when 
 
465Referring to Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608 
466In Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008) 3 SCC 1 
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justice A.K.Sikri) states that “Even Gay, Lesbian, bisexual are included by the descriptor 
‘transgender’.”472 but then goes on to explain that the current ruling is restricted to 
transgender people in the specific Indian context, which they define as relating to the cultural 
history of hijras and other cultural groups473. 
 
The court ultimately made a number of declarations, including that hijras and eunuchs be 
legally  recognised as a third gender, that they be treated as an educationally backward class 
and that the national and local governments must take action to address discrimination and 
stigmatization of transgender identities, as well as requiring the government to take specific 
measures such as to include transgender people in HIV monitoring and treatment efforts as 
well as requiring national and state governments to “...also take measures to regain their 
respect and place in the society which once they enjoyed in our cultural and social life.”474 
The ruling concludes by noting that a review of the law was already in progress at the time of 
the judgement and required the reconsiderations made by that review to be based on the 





Following this ruling a number of efforts were initiated to attempt to bring laws and 
executive practices into compliance with the ruling, including the creation of a bill designed 
to protect the rights of trans citizens476. 
 
The 2016 bill included a number of provisions that were recommended in the committee 
report such as protection from discrimination477. However the bill itself was criticised for 
 
472National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
paragraph 107 
473National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
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474 National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
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475National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
paragraph 130 
476The Transgender Persons (protection of rights) Bill, 2016 
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having “failed the community”478 as it has a number of unusual features which did not find 
favour with the transcendent community. The starts with an unusual definition of the term 
transgender, defining it as: 
 
“2 (i) "transgender person" means a person who is— 
(A) neither wholly female nor wholly male; or 
(B) a combination of female or male; or 
(C) neither female nor male; and whose sense of gender does not match with the gender 
assigned to that person at the time of birth, and includes trans-men and trans-women, persons 
with intersex variations and gender-queers”479 
 
This definition does not match the definition of transgender used by various other bodies, 
such as the American Psychological Association480, and also differs from the definition used 
by the committee481, the findings of which were intended to form the basis of the legislation. 
This definition has not been well received by the community482. 
 
The Bill included other controversial aspects, in particular its gender recognition provisions 




478 The New Transgender Bill Fails the Community, Danish Sheikh, 
 The Wire, 04/AUG/2016 located at  https://thewire.in/gender/failures-of-the-new-transgender-bill, accessed 
28/12/2020 
479 The Transgender Persons (protection of rights) Bill, 2016, Section 2 
480American Psychological Association, Transgender People, Gender Identity and Gender Expression, located at 
www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx, accessed 15/05/2018 
481Report of the Expert Committee on Issues Relating to Transgender Persons, located at 
socialjustice.nic.in/writereaddata/UploadFile/Binder2.pdf, accessed 28/12/20, page 65 of the pdf 
482All you need to know about the Transgender Persons Bill, 2016 Rohan Abraham, The Hindu, November 30 
2017, located at www.thehindu.com/news/national/all-you-need-to-know-about-the-transgender-persons-
bill-2016/article21226710.ece, accessed 28/12/2020 
483All you need to know about the Transgender Persons Bill, 2016 Rohan Abraham, The Hindu  November 30 
2017, located at www.thehindu.com/news/national/all-you-need-to-know-about-the-transgender-persons-
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“4. (1) A transgender person shall have a right to be recognised as such, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Act. 
            (2) A person recognised as transgender under sub-section (1) shall have a right to 
selfperceived gender identity.”484 
 
 
This is somewhat self contradictory, as it grants a right to “selfperceived gender identity”, 
this wording would lead one to believe that it refers to a system of “self-identification”, a 
system in which a person may have their gender recognised on condition that they sign a 
document verifying that it is in fact their gender. The main distinguishing feature of a system 
of self-identification is that the system does not involve any sort of gender recognition panel 
or require any expert testimony or verification, a person is trusted to identify their own 
gender. However the system proposed by this bill does not match this description. This 
system requires a person to make an application to a district magistrate485, who must then 
refer the matter to a District Screening Committee486, who will then make recommendation, 
which are then sent back to the magistrate to form the basis of the decision of whether to 
grant “a certificate of identity as transgender person”487. There are no other criteria given 
which the magistrate may use to make their decision, so it appears that the sole factor they 
should consider is the recommendation given by the committee. As such it seems strange that 
there are so many steps, or even that the magistrate is involved at all, as if the only thing they 
may consider is the decision of the committee, why not simply have someone apply directly 
to the committee, which can issue the certificate directly, as is done in other jurisdictions 
such as the U.K488. Not only is this system seemingly needlessly complex, but the 
requirement for a panel of experts to review a person’s application seems to place this system 
outside the realm of systems that could be said to enable self-identification. Because of this, it 
is not clear what section 4 means when it states that a person recognised by the procedure set 
out in the act “shall have a right to selfperceived gender identity”489. What does it mean, to 
have a right to a self perceived identity if the right to that identity is dependent on going 
 
484 The Transgender Persons (protection of rights) Bill, 2016, Section 4 
485 The Transgender Persons (protection of rights) Bill, 2016, Section 5 
486 The Transgender Persons (protection of rights) Bill, 2016, Sectiom.6 
487 The Transgender Persons (protection of rights) Bill, 2016, Section7 
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through a process of having your identity validated by others? Also, what does to have the 
right to an identity mean? Does this mean the right to legal recognition of this identity? It 
seems as though it must, otherwise this section implies that a person has no right to have their 
identity until it is legally recognised by others, but if it does mean the right to have that 
identity legally recognised, why does it say that the right is to a self-perceived identity, when 
the method of legal recognition recognises a socially perceived identity, verified by experts? 
While the identity recognised by the committee may align with someone’s self-perception, 
that perception is not determine ones recognised gender under this system, the perception of 
the committee does. Furthermore if a person’s self-perceived identity changes do they then 
have the right to have that identity recognised without needing to apply to the panel? This 
seems not to be the case, as this is mentioned nowhere in the act. 
 
It is worth noting that this system was not present in the 2014 version of the Bill490. The 2014 
version of the bill also had a definition of transgender which more closely conforms to those 
made by the expert committee and other organisations491.  
 
Since the 2016 bill was proposed it has been criticised by the Standing Committee on Social 
Justice492, which as reportedly lead to a number of revisions being made to the bill493, 
including changes to the definition of transgender494, although the text of the revised version 
was not available at the time of writing. 
 
 
490 The Transgender Persons (protection of rights) Bill, 2014, Bill No. XLIXC-C of 2014, Located at 
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Until a national transgender rights bill was successfully passed there was no national statute 
regarding transgender and intersex people and their rights. Because of this gender recognition 
measures were largely implemented either through procedure changes at an executive level or 
through legislation at a regional level.  
 
In 2019 the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act495 was passed. This act provides 
a national gender recognition framework, however the way in which it was implemented left 
much to be desired. The gender recognition system created by the Act has two phases. First a 
person must be recognised as a transgender person496. This is done by applying to the local 
district magistrate who will grant the application “after following such procedure and in such 
form and manner, within such time, as may be prescribed indicating the gender of such 
person as transgender.”497 Once this application has been successful the applicant is eligible 
to change the first name recorded on their birth certificate or any other identity documents, 
but notably not eligible to change the sex recorded on the certificate498. The Act does not 
specify any evidential requirements for this process. One a person has been recognised as 
transgender they may then, if they have had surgery, apply to be recognised as either male or 
female499, which is done by amending the certificate of identity, rather than their birth 
certificate500.  
 
The 2019 Act was criticised on a number of grounds. The first ground was that the use of 
district magistrates and the lack of guidance as to how they were to decide whether or not to 
issue certificates of identity risked inconsistency and possibly the arbitrary exercise of 
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power501. Additionally, it was also criticised for its requirement of surgery502 and its focus on 
Hijras and the relative lack of attention paid to trans men and intersex people503.  
 
In part in response to these criticisms the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules 
were issued in 2020504. These regulations are made under section 22 of the Act which permits 
the creation of rules regarding the implementation of the Act, including the form and manner 
in which applications under Sections 5 and 7 are made505. The rules address the criticism of 
the surgical requirement by “circumventing”506 it. This is accomplished via rule 6, which 
allows for anyone who has received “medical intervention towards a gender affirming 
procedure, either as male or female” to submit evidence of this to the district magistrate, who 
will then issue a revised certificate of identity507. The rules use a broad definition of medical 
intervention, which includes counselling, hormone therapy and surgery508. This appears to 
have the effect of creating a parallel system of having one’s gender recognised as male or 
female to the one addressed in section 7 of the Act. Despite the apparent progress with 
regards to the medical requirements for recognition the Rules have been criticised as being “a 
half-hearted attempt at a comprehensive framework for securing trans rights in India.”509 Due 
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accessed 01/01/2021 
504 Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules, 2020. 
505 The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 NO. 40 of 2019, Section 22 
506 Transgender Persons Rules 2020: A Halfhearted Attempt at Redemption, Anamika Dudvaani and Rishav 
Devrani, OxHRH Blog, October 2020, http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/transgender-persons-rules-2020-a-halfhearted-
attempt-at-redemption, accessed 01/01/21, paragraph 2 
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508 Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules, 2020. Rule 2 (i) 
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The following sections address gender recognition in practice in the particular situations of 
passports, marriage and prisons. Due to the number of jurisdictions within India which differ 
in their gender recognition measures only national rules will be discussed, with the addition a 
few regions which shall be addressed here if the approach taken in that jurisdiction is unusual 






Indian passports require an applicant to state their gender, which may be marked on the 
application form as male, female or transgender510. While transgender is a category separate 
from male and female on the application form there is no indication that all transgender 
people must identify their gender as such on the form, rather than male or female, so this 
category is presumably for those who identify as a culturally recognised third gender which, 
as seen in supreme court ruling, are sometimes referred together as transgender despite 
transgender people who identify with binary genders also being acknowledged. There is no 
indication that additional evidence is required for a person identifying as transgender than 
would be required in any other case511. 
If a person already has an Indian passport it is possible to have the gender marker changed, 
although this requires the passport to be re-issued512. This requires the applicant to submit 
evidence, including the original passport, a sworn affidavit of change of sex and certification 
from a hospital that the applicant has undergone sex reassignment surgery513. This is 
noteworthy for a number of reasons. Firstly, the information required refers to physical sex, 
 
510Passport application form, Located at 
https://portal1.passportindia.gov.in/AppOnlineProject/online/downloadEFormStatic accessed 19/06/2018 
511There is no evidence of this on the passport office website or on the guidance documents. 
512 Consular, Passport and Visa Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Application Form Overview, Passport 
Seva, Government of India, Located at 
https://portal1.passportindia.gov.in/AppOnlineProject/online/faqApplicationForm, accessed 19/06/2018 
513Consular, Passport and Visa Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Application Form Overview, Passport 
Seva, Government of India, Located at 
https://portal1.passportindia.gov.in/AppOnlineProject/online/faqApplicationForm, accessed 19/06/2018, 
This information is available after selecting the following options, a normal application for an adult, 
employment type other with no change of address and no eligibility for non ECR category. 
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but the field to be changed on the passport application form refers to gender, which may 
indicate a conflation of sex and gender. Secondly these evidential requirements may cause a 
number of problems. Any system that requires evidence of sex reassignment surgery will 
encounter a number of problems simply due to that requirement alone. The practice of 
requiring such evidence may be contrary to a person’s human rights. A 2014 interagency 
statement issued by the World Health Organisation, UN Women and UN Aids amongst 
others referred to such requirements as sterilization requirements, and stated that they “... run 
counter to respect for bodily integrity, self-determination and human dignity, and can cause 
and perpetuate discrimination against transgender and intersex persons.”514 In addition to this 
a 2013 report from the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment called upon all states to end such requirements515. On a 
fundamental level, if to have one’s gender legally recognised is regarded as a right, it may 
seem strange that, while most of the population access this right automatically at birth, a 
minority group must accept sterilization to obtain a right that those in the majority are granted 
simply for being born. This issue was raised in a European Court of Human Rights case, 
where it was stated that: 
 
“Medical treatment cannot be considered to be the subject of genuine consent when the fact 
of not submitting to it deprives the person concerned of the full exercise of his or her right to 
gender identity and personal development”516 
 
While India is not a party to the European Convention on Human rights, this ruling can still 
be regarded as being persuasive, as while the specifics of the margin of appreciation will only 
be applicable within states that are parties to the ECHR, the reasoning regarding human rights 
may have broader applications. The reasoning deployed in this case raises the issue that 
 
514Eliminating forced, coercive and otherwise involuntary sterilization: an interagency statement, OHCHR, UN 
Women, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO. Located at 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/112848/9789241507325_eng.pdf;jsessionid=99B16BC382F
F84A6BB476E18E2241935?sequence=1, accessed 11/07/2018, page 7 paragraph 4 
515Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
Juan E. Méndez, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Twenty-second session, 
February 2013, Located at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.53_English.
pdf, accessed 09/01/2021, para 88 
516A.P., Garcon and Nicot v France applications 79885/12, 52471/13 and 52596/13 text located at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172913 accessed 21/07/2018 at para 131 
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beyond undermining the universality of the right to one’s gender identity, restricting a 
person’s right in this way is inherently coercive. Due to this coercive influence the practice of 
requiring those seeking gender recognition to have sterilising surgeries means that the 
consent given to these surgeries is not freely given. As such these requirements not only 
undermine a person’s right to their gender identity but also undermine their right to bodily 
autonomy. 
 
In addition to these issues these requirements may be particularly problematic in the Indian 
context, where transgender and intersex status and identity are so strongly attached to various 
cultural groups. In such a situation it could be argued that sterilization requirements are 
particularly concerning due to the history of forced or coerced sterilization being used against 
minority cultural and ethnic groups to control or exterminate those groups517. 
 
Surgical requirements can also be problematic on a practical level. The first issue in this 
regard is that many transgender people simply do not choose to have surgery518. This can be 
for a number of reasons, for example they may be unable to afford it, may have personal 
reasons for not wanting it or may simply not find the surgery not to be worth the risks in their 
individual case. This may be particularly the case in India, due to cultural gender identities 
such as hijra not having the same association with surgery as binary transgender identities 
elsewhere in the world. While national level data is not readily available, a survey of 
transgender people in Kerala showed that only 9 percent of transgender people had changed 
their appearance through medical or surgical means519, so the figures for those who have had 
surgery may well be significantly lower. This means that any system for gender recognition 
 
517Eliminating forced, coercive and otherwise involuntary sterilization: an interagency statement, OHCHR, UN 
Women, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO. Located at 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/112848/9789241507325_eng.pdf;jsessionid=99B16BC382F
F84A6BB476E18E2241935?sequence=1, accessed 11/07/2018, Page 2 paragraph 2 
518 For example in a US survey the majority of respondents had not had surgical interventions National 
Transgender Discrimination Survey Report on health and health care, Findings of a Study by the National 
Center for Transgender Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force By Jaime M. Grant, Ph.D., 
Lisa A. Mottet, J.D., and Justin Tanis, D.Min. With Jody L. Herman, Ph.D., Jack Harrison, and Mara 
Keisling October 2010, located at 
www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/resources_and_tools/ntds_report_on_health.pdf, accessed 
24/072018,   pages 11-12 
519 Transgender survey Kerala 2014-2015, Submitted to the Director, Departement of Social Justice, 
Government of Kerala by Sangama, 50/1899 kochuveeti House, Major Road, Vyttila, Cochin, Kerala 682019 




which contains surgical requirements must seriously consider whether or not these surgical 
requirements meet the goals of the system. If the goal of the system is to grant legal force to a 
person’s gender identity, but that system contains surgical requirements then it will not 
achieve its goal in most cases. Such requirements often exist because such systems wish to 
restrict recognition, and only give it to people who meet the criteria in which the culture in 
which the system exists has established. Often this is sterilization, as some cultures believe 
that one should not be recognised as a woman if they are still capable of “fathering” a child. 
In other cases it is simply a requirement of physical conformity, to ensure that all those 
legally recognised as members of a gender share certain physical characteristics.  While these 
requirements may seem to serve the needs of the society in which they exist, in terms of who 
a society is comfortable perceiving as a man or a woman, it should be noted that as these 
requirements are physical in nature, they can have little bearing on an individual’s gender 
identity. A person may have any gender identity, regardless of their physical characteristics. 
A person’s experience of their gender, while it can be impacted by their physical 
characteristics, is not understood to be dependant on them520. Because of this any system 
featuring surgical requirements will necessarily be regarding some persons gender identities 
as not worthy of recognition as a cost of meeting societal standards. 
 
It is also worth noting that surgical requirements do not impact everyone equally. For 
example depending on healthcare provisions in the jurisdiction, some people simply may be 
unable to afford them. This may function as a barrier to people with lower income levels, 
essentially restricting the right to gender recognition based on income. Similarly not all 
surgical procedures are equally available. Some may not be available within a reasonable 
distance that a person can practically travel, but in addition to this some surgeries are 
performed less often, and by a lower number of practitioners. For example according to a US 
survey, a much lower percentage of those identifying as “ftm” had had a phaloplasty than 
those identifying as “mtf” who had received a vaginoplasty521. This could be for a number of 
 
520 Clinical intervention and embodied subjectivity: atypically sexed Children and their Parents, Katrina Roen, 
published as a part of Critical Intersex, Edited by Morgan Holmes, Ashgate publishing, 2009, page 22 paragraph 
2 
521 For example in a US survey the majority of respondents had not had surgical interventions National 
Transgender Discrimination Survey Report on health and health care, Findings of a Study by the National 
Center for Transgender Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force By Jaime M. Grant, Ph.D., 
Lisa A. Mottet, J.D., and Justin Tanis, D.Min. With Jody L. Herman, Ph.D., Jack Harrison, and Mara 




reasons such as differing psychological needs or cultural exceptions, but it is worth noting 
that a phaloplasty is regarded as being a difficult surgery to perform, with good results being 
more rare than in the case of vaginoplasty522. As such surgical requirements may result in 
fewer people from the “ftm” demographic being able to assess gender recognition, because 
the surgery they would require may be less desirable or more difficult to obtain. It is also 
worth noting that, even ignoring the specifics of individual procedures, surgeries are not 
something everyone can undergo, some people may be unable to do to various health 
conditions or religious beliefs. As such people with disabilities, those with conditions 
associated with ageing and certain religious groups may also find themselves unable to access 
gender recognition due to surgical requirements. 
 
Related to the issue of surgical availability differing for various procedures is the issue of 
simply which surgeries would be required. Sex reassignment surgery, the term used by the 
requirements to change the gender marker on an Indian passport, can include a number of 
different procedures523. It is not specified which of these procedures are required, or if all of 
them are required, or if a person may choose any one procedure from those considered sex 
reassignment surgeries. These procedures are considered sex reassignment surgeries not 
because they alter a person’s sex definitively, but because they serve a therapeutic purpose in 
treating transgender persons and aiding their transition524. In fact the surgeries that can serve 
this purpose include some that the average person may not associate with sexual 
reassignment, such as liposuction. This is because, in the medical context, sex is determined 
holistically, with a number of factors being considered and weighed in a complex series of 
judgements that often require a panel of inter-disciplinary experts525. It is worth noting that 
this judgement is not an assessment of some objective and definitive truth, it is done with 
 
24/072018,   pages 11-12 
522Patient reported outcome measures and quality of life assessment in genital gender confirming surgery, 
Geolani W. Dy, Ian T. Nolan, James Hotaling, Jeremy B. Myers, Transl Androl Urol. 2019 Jun; 8(3): 228–
240, Located at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6626309/, accessed 28/12/2020 
523 Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People, 7th 
version, World Professional Association for Transgender Health, Located at 
https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/SOC%20V7_English.pdf Accessed 24/07/2018 
Page 57 
524 Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People, 7th 
version, World Professional Association for Transgender Health, Located at 
https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/SOC%20V7_English.pdf Accessed 24/07/2018 
Page 55 
525Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality, Anne Fausto-Sterling, New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 2000. 
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reference to societal values, and seeks to determine how a person’s body would best fit in 
with society, rather than being as simple as the common notion that sex can be objectively 
and definitively determined526. As such it is important to note that sex is complex, and while 
a surgery can alter the factors considered in sex determination, a single surgery cannot be 
considered determinative of sex. As such it is important that jurisdictions with surgical 
requirements for gender recognition consider exactly why they need the surgical requirement, 
and exactly what such a requirement will accomplish. 
 
In addition to the general problems with surgical requirements an additional issue may be 
observed in the case of India. Because India, in its passports, recognises the existence of non-
binary identities, how does the requirement for surgery interact with these identities? This is 
not made clear on the guidance available from Ministry of External Affairs. This poses an 
interesting question, as sexual reassignment surgeries serve to make a person’s physical 
appearance more closely conform with the phenotype associated with the sex that matches 
their gender identity. This is relatively straightforward when one considers men and woman, 
the phenotypes associated with male and female bodies are well understood by most people. 
However, there is no such simple phenotype associated with non-binary gender identities. 
While some identities (such as eunuch or hermaphrodite) may have physical characteristics 
associated with them, many non-binary identities do not. As such, in the absence of 
clarification, it is difficult to know what a person who identifies with a non-binary identity, 
such as hijra or one of the other diverse identities referred to in the supreme court judgement, 
should do in order to have their identity recognised. It may be the case that surgical 
requirements are not viable in the case of individuals with non-binary identities. 
 
These requirements have been challenged, in particular by Sandeepta Das, who sought to 
have her gender (female) recognised on her passport. She had sufficient evidence for other 
identity documents, but her application for a passport was denied, as she was told by officials 
that without proof of surgery she could not be recognised as a woman, but only as a man or as 
“belonging to the other sex”527, which presumably referred to the ability to be recognised on a 
 
526 This is discussed in Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8 
527 Transwoman faces gender hurdle at passport office, Subhro Niyogi, The Times of India, February 24 2018, 
located at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/transwoman-faces-gender-hurdle-at-passport-
office/articleshow/63051985.cms, accessed 26/07/2018, paragraph 2 
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passport as transgender528. She has challenged this decision, which will be reviewed, but a 
search did not reveal any updates on the case. In addition to demonstrating that these 
requirements are indeed implemented, this case may shed light on exactly how the passport 
office sees the transgender category. As there is no detailed guidance on the issue, this case 
seems to show that the category is seen as a larger “umbrella” category than the other two, 
serving as a sort of “other” section. From this case it seems that the third category is not only 
for individuals with non-binary identities, it is also used for individuals who have a binary 
identity, but have not adhered to the surgical requirements. This is somewhat interesting, as it 
indicates that male and female are seen as more than socially constructed genders. To be male 
or female under the current recognition model used by the Indian passport office one must 
not only indicate a certain gender identity, but also certain physical characteristics, wither 
they are acquired naturally or via surgery, with the “other” category being reserved for all 






India does not have a single marriage act, instead it has a number of acts which cover various 
types of religious marriages529, and the special marriage act which allows for “civil” 
marriage, without a religious component530. There is also no reported major Indian case 
regarding marriage with relation to transgender or intersex people, although National Legal 
Services Authority v Union of India does state that: 
“Indian Law, on the whole, only recognizes the paradigm of binary genders of male and 
female, based on a person’s sex assigned by birth, which permits gender system, including 
 
528Transwoman faces gender hurdle at passport office, Subhro Niyogi, The Times of India, February 24 2018, 
located at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/transwoman-faces-gender-hurdle-at-passport-
office/articleshow/63051985.cms, accessed 26/07/2018 
529 The Hindu Marriage Act 1955, located at https://highcourtchd.gov.in/hclscc/subpages/pdf_files/4.pdf 
accessed 28/07/2018, The Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872 located at 
http://ncw.nic.in/acts/TheIndianChristianMarriageAct1872-15of1872.pdf accessed 28/07/2018, The Parsi 
Marriage and Divorce Act 1936 located at  https://www.legalcrystal.com/act/134018/parsi-marriage-and-
divorce-act-1936-complete-act accessed 28/07/2018 
530 The Special Marriage Act-1954 located at 
http://keralaregistration.gov.in/pearlpublic/downloads/The%20Special%20Marriage%20Act.pdf?tok=49sddh
3ss34ff4 accessed 20/07/2018 
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the law relating to marriage, adoption, inheritance, succession and taxation and welfare 
legislations.”531 
 
None of the marriage acts mention transgender or intersex people, but they do use gendered 
language which would suggest that they are intended to apply to male-female pairs, despite 
not stating that only such pairs are eligible for marriage. For example the Indian Christian 
Marriage Act does not explicitly state that only marriages between a male-female pair are 
valid, but it does refer to “the man intending to be married” and “the woman intending to be 
married”532. Similarly the Hindu Marriage Act refers to the ages of the bride and the 
bridegroom533 and the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act refers to the ages of the participants 
“if male” and “if female” although it does not suggest that one person in the marriage must 
belong to each category534, and the Special Marriage Act refers to the ages of “the male” and 
“the female”535. It is worth noting that these acts do not apply to all areas of India, for 
example the Special Marriage act does not apply to Jammu and Kashmir536. 
 
Same sex marriages are not mentioned by any legislation, and section 377 of the Indian Penal 
Code states that: 
 
“Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman 
or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”537 
 
531  National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012  
paragraph 49 
532 The Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872 located at 
http://ncw.nic.in/acts/TheIndianChristianMarriageAct1872-15of1872.pdf accessed 28/07/2018, S60 (1) 
533 The Hindu Marriage Act 1955, located at https://highcourtchd.gov.in/hclscc/subpages/pdf_files/4.pdf 
accessed 28/07/2018, S5 
534 The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936 located at  https://www.legalcrystal.com/act/134018/parsi-
marriage-and-divorce-act-1936-complete-act accessed 28/07/2018, S3 (1) (c) 
535 The Special Marriage Act-1954 located at 
http://keralaregistration.gov.in/pearlpublic/downloads/The%20Special%20Marriage%20Act.pdf?tok=49sddh
3ss34ff4 accessed 20/07/2018, S4 (c) 
536The Special Marriage Act-1954 located at 
http://keralaregistration.gov.in/pearlpublic/downloads/The%20Special%20Marriage%20Act.pdf?tok=49sddh
3ss34ff4 accessed 20/07/2018, S1 (2) 





This has been interpreted as criminalizing homosexual intercourse, and was upheld in 
2013538, as it was decided that the court should defer to the legislature on the matter. 
However section 377 was found to be unconstitutional in 2018539. 
 
Despite the lack of clarification regarding the meanings of gendered terms in the various 
marriage acts there were a small number of cases where transgender people were able to 
marry540 541. However, both of these cases occurred in areas which have their own gender 
recognition policies, which do not exist on the national level542. Clarification on a national 
level was given in 2019, with the ruling in Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration in 
the Madras High Court. The court stated not only that a marriage between a cis man and a 
trans woman was legitimate under the Hindu Marriage Act, but that to declare so was 
“merely stating the obvious.”543. The court also pointed out the injustice of the state of affairs 
at the time, when a person could be recognised as having a right to marry in Karnataka, but 
not in Tamil Nadu544. The reasoning deployed in this case concerned the interpretation of the 
word “bride”, which was defined as being a woman on her wedding day, which thus 
prompted the court to consider whether the word woman included trans women545. The court 
found that, as the constitution had been found to support the right of transgender people to be 
recognised according to their self-identified gender identity that the Hindu Marriage Act 
 
538 Suresh Kumar Koushal and another v NAZ Foundation and others, Civil Appeal No.10972 of 2013, located 
at https://www.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/41070.pdf accessed 16/08/2018 
539 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India W. P. (Crl.) No. 76 of 2016 D. No. 14961/2016 
540 Kerala witnesses first transgender marriage, Indian Express news service, May 11 2018, located at 
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/kerala-witnesses-first-transgender-marriage-5172148/ accessed 
16/08.2018 
541 First transgender marriage registered in Karnatka, The Times of India, Niharika Alva, Jan 24 2018, located at 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bengaluru/first-transgender-marriage-registered-in-
state/articleshow/62632252.cms accessed 16/08 2018 
542 Kerala and Karnataka 
543 Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021, paragraph 1 
544 Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021, paragraph 13 
545 Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021, paragraph 3 
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should be interpreted in that light546. This is particularly noteworthy due to the possible 
application of this case to other jurisdictions. The court stated that the word bride “cannot 
have a static or immutable meaning”547 and that a statute must be interpreted in light of the 
legal system as it exists today. This of course may not be applicable to legal systems which 
have other conventions of statutory interpretation, but in jurisdictions where this reasoning is 
permissible it may allow for the incorporation of transgender rights into the law of marriage 
without legislative action. 
 
The court also addressed the issue of surgery performed on intersex infants548. The court cited 
the NLSA case stating that no one should be forced to undergo medical procedures, including 
SRS or hormonal therapy, but ultimately found that surgeries on intersex infants constitute a 
more fundamental violation of section 32 (f) of the Indian constitution549 which states that: 
 
“The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that children are given 
opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and 
dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and 
material abandonment.”550 
 
In reaching this conclusion the court cited an earlier decision which stated that the consent of 
the parents cannot fully substitute for the consent of the child, stating that “Ultimately, 
neither the father nor the mother can claim suzerainty over the child"551 The court also cited a 
WHO (World Health Organisation) report552 to demonstrate that “normalisation” surgeries 
 
546 Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021, paragraph 10 
547 Ibid 
548 Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021, paragraph 16 
549 Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021, paragraph 19 
550 The Constitution of India, 1949, located at 
https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf section 32 (f) 
551 S. Amutha Petitioner v C. Manivanna Bhupathy (2007) 2 CTC 97 paragraph 35 





conducted on intersex infants are increasingly recognised as contrary to the best interests of 
the child553. Ultimately the court ordered the state government of Tamil Nadu to issue a 
Government Order prohibiting such surgeries on intersex infants554.  The fact that this issue 
was addressed alongside the right of transgender persons to marry is noteworthy, as it 
demonstrates that intersex and transgender issues are still conflated to some degree in India. 
It appears, from reading the text of the judgement, that the court regarded both of these issues 
to be fundamentally about gender. While the court correctly identifies intersex as being 
related to physical characteristics555, it does so in order to state that an intersex person should 
not be modified surgically specifically so that they are free to discover their own gender 
identity556. This demonstrates that while the transgender and intersex communities face 
different specific problems, many of the fundamental issues at the core of intersex and 
transgender legal problems are often somewhat connected, as gender and sex are often 




Bathrooms are often a focal point of discussions surrounding legal gender identity558, as 
bathrooms are often sex-segregated559. While there is no national law regarding the status of 
transgender or intersex people with regards to bathrooms, the government, through its 
ministry of drinking water and sanitation has issued guidance on gender issues in 
sanitation560. While these guidelines mostly address other issues, they do, under the heading 
 
553 Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021, paragraph 18 
554 Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021, paragraph 25 
555 I Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021, paragraph 16 
556 Ibid 
557 Sex/gender: Biology in a social world, (Routledge series integrating science and culture, Anne Fausto-
Sterling, 2012 
558The toilet debate: Stalling trans possibilities and defending ‘women’s protected spaces.’ Jones C, Slater J, The 
Sociological Review. 2020;68(4):834-851. 
559Ibid 
560 Government of India, Ministry of drinking Water and Sanitation Swachh Baharat Mission (Gramin), Letter to 
The principal secretaries / secretaries in-charge of Rural Sanitation, All States/ UTs Regarding Guidelines on 
Gender issues in sanitation. 03/04/2017 Located at 
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of inclusivity, refers to the “third gender” and states that local authorities should “should 
make a conscious effort that they are recognised as equal citizens and users of toilets.” and 
goes on to state that “They should be allowed to use the facility of their choice (men or 
women) in community or public toilets.”561. While this document does only refer to the third 
gender, and does not use the word transgender, it is possible that, as these terms are often 
conflated, that this guidance could apply to all transgender people, and is not restricted to just 
those who identify with a non-binary gender. Similarly because these gender identities are 
often conflated with intersex people, it is possible that this instruction may also apply to 
them, provided that they identify with one of the identities referred to in India as “third 
gender” some of which are culturally understood to refer to an intersex identity. These 
guidelines are somewhat interesting, as while they occupy only a small section of the 
document, and are relatively simple, they represent a fairly strong statement on the rights of 
transgender people. These guidelines effectively sidestep the lack of national gender 
recognition legislation, granting rights fairly rapidly despite the apparent legislative deadlock. 
They also, in respect to the right to access sex segregated bathrooms, grant a right to self-
identification, essentially stating that the government is unconcerned with physical sex, but 
instead wishes to grant rights based on gender identity, which is self-determined. In doing so 
it rejects arguments raised in a number of other jurisdictions, relating to claims that a 
transgender person remains essentially their gender assigned at birth, and thus should have 
their legal rights forever bound to that gender. It also rejects the notion that external 
verification is required to protect the users of bathrooms from persons lying about their 
identity in order to access the facilities for illegitimate purposes. These guidelines also reject 
the idea of separate bathrooms for transgender people, or adding additional gender-neutral 
facilities, as well as the notion of making all bathrooms gender neutral. 
 
In addition to these guidelines there has been reporting of a judgement in which the 
government of Tamil Nadu was instructed by the court to take steps to build public toilets 




561 Letter to The principal secretaries / secretaries in-charge of Rural Sanitation, All States/ UTs Regarding 
Guidelines on Gender issues in sanitation, Swachh Baharat Mission (Gramin), Ministry of drinking Water and 
Sanitation, Government of India, 03/04/2017, Located at 
https://mdws.gov.in/sites/default/files/Guidelines%20on%20Gender%20issues%20in%20Sanitation.pdf 
Accessed 02/08/2018, paragraph 7 
562 Madras HC directs Tamil Nadu govt to build public toilets for trangenders, Hindustan times,  4th April 2017, 
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the guidelines by the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation. At time of writing the 
judgement text was not available, so it is unclear if this ruling has been impacted by the 
guidance, which contradicts it due to instructing that transgender people be permitted to 







Prison policy is another area where the gender recognition mechanism used can have a great 
deal of impact on the welfare of those interacting with the system. While the national 
government does provide funding for prisons, it appears that there is not a national policy 
with regards to the housing of transgender or intersex prisoners. There is a national model 
prison manual563, however there is no obligation on states to adopt it, and it makes no 
mention of transgender people.  
 
 
Documents on state level policies do not appear to be readily available, and due to time and 
scope limitations, obtaining them and evaluating them has proven out of the viable scope of 
this research. Data on transgender prisoners in India has in general proven hard to find, in 
part due to the lack of commitments to collecting data on trans prisoners564. Scholars have 
criticised this lack of data as contributing to the invisibility of transgender prisoners, which in 
turn contributes to their poor treatment, as problems cannot be solved if they are not 
observed565. However state level policies on these issues do exist in some cases. A number of 
 
located at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/madras-hc-directs-tamil-nadu-govt-to-build-public-
toilets-for-transgenders/story-eVlLHoEpkF5RiHwhEF05iL.html accessed 27/08/2018 
563 Model Prison Manual, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 2016, Located at 
https://www.mha.gov.in/MHA1/PrisonReforms/NewPDF/PrisonManual2016.pdf, accessed 04/01/2021 
564 Lost Identity, Transgender persons inside Indian prisons, The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2020, 
Located at 
https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/download/1606377171Lost%20Identity%20Transgender%20Persons%2
0in%20Indian%20Prisons.pdf, accessed 02/01/2020, page 41 
565 Confinement at The Margins: Preliminary Notes on Transgender Prisoners in India, Deekshitha Ganesan & 
Saumya Dadoo, 13 NUJS L. Rev. 3 (2020), Located at nujslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/13-3-
Ganesan-Dadoo-Confinement-at-the-Margins.pdf, accessed 04/01/2021 
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news reports have mentioned the creation of a cell block specifically for transgender inmates 
in Kerala at Viyyur central prison566. However the Kerala prisons website567 makes no 
mention of this but does mention that a women’s prison exists in Viyyur as well as the central 
prison568. Despite the unavailability of information regarding this cell block and the policies 
that must exist for such a cell block to operate, as to have a cell block for transgender inmates 
there must be a way of determining who is transgender, Kerala does make reference to gender 
in general in the legislation that governs its prisons. At the time of writing an English copy of 
the most recent legislation, the Kerala Prisons and Correctional Services (Management) Act 
2014569 was not available, the preceding legislation570 was available in English. Section 38(2) 
of the 2010 act requires that offenders be classified as male or female and that prisoners 
receive separate housing based on this classification571. Section 38(3) goes on to require that 
some female prisoners be housed separately from other female prisoners if they have 
committed an offence under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act 1956572. The Immoral 
Traffic (Prevention) Act 1956 contains a number of offences, mostly relating to 
prostitution573. While these offences do not directly refer to transgender people, it is worth 
noting that transgender people may be involved in sex work more often than their cis 
counterparts574, particularly if there is a high rate of discrimination against trans people in 
other fields of work where they live. This subsection is also worth mentioning as it requires 
separate housing of female prisoners based on the offence committed. While this may not 
seem initially relevant to transgender or intersex people it is worth noting that one of the 
commonly voiced objections to the recognition of a transgender persons gender identity in 
 
566 Transgender inmates in Kerala jails to get their own blocks, Ramesh Babu, October 07 2015, Hindustan 
Times, located at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/transgender-inmates-in-kerala-jails-to-get-their-
own-blocks/story-rCmoZYpWTEjvjvpUbKuUJK.html accessed 02/10/2018 
567 Kerala Prisons Website, Located at http://www.keralaprisons.gov.in/ accessed 02/10/2018 
568Women Prison and Correctional Home, Kerala Prisons Website, Located at 
http://www.keralaprisons.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74&Itemid=79 accessed 
02/10/2018 
569 Kerala Prisons and Correctional Services (Management) Act 2014, located at 
https://kerala.gov.in/documents/10180/49d45b2b-9d85-49c8-b9bc-a2f19335346c accessed 30/10/2018 
570 The Kerala Prisons and Correctional Services (Management) Act 2010, located at 
http://www.lawsofindia.org/pdf/kerala/2010/2010KERALA9.pdf accessed 30/10/2018 
571  The Kerala Prisons and Correctional Services (Management) Act 2010, located at 
http://www.lawsofindia.org/pdf/kerala/2010/2010KERALA9.pdf accessed 30/10/2018, s38(2) 
572  The Kerala Prisons and Correctional Services (Management) Act 2010, located at 
http://www.lawsofindia.org/pdf/kerala/2010/2010KERALA9.pdf accessed 30/10/2018, s38(3) 
573 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,1956, located at 
https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1661/1/1956104.pdf accessed 30/10/2018 
574 “Study on Human Rights of Transgender as Third Gender”, National Human Rights Commission, India 




prison may lead to male sex offenders to be housed alongside cis women who would then be 
at a higher risk of sexual violence 575.  
 
A recent report from the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative examined the treatment of 
transgender prisoners in India576. The report found that not only can how transgender 
prisoners vary from state to state, but also between different jails in the same state577. This 
report observed that policies on the housing of transgender prisoners tend to fall into one of 
three categories: placement based on the gender on court warrant, placement based on advice 
by the chief medical officer, and those who have no policy at all on the placement of 
transgender prisoners578. In addition to these categories 6 states did not provide sufficient 
information for them to be placed in one of the other categories579. Out of those states which 
house prisoners according to medical advice the most common approach appears to be to 
treat transgender prisoners as a third gender, and are they are thus segregated from both cis 
male and cis female prisoners580. The remaining four states who house transgender prisoners 
according to medical advice classify prisoners as male or female according to their genitals 
and house them accordingly. 
 
The prevalence of the use of medical advice in Indian prisons is interesting, as it may be in 
conflict with the NLSA ruling, which stated that everyone has a right to their self-identified 
gender581. It could be argued that this refers to the right to identify as transgender or not, and 
thus to be placed in a third gender category based on self-identification. However the NLSA 
 
575After Karen White: What is the government doing to make sure women in prison never get attacked by a male 
inmate ever again?, Fair Play for Women, December 2018, Located at https://fairplayforwomen.com/prison-
review/, accessed 06/01/2021 
576 Lost Identity, Transgender persons inside Indian prisons, The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2020, 
Located at 
https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/download/1606377171Lost%20Identity%20Transgender%20Persons%2
0in%20Indian%20Prisons.pdf, accessed 02/01/2020 
577 Lost Identity, Transgender persons inside Indian prisons, The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2020, 
Located at 
https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/download/1606377171Lost%20Identity%20Transgender%20Persons%2
0in%20Indian%20Prisons.pdf, accessed 02/01/2020, page 43 
578 Lost Identity, Transgender persons inside Indian prisons, The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2020, 
Located at 
https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/download/1606377171Lost%20Identity%20Transgender%20Persons%2
0in%20Indian%20Prisons.pdf, accessed 02/01/2020, page 45 
579 Ibid 
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case has since been interpreted as giving a right to be treated as the gender which a person 
self identifies as, which was used to explain the interpretation of the word “bride” as 
including trans women582. Because of this it appears likely that the right to self-identified 
gender includes the right to be specifically recognised as the gender one identifies as, rather 
than being recognised as generically transgender. It will be interesting to see any future cases 
which challenge state and local rules regarding the housing of transgender prisoners. 
 
 
News articles refer to a judgement in the Madras high court requiring the government of 
Tamil Nadu to alter its policy regarding open prisons, as the existing policy resulted in 
women and transgender prisoners being unable to be housed in these facilities583. At the time 
of writing the text of this judgement could not be located, nor could the policy in question. 







Overall gender and sex recognition in India is characterised by its culture, history and 
diversity. India is a large country, so it should be no surprise that due to this and its history it 
is home to a diversity not only of ideas about gender but also diverse gender identities. This 
diversity is evident from various court judgements which make reference to the variety of 
identities present amongst the transgender community in India585. These judgements also 
repeatedly cite important cultural texts including poems and extracts from religious and other 
 
582 Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021 
583 Make woman and transgender prisoners eligible to be inmates of open prisons, Madras HC tells TN govt, 
Srikkanth D, September 11 2018 The Times of India, located at 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/make-woman-and-transgender-prisoners-eligible-to-be-
inmates-of-open-prisons-madras-hc-tells-tn-govt/articleshow/65770546.cms accessed 02/10/2018 
584 Tamil Nadu Prisons Website, Located at http://www.prisons.tn.nic.in/ accessed 02/10/2018 




influential texts586. Which can be seen as a demonstration that the unique cultures of India 
continue to play a role in the legal reasoning used in determining cases regarding transgender 
and intersex people. The fact that identities which have existed in Indian culture for centuries 
also demonstrates another factor which has contributed to the treatment of transgender and 
intersex people: the continuing impact of colonialism. It cannot be ignored that many 
elements of the Indian legal system which harmed the transgender community were 
introduced under British rule, particularly section 377587. The current national system 
introduced by the 2019 Act588 can be seen as a blending of Indian cultural perspectives and 
the ongoing impacts of colonialism. It incorporates the western concept of gender being 
binary and related to biology in its surgical requirement for a person to be recognised as 
having a binary gender, as well as incorporating Indian cultural conceptions of gender in 
recognising a third status of “transgender”589 which is distinct from the western concept of 
being transgender which is not normally understood as its own gender category, but which 
can incorporate non-binary gender categories. This understanding of “transgender” as a third 
category can be seen in the NLSA judgement, particularly in its reference to the Ramayana, in 
which Hijras are portrayed as a distinct group from men and women590. 
 
The diversity of India can also be seen in the diversity of approaches taken to trans and 
intersex issues by the states. Each state is geographically unique and culturally distinct, and 
this is recognised by the federal system which allows each state to legislate in its own right 
on various issues. The states have taken a variety of approaches to transgender issues, from 
appearing to take no action at all, to establishing special policies to ensure equality and 
eliminate discrimination, as well as implementing their own gender recognition systems prior 
to the 2019 Act591. This has the democratic advantage of giving those who live in a 
jurisdiction the ability to make rules appropriate to their local culture and circumstance, 
 
586Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021, paragraphs 5 and 6 
587 The Indian Penal Code 1860, located at www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=201592 accessed 
28/07/2018, Section 377 
588 The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 NO. 40 of 2019 
589 The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 NO. 40 of 2019, Sections 7 and 4 
590 National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and others, writ petition (civil) NO. 400 of 2012 
paragraph 13 
591For example see Kerala Transgender Policy, 2015, G.O. No. 61/2015/SJD, Located at 
https://kerala.gov.in/documents/10180/46696/State%20Policy%20for%20Transgenders%20in%20Kerala%2020
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however it has also led to a lack of uniformity. While uniformity is not always desirable 
solely in its own right, it is important to remember that a lack of uniformity in the case of 
gender recognition means that individuals may lack legal rights based solely on where they 
happen to live or be born. This can be seen in the Arunkumar case, where the state of Kerala 
had failed to act in order to prevent surgeries on intersex infants, and was ordered by the 
court to fulfil this obligation592. 
 
The approach taken by India to gender recognition can also serve as an example of the 
usefulness of the courts in enabling gender recognition, as well as some of the disadvantages 
of that approach. The NLSA ruling is an example of how a court can prompt the adoption of 
gender recognition measures in the absence of legislative action. Additionally the fact that it 
was a ruling on constitutional interpretation arguably means the judgement is stronger than 
any prior legislative action would have been, as it cannot be as easily reversed as legislation 
could be repealed. However it also demonstrates how while the courts can be a progressive 
force, they cannot act as a replacement for the legislature. Prior to the 2019 Act India was in a 
situation where it was obliged to recognise the gender identities of transgender people, but 
had no legislative framework to guide how this should be done. This led to gender 
recognition being implemented in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, with different government 
bodies implementing different rules which were inconsistent with each other as well as being 
different from the approaches adopted by the states. While the courts did act during this 
period to reduce the injustices caused by the failure of various bodies to implement gender 
recognition of policies that were conscious of the needs of transgender period593, this was an 
attempt to remedy individual injustices caused by a lack of clear national policy and 
legislation, not a replacement for it. In most circumstances the courts must wait for an 
injustice to have already occurred, they cannot act to prevent future problems in the way that 
legislation can. Similarly the requirement to have sufficient funds to pursue a court case can 
mean that justice via the courts is only accessible to a fortunate few. 
 
 
592 Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration, WP(MD) No. 4125 of 2019, judgment text located at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-360185.pdf, 
accessed 03/01/2021 
593 Madras HC directs Tamil Nadu govt to build public toilets for trangenders, Hindustan times,  4th April 2017, 
located at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/madras-hc-directs-tamil-nadu-govt-to-build-public-




















The legal situation in the UK 
 
The UK law on gender recognition for transgender people 
 
The UK does not currently recognise non-binary genders or intersex status in any legal 
document. It does, however, attempt to address the existence of transgender and intersex 
people in the legal system to some degree. There have also been recent calls to introduce 
legal recognition of non-binary gender and sex identities594. This chapter will examine the 
 
594 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390, House of commons Women and 
Equalities Committee, Published on 14 January 2016, Located 
at  https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf 
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current UK law applicable to transgender individuals and gender recognition, and the 
references within that law to intersex people with a view to examining how the law on this 
issue in the UK may change in the future. It is worth noting that the UK law on the subject 
has been highly influential on the law in other jurisdictions particularly former colonies595. 
Examining its development and current structure can be a useful aid in understanding the law 
in a large number of jurisdictions and is the “common ancestor” of the laws of the other 
jurisdictions examined in this thesis.  
The law on gender recognition in the UK comes, for the most part, from the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004596. This act interacts with the Equality Act 2010597, and has also been 
the subject of case law. An understanding of which is necessary to understand the position of 
the UK with regards to gender recognition. There are also gender recognition measures in 
other areas of the law, such as with regards to passports and prisons. For the sake of clarity 
this chapter will begin by exploring the case law which led to the Gender Recognition Act, 
and then address the relevant case law, followed by other aspects of the law, in particular the 
Equality Act, the Marriage (same sex couples) Act and the treatment of transgender 
prisoners, as well as the recent review of the law relating to transgender people. 
One of the first major cases concerning the rights and legal status of transgender people in the 
UK was Corbett v Corbett598. This case, while it concerned the validity of a marriage, 
impacted every aspect of the legal recognition of transgender people. It was also hugely 
influential outside the UK and gave voice to many of the arguments still used to deny the 
rights of transgender people. 
The case concerned April Ashley and Arthur Cameron Corbett, who, having met in 
November 1960 were involved in a wedding ceremony in Gibraltar on September 10th 
1963599 following the termination of Arthur Cameron Corbett's first marriage600. Their 
relationship ended just 14 days after the ceremony601. April Ashley was a transgender woman 
assigned male at birth had been taking hormonal treatment since 1956602 and had undergone a 
“sex change operation” in May 1960603. Arthur Cameron Corbett was aware of this since 
 
595 For example it is discussed in M v. M, [1991] NZFLR 337 para 35 
596 Gender Recognition Act 2004 
597 Equality Act 2010 c.15 
598 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83 
599 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 98 para 3 
600 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 93 para 2 
601 Ibid 
602 Ibid 
603 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 90 para 3 
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their first meeting in November 1960604. He argued that the marriage was void, as he claimed 
April Ashley was a man605 and that the marriage had not been consummated606. 
 
The court found that biological sex is the key component in marriage, as it was the 
cornerstone of the family and therefore required “natural hetero-sexual intercourse”607. The 
court did not seek to make a pronouncement of a person’s “legal sex”, but instead found that 
marriage in particular, due to it requiring heterosexual intercourse, must have biological 
criteria for determining who is a man or woman for the purposes of marriage608. The court 
found that in this case April Ashley was always male, and this had not been changed by 
surgery or hormones609. This was based on the reasoning that sex is fixed at birth, based 
largely on chromosomal sex, and that any surgery or other treatment in this case was online a 
“pastiche of femininity”610 rather than the genuine article. This was because a person could 
not change their chromosomal sex. As such it was found that a transsexual could not marry. 
How a person experienced their own gender and was treated by society was found 
irrelevant611, and that it was sex which was essential in marriage, and that this could not truly 
be changed after birth. 
 
A significant portion of the judgement is spent discussing intersex conditions. While the 
judgement does not say what the result would have been had April Ashley been found to be 
intersex, the issue is discussed in the context of attempts to confirm what her sex should be 
considered to be. Three interesting features of the case can be found in this section of the 
judgement. The first being that two of the five expert witnesses said that they would classify 
a transsexual to be a subtype of intersex person612, a finding which perhaps foreshadows the 
finding in Re: Kevin [2001] that a transsexual could be considered to be intersex on the 
grounds of “brain sex”613. The second interesting feature of this section is that overall three of 
the five experts said that they would classify April Ashley as intersex, yet the court did not 
 
604 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 91 para 2 
605 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 98 para 3 
606 Ibid 
607 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 105 para 2 
608 Ibid 
609 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 109 para 1 
610 Ibid 
611 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 106 para 2 
612 Ibid 
613 Re Kevin (validity of marriage of transsexual)[2003] FamCA 94 paragraphs 183 - 186 
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find this convincing, choosing instead to classify her as male on the grounds of chromosomal 
and gonadal sex at birth614. This was in part due to a lack of evidence for any specific intersex 
condition, and an apparent disregard for other factors such as hormonal factors and the brain, 
preferring to focus on chromosomes and the presence of testicles.  
 
The third feature is less a feature of the case itself, but rather a feature of how gender was 
recognised prior to the case. When discussing the view that transsexuals may be a type of 
intersex person it is mentioned that two of the experts called upon in the case had been 
successful in having patients recognised as female by the Ministry of Labour for the purposes 
of national insurance615. This is noteworthy as this seems to have been prior to any formal 
system of gender recognition existing in the form of primary or secondary legislation or as 
common law, and prior to any available evidence of formal policy for allowing a transgender 
person to alter their recognised gender. However, in addition to being an interesting example 
of gender recognition occurring prior to any formal framework , the recognition of these 
patients prior to any legislation and the way the court discusses how gender interacts 
differently with various areas of the law provide a useful framework for understanding the 
entirely of how legal gender recognition has been addressed in the UK and related 
jurisdictions.  
 
While Ormrod J. does state that this case is concerned only with sex “for the purposes of 
marriages”616 he does give an account of how the law interacts with sex in general. This 
account does not claim that one particular method of determining a person’s sex or gender 
should be authoritative in all cases, but rather that the method used will vary and be 
determined by the purpose for which the person’s gender or sex is being recognised. He states 
that: 
“For the limited purposes of this case, legal relations can be classified into those in which the 
sex of the individuals concerned is either irrelevant, relevant or an essential determinant of 
the nature of the relationship. over a very large area the law is indifferent to sex. It is 
irrelevant to most of the relationships which give rise to contractual or tortious rights and 
 
614 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 103 paras 3 and 4 
615 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 99 para 2 
616 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83, at 106 para 1 
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obligations, and to the greater part of the criminal law. In some contractual relationships, e.g., 
life assurance and pensions schemes, sex is a relevant factor in determining the rate of 
premium or contributions. It is relevant also to some aspects of the law regulating conditions 
of employment and to various state-run schemes such as national insurance, or to such fiscal 
matters as selective employment tax. It is not an essential determinant of the relationship in 
these cases because there is nothing to prevent the parties to a contract of insurance or a 
pension scheme from agreeing that the person concerned should be treated as a man or as a 
woman, as the case may be. Similarly, the authorities, if they think fit, can agree with the 
individual that he shall be treated as a woman for national insurance purposes, as in this case. 
On the other hand, sex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called marriage 
because it is and always has been recognised as the union of man and woman. It is the 
institution on which the family is built, and in which the capacity for natural hetero-sexual 
intercourse is an essential element.”617 
 
This sets out three categories into which laws may fall based on how they interact with sex. 
The first category, those laws which do not interact with sex at all at least not explicitly in 
their text, while they make up the bulk of the law, are largely irrelevant for the purposes of 
this discussion. The important aspect of this paragraph is that it divides the laws that do care 
about sex into two categories, those laws which regard gender as “relevant” and those laws 
for which sex is “an essential element”. 
 
The “relevant” category is noteworthy because it is recognised as being essentially mutable 
and negotiable. Ormrod J correctly identifies that legal relationships exist which care about 
sex, but for which the exact meaning of sex may be variable or negotiable. For example, if a 
bank were to open a special account for women with a higher interest rate to encourage 
women to save and develop increased financial independence618, it would be up to them to 
determine who they consider to be within the category of “women”. Ormrod J goes on to say 
that it is within the power of “the authorities” to define “woman” however they would like for 
national insurance purposes619. This can be seen as an acknowledgement that terms relating to 
 
617 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 83, at 105 para 2 
618 Ignoring, for the purposes of this hypothetical, whether this would actually be possible under modern 
equality law. 
619 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 83 At 105 para 2 
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sex or gender such as “woman” can be defined in a variety of ways, not only in private 
contractual relationships, but also in legislation applicable to the population at large. It is due 
to the existence of this category that the patients mentioned elsewhere in the judgement were 
able to have their gender recognised for the purpose of national insurance. The distinguishing 
feature being that, in the view of Ormrod J. national insurance and marriage relate to gender 
and sex in fundamentally different ways, with national insurance capable of change in how it 
recognises gender, but with marriage belonging to the much more inflexible “essential” 
category.  
 
The “essential” category is the true focus of the judgement, but is a much smaller category 
than the previous two. In the judgement Ormrod J. only gives a few examples of laws which 
fall within this category: 
“There are some other relationships such as adultery, rape and gross indecency in which, by 
definition, the sex of the participants is an essential determinant”620 
 
The judgement also places marriage within this category as “It is the institution on which the 
family is built, and in which the capacity for natural hetero-sexual intercourse is an essential 
element.”621 Ormrod J. goes on to talk about how in order to be a woman for the purpose of 
marriage one must be capable of “performing the essential role of a woman in marriage.”622 
which means, according to Ormrod J, having “female” gonads, chromosomes and genitals623. 
While a number of subsequent cases have disagreed with this characterisation of marriage624, 
the focus of this thesis is not on marriage itself, but on the nature of the category of laws for 
which sex is deemed “essential”.  
 
Ormrod J.  draws a distinction in the judgement between sex and gender625. When he states 
that sex is an essential component of some laws, it appears, particularly given the examples 
of this category he invokes, that he means simply that these laws necessarily relate to a 
 
620 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8 At 106 
621 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8 At 105 
622 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8 At 106 
623 Ibid 
624 For example M v. M, [1991] NZFLR 337 
625 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 83 At 107 
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person’s physical status. Because of this the Corbett case can be regarded, not as a case about 
legal gender, but as a case rejecting the very concept.  
 
Since the Corbett case the legal nature of marriage has changed. As a legal relationship it is 
no longer exclusively or necessarily hetero-sexual626. Gross indecency as an offence no 
longer exists627. Rape is defined with regard to the possession of a penis and a vagina628, and 
as such does not require any judgement as to a person’s sex, which can be complex and 
multi-faceted629. Adultery is the sole example cited by Ormrod J. which remains, under the 
law exclusively heterosexual630. Because of this, as well as modern developments in gender 
recognition law, it is possible that this category no longer exists in modern law.  
 
For modern purposes, the major category of legal gender referred to Corbett is that where sex 
is “relevant” but not “essential”. Which is defined by being negotiable and as being definable 
in any number of ways as determined by the parties involved. This paints a picture of the 
system of legal gender in the UK which is distinguished by its versatility but also it also by its 
possible conflicts. While a transgender person could, in theory, have their gender recognised 
in virtually all aspects of life, in reality this would have to have been negotiated separately in 
virtually every area of life. This poses a number of difficulties for the trans person in 
question.  
 
Firstly, such a negotiation is not the same as a commercial negotiation, in which there is give 
and take. Gender recognition is usually not a case of simply agreeing to pay more to have 
one’s gender recognised. It is often more akin to a measuring than a negotiation, in which 
rather than offering something in exchange, the individual and their characteristics are 
measured against a set of individual or social standards to see if they “measure up” and thus 
can be said to fit within the category they seek to be recognised as a member of. Because the 
standards by which a person is “measured” in this way are often social standards, which have 
 
626 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 Section 1(1) 
627 Sexual Offences Act 2003 schedule 7 
628 Sexual Offences Act 2003 section 1(1) 
629 For an example of this complexity see Intersex: Concept of multiple sexes is not new, Anne Fausto-Sterling, 
Nature, 3/18/2015, Vol.519(7543), pp.291-291 
630 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 Section 1(6) 
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a degree of uniform standards, the transgender person seeking recognition can be seen to be 
the party who has much less power in this situation. These standards may be difficult to 
“negotiate against” for the individual in question due to the extreme power imbalance of the 
individual in conflict with a series of social standards that may be founded on ignorance, 
misunderstanding or prejudice. In such a system progress may be very difficult for any 
individual to obtain. 
 
Secondly the diversity of standards involved and the need to prove one’s gender for each 
particular purpose creates a number of practical problems. This is in addition to being 
difficult to negotiate social concepts of gender that may be exclusionary. Not only can this 
require a significant amount of effort for an individual, but the very fact that different forms 
of recognition can contradict each other can cause practical problems, even though notionally 
they should not as they all relate to different purposes and thus do not necessarily refer to the 
same thing, despite all referring to gender or sex. As pointed out in later cases631 a diversity 
of standards, many of which are backed up by social attitudes which can be resistant to 
change means that a person must necessarily reveal themselves as transgender to the relevant 
authority for each purpose, often a private individual. This places the person seeking 
recognition in a vulnerable position where they can be subject to social shaming and 
discrimination. In addition to this, having documents that recognise different genders makes 
it easier for a person to be revealed to be transgender against their wishes, placing them in a 
similar vulnerable position632. Because of this the situation where the vast majority of gender 
recognition occurs in the “relevant but not essential” category where recognition is 
independently negotiated for each purpose continued to cause difficulties for transgender 
people. Subsequent cases focus on the injustices caused by not only lacking recognition for 
specific purposes but additionally on the difficulties caused by having to “negotiate” against 
social ideas of gender independently for each purpose. 
 
While it is important to mention Corbett for the purposes of understanding the background of 
gender recognition law, and a number aspects of its functioning, its impact on modern law is 
not merely structural. While the case has been criticised633, and the Gender Recognition Act 
 
631 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 77 
632 Ibid 
633 A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 21 paragraph 3 
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now provides a path to recognition for the purpose of marriage634, Corbett remains the current 
law in certain situations, as can be seen in the recent case of P v P635.This was particularly 
relevant before the introduction of marriage equality in the UK636, as it remained the case that 
without a gender recognition certificate a person’s gender for that purpose remained their 
gender assigned at birth637.  
 
After Corbett the next case to address the issue of “legal gender” was R v Tan638. It is 
different from the vast majority of other cases in this area because it does not relate to birth 
certificates or gender recognition on any other official document. Instead it addresses the 
issue of what a person’s gender or sex should be for the purpose of the criminal law. While it 
does not relate to “gender recognition” in terms of the idea of a uniform, singular process of 
recognition as future cases would, it follows Corbett in examining the issue of gender 
recognition with regard to a specific purpose.  
 
The issue at hand in R v Tan was the conviction of Gloria Gina Greaves for keeping a 
disorderly house and of being a man living on earnings of prostitution. She appealed on the 
basis that while “biologically male” she had been “psychologically and socially female for 
more than 18 years she ought to have been deemed to be female”639. While the offence at 
hand no longer exists, so in the strictest sense may not be applicable to modern law, the 
reasoning for the decision gives insight to the attitude adopted following Corbett v Corbett 
and has been cited in more modern cases as being authoritative on the issue of “legal 
gender”640. The reasoning in the case is best encapsulated by the following extract from the 
judgment text:  
 
“We reject this submission without hesitation. In our judgement both common sense and the 
desirability of certainty and consistency demand that the decision in Corbett v. Corbett should 
apply for the purpose not only of marriage but also for a charge under section 30 of the 
 
634 Gender Recognition Act 2004 
635 P v P (Transgender Applicant for Declaration of Valid Marriage) [2019] EWHC 3105 (Fam) 
636 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 
637 J v C (Void Marriage: Status of Children) [2006] 3 W.L.R. 876 
638 Regina v Tan and Others [1983] 3 W.L.R. 361 
639 Regina v Tan and Others [1983] 3 W.L.R. 361 at 1055 
640 Chief Constable of The West Yorkshire Police v A and Another (No 2) [2002] I.C.R. 552 paragraph 3 
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Sexual Offences Act 1956 or section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967. The same test would 
apply also if a man had indulged in buggery with another biological man. That Corbett v 
Corbett would apply in such a case was accepted on behalf of the appellant. It would, in our 
view, create an unacceptable situation if the law were such that a marriage between Gloria 
Greaves and another man was a nullity, on the ground that Gloria Greaves was a man; that 
buggery to which she consented with such other person was not an offence for the same 
reason; but that Gloria Greaves could live on the earnings of a female prostitute without 
offending against section 30 of the Act of 1956 because for that purpose he/she was not a 
man and that the like position would arise in the case of someone charged with living on his 
earnings as a male prostitute.”641 
 
Unfortunately this extract is the sum of the discussion on the concept of legal gender in R v 
Tan, and while it clearly states that having a person’s “legal genders should be the same for 
the purpose of marriage as in Corbett as for the criminal law, but does not state why these 
two purposes should be consistent with each other. While the desire for consistency is 
understandable, it seems to fundamentally contradict the reasoning in Corbett to state that all 
purposes should use the same standard of legal sex/gender as the “essential” category 
discussed in Corbett. However, it may be that this extract is simply stating the view that 
sexual offences should be seen to be in the “essential” category, which corresponds with the 
short discussion of that category in Corbett642. It is not particularly clear how R v Tan should 
be read in this regard. While the section of the judgement regarding legal gender only 
mentions the specific charge at hand and buggery, both being sexual offences, the judgement 
has since been cited in arguments that claim that it extended the idea of an unchanging “legal 
gender” assigned at birth to all of the criminal law643. 
 
Following R v Tan the predominant legal argument seems to shift from a focus on what a 
person’s legal gender is for a specific purpose to focus on the idea of whether the UK should 
introduce a system that would allow a transgender person to have a single legal gender 
recognised “for all purposes” due to the difficulties mentioned previously associated with a 
person having many legal genders. The possibility that a person may have a number of 
 
641 Regina v Tan and Others [1983] 3 W.L.R. 361 At 1064 
642 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8 At 106 
643 Chief Constable of The West Yorkshire Police v A and Another (No 2) [2002] I.C.R. 552 paragraph 3 
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equally valid but differing legal genders would not be addressed again by the House of Lords 
or Court of Appeal until 19 years later in the case of  Chief Constable of The West Yorkshire 
Police v A644.  
 
Following Corbett and R v Tan the UK was taken to the European Court of Human Rights 
regarding the state of its gender recognition law in the case of Rees v UK645 in 1987. This 
case concerned a trans man, who alleged that the UK had violated articles, 8 and 12, the right 
to a private and family life and the right to marriage. This was due to the UK failing to have 
any system for altering a person’s sex on their birth certificate, and the fact that due to 
Corbett v Corbett a trans man would not be considered a man for the purposes of marriage646. 
 
The main arguments raised in this case were that the failure to issue a new birth certificate 
caused humiliation and prevented full integration of transgender people into society647. The 
court was not persuaded by this, instead pointing out that many of the obligations under the 
Convention are negative obligations, which oblige a state to refrain from taking a specific 
action. However, if there were to be an obligation to have a coherent system of gender 
recognition, or even an obligation to have any system at all, this would be a positive 
obligation, and thus would require more evidence to persuade the court that this was required 
by the convention648. With regards to the alleged breach of article 8, the court found that there 
was none. This was because there was no coherent standard among the member states as to 
gender recognition, and the UK would, if an obligation was found to be present under article 
8, need to use resources to reform its entire system, which would affect other citizens. The 
court found that only recognising a transgender person as their “new” gender for certain 
purposes was sufficient, as incidental alterations to the existing systems was all that was 
required to “strike a fair balance”649 between a person’s right to have their gender recognised 
and the need for the state to use its resources in such a way as to benefit as many of its 
citizens as possible. 
 
644 Chief Constable of The West Yorkshire Police v A and Another (No 2) [2002] I.C.R. 552 
645 Rees v United Kingdom (A/106) [1987] 2 F.L.R. 111 
646 Rees v United Kingdom (A/106) [1987] 2 F.L.R. 111 at 31 and 32 
647 Rees v United Kingdom (A/106) [1987] 2 F.L.R. 111 at 34 
648 Rees v United Kingdom (A/106) [1987] 2 F.L.R. 111 at 37 




With regards to article 12 the court dealt with the issue briefly, in two paragraphs, stating that 
the right under article 12 under the convention referred only couples of opposite biological 
sexes, with no justification or explanation for this interpretation offered650. 
 
The same issue was addressed again by the European Court of Human Rights in Cossey v 
United Kingdom [1991]651. As in the Rees case, the relevant articles were 8 and 12. However, 
the Cossey and Rees cases are somewhat different. Cossey focused more on marriage and 
involving a marriage that actually occurred, whereas marriage was mentioned only in Rees as 
one of the rights the failure to recognise transgender people interfered with. However, despite 
these differences the court found that the facts were not sufficiently different to mean the 
cases should be distinguished from each other, it also pointed out that it is not bound by its 
previous decisions652. The court went on to immediately state that its opinion was unchanged 
from that in the Rees case653. With regards to article 12 the court noted that there had been 
developments since the Rees case654, but maintained that article 12 only created an obligation 
to recognise marriage between people of opposite biological sexes655.  
 
Despite this judgement the precursors to change may be seen in this case, particularly in the 
dissenting opinions of Judges Palm, Foighel and Pekkanen, who believed that there had been 
violations of article 8 and 12. This is because the failure to provide a system to alter birth 
certificates put transgender people in an “impossible situation” where they either had to 
disclose their transgender status or conceal the reality of their lives656. This dissent also 
pointed out that biology was a poor criteria as, following surgery, Ms Cossey could not be 
biologically considered a woman either, so the only solution that seemed viable was the 
compassionate solution of considering her a woman for the purposes of marriage. The dissent 
 
650 Rees v United Kingdom (A/106) [1987] 2 F.L.R. 111 at 49 and 50 
651 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 
652 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 paragraphs 32 to 35 
653 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 paragraphs 36 to 42 
654 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 at paragraph 46 
655 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 paragraphs 43 to 48 
656 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 paragraph 4 of the dissent located at 663 para 2 
135 
 
also dismissed the argument that marriage is essentially procreative, pointing out that men 
and women who cannot bear children are still permitted to marry657.  
 
Judge Martens disagreed with the majority, but on slightly different grounds. Judge Martens 
pointed out that the Reese case was decided on the grounds that to require a means of altering 
the register of births would impose a positive obligation on the UK. However, Martens points 
out that the claim in Reese should be seen as being “the existence of this system that 
recognises only biological sex is a violation of article 8” rather than the construction that the 
court seemed to use of “the lack of existence of a system of altering the registry of births is a 
violation of article 8”658. Using this alternate construction, it can be seen that the Reese case 
can be constructed as not requiring a positive obligation, but as requiring states to refrain 
from implementing systems which are based solely on biological sex. As such the Reese case 
may have been wrongly decided. This dissent also points out that the argument that article 12 
should be interpreted as only applying to “traditional marriage” and therefore requiring that 
the participants of a marriage protected by article 12 be of opposite biological sexes is 
essentially an appeal to the intent of the legal drafters. This may be a flawed basis for an 
argument, as the convention should be seen as a living instrument, and the intent of the legal 
drafters may well be a flawed guide, as the existence of transgender people was not an issue 
the drafters of the convention would have likely been aware of659. Martens also refers to the 
reliance on chromosomal sex in Corbett as “arbitrary and unreasonable”660 as it ignores the 
effects of sexual reassignment surgery on a person’s body. 
 
 
After Cossey the issue was next examined by the ECHR in B v France661. This case is 
notable, as it was the first time the court recognised a breach of article 8 due to the failure to 
provide gender recognition mechanisms. The case concerned a transgender woman who had 
undergone hormone therapy and sexual reassignment surgery662 who alleged a violation of 
article 8 due to the fact that refusing to alter her birth certificate violated her privacy, as she 
 
657 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 paragraph 5 of the dissent located at 665 para 2 
658 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 paragraph 3.4 of the dissent located at 650 para 1 
659 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 at 4.4.2 of the dissent, located at 656, paragraph 3 
660 Ibid 
661 B v France (A/232-C) (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 1 
662 B v France (A/232-C) (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 1 at paragraph 11 
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would have to disclose the fact that she was transgender to people she may not wish to 
disclose that information to663. The French court of appeal had denied her claim because:  
 
“… contrary … to Mr. [B.'s] contention, his present state is not 'the result of irreversible 
innate factors existing before the operation and of surgical intervention required by 
therapeutic necessities,' nor can it be considered that the treatment voluntarily undergone by 
Mr. [B.] led to the disclosure of his hidden true sex, but on the contrary it indicates a 
deliberate intention on his part without any other treatment having been tried and without the 
operations having been necessitated by Mr. [B.'s] biological development.”664 
 
Further appeals had been unsuccessful. While the court reiterated its statements in Rees and 
Cossey that there was not yet sufficient consensus among member states and that the science 
on the issue was “in a state of flux”665. However, the court found that the legal situation in 
France was significantly different from the UK666 and this justified finding France to be in 
breach of article 8.  Of particular relevance was the fact that the French system did not allow 
the applicant to change her name667, and that the French system was not designed to be a 
historical record of a person’s status at birth, but did allow amendments and alterations in 
other situations through a person’s life to reflect their current identity668. The court found that 
those factors, in addition to the increased severity and frequency of inconveniences caused by 
needing to verify ones gender on a large number of documents were sufficient to distinguish 
the case from Rees and Cossey and find a violation of article 8669 
 
 
Following this the issue of treatment of transgender people in the UK was addressed in P v S 
and Cornwall CC670. Although this case was not directly concerning gender recognition, the 
issue was touched upon and the previous ECHR cases on the matter were referenced. This 
 
663 B v France (A/232-C) (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 1 at paragraph 13 
664 B v France (A/232-C) (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 1 at paragraph 15 
665 B v France (A/232-C) (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 1 at paragraph 48 
666 B v France (A/232-C) (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 1 at paragraph 51 
667 B v France (A/232-C) (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 1 at paragraph 58 
668 B v France (A/232-C) (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 1 at paragraph 55 
669 B v France (A/232-C) (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 1 at paragraph 63 
670 P v S and Cornwall CC (C13/94) [1996] I.C.R. 795 
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case concerned the implementation of directive 76/207/EEC671, known as the equal treatment 
directive. The question was whether article 2(1), which prohibits discrimination on the 
grounds of sex should be interpreted as including discrimination against a transgender person 
who had not yet undergone sexual reassignment surgery. In this case the court referred to 
Rees, Cossey and B v France, placing particular emphasis on the statement in Rees that the 
law on transsexuals should be constantly re-examined in the light of the circumstances  and 
keeping in mind the severity of problems faced by the transgender community672. A 
definition of transsexual from the Rees case was also used673. The court found that 
transsexualism is a condition relating to a person’s sex, and that the directive did not include 
language to suggest that it should be restricted to mean “one sex or another” that the directive 
should be interpreted as protecting transsexuals from discrimination as: 
 
“Such discrimination is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person 
concerned. Where a person is dismissed on the ground that he or she intends to undergo, or 
has undergone, gender reassignment, he or she is treated unfavourably by comparison with 
persons of the sex to which he or she was deemed to belong before undergoing gender 
reassignment.”674 
 
As such the court found that such discrimination is a violation of article 2(1) of the directive. 
While this case is not directly on the issue of gender recognition, protection from 
discrimination, and the criteria for belonging to that protected class can be seen as a variation 
on gender recognition, as it relates to recognising when one can be considered to be a 
transgender person and when that category is a protected category. This can be relevant when 
discrimination law recognises a person as belonging to a category that they would not be 
considered to belong to by other areas of the law. 
 
 
671 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, Official Journal L 039, 14/02/1976 P. 0040 - 0042   
672 P v S and Cornwall CC (C13/94) [1996] I.C.R. 795 at paragraphs 12 and 13 of the opinion of the advocate 
general 
673 P v S and Cornwall CC (C13/94) [1996] I.C.R. 795 paragraph 
674 P v S and Cornwall CC (C13/94) [1996] I.C.R. 795 paragraph 21 
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The issue of gender recognition in the UK was again revisited by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom in 1992675. In this case two cases 
were combined to be heard together, as they shared similar elements of objecting to the lack 
of legal gender recognition for transgender people in the UK and allegations of violations of 
articles 8, 12, 13 and 14. 
 
With regards to article 8 the court found that the issues faced by applicants did not reach such 
severity that would tip the balance in favour of requiring the UK to implement gender 
recognition measures676. It also found that there had not been sufficient changes in the lack of 
consensus among states in the Council of Europe on the matter, and the science on 
transsexuals had not advanced to the point where determining gender based on biological sex 
could be considered unreasonable677. It found that the available measures for gender 
recognition should be kept constantly under review, and even with the lack of medical 
certainty, increased social acceptance and acknowledgement of problems faced by 
transgender meant that states should continue to review their gender recognition measures678. 
The court also found that there was no violation of article 12, due to the presence of the 
words “found a family” which, in the courts view, was sufficient to justify the view that 
restricting this right to couples of differing biological sexes could be justified, referring to its 
previous judgement in Cossey679. The court also found no violations of article 14 due to the 
lack of breaches of articles 8 and 12, and no violation of article 13. 
 
Following Sheffield and Horsham v UK the issue of gender recognition in the UK would next 
be dealt with by the ECHR in the case of Goodwin v UK. However, between these two cases 
the issue of gender recognition for various purposes was still being raised in domestic courts. 
Notably in the case of Chief Constable of The West Yorkshire Police v A and Another (No 2). 
Which, while it would be heard in the Employment Appeal Tribunal before Goodwin, would 
conclude in the Supreme Court 2 years after that case.  Chief Constable of The West 
Yorkshire Police v A and Another (No 2) concerned whether the chief constable had 
discriminated against a transgender woman contrary to the Sex Discrimination (Gender 
 
675 Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom (1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 16 
676 Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom(1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 163 at paragraph 59 
677 Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom(1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 163 At paragraph 56 
678 Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom(1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 163 At paragraph 60 
679 Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom(1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 163 At paragraphs 66-67 
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Reassignment) Regulations 1999/1102 in not hiring her as a police constable on the grounds 
that a female constable would need to conduct intimate searches of women. It is worth noting 
that unlike the ECHR cases up to this point, which focus on whether the UK should be 
required to implement a centralized form of gender recognition, this case focused on 
specificity on whether the need to conduct intimate searches should be considered a genuine 
occupational requirement which would justify excluding a transgender person from that 
employment. This case is somewhat similar to Corbett, as while on the surface it addressed a 
discrimination issue, the core of the question that the EAT asked itself was “what should a 
person’s gender be considered to be for a specific purpose”, the purpose in this case being 
that of conducting intimate searches. In this case the employment appeal tribunal stated: 
 “The domestic authorities speak with one voice, an echo of Corbett v Corbett (orse Ashley) 
[1971] P 83. No decision of the European Court of Justice binds us to ignore those domestic 
authorities. Whilst we recognise the very real strength of Miss Harrison's argument that it is 
time that a change was made, we see irresistible force in leaving any change to Parliament. 
The need for certainty and consistency in R v Tan [1983] QB 1053 suggests that on a subject 
that has implications as diverse as, for example, the meaning of marriage, the definition of 
incest, the ingredients of rape and the availability of one or other of differential annuity or 
pension rights, it would be undesirable for a case-by-case judge-made departure from or 
extension of or failure to depart from or extend Corbett with, inevitably, finer and finer 
distinctions been drawn between past and present cases as the incremental development of 
case law progressed. Better by far that Parliament should deal with the subject, as both 
Johnson J and the majority in the Court of Appeal in Bellinger have underlined. Accordingly, 
whilst we add our voices to those inviting the legislature to grasp this nettle, we shall, 
adopting Corbett , recognise the applicant as male in law, notwithstanding surgical or other 
intervention and notwithstanding her wish to be treated as, and such ability as she has to be 
taken to be, female.”680 
This reiterates the statement made in R v Tan, that a uniform legal gender is necessary for 
legal certainty. It states that Tan suggests that on such an important topic as legal gender, that 
a case by case approach should not be taken, and that it should be up to Parliament to create a 
solution. This seems to, while citing Corbett, represent a movement away from the possibility 
 
680 Chief Constable of The West Yorkshire Police v A and Another (No 2) [2002] I.C.R. 552 paragraph 19 
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of a person having multiple legal genders for various purposes that was mentioned in that 
case.  
The case was appealed, but Lord Bingham's judgement in the House of Lords seems to agree 
with that at the EAT on this issue, speaking about the Corbett and Tan decisions he stated 
that:  
“Both decisions have been heavily criticised, and other jurisdictions have adopted other rules. 
But there was nothing in English domestic law to suggest that a person could be male for one 
purpose and female for another, and there was no rule other than that laid down in Corbett 
and R v Tan.”681 
While this seems to be a fairly definitive declaration that if the notion of a person having 
multiple different legal genders for certain legal purposes was created in Corbett, it no longer 
exists in English and Welsh, or that it never existed at all. However, there may be a number 
of reasons to treat this statement with scepticism.  
 
Firstly, on a purely literal level it is not true that there is nothing in English domestic law to 
suggest this, as this suggestion can be derived from Corbett itself. The most charitable 
reading of this statement would be to say that the idea of a person having different genders 
recognised in situations where sex/ gender is relevant but not essential is obiter dicta and as 
such not a part of any precedent created by Corbett. However, it seems as though this is not 
the case, as the discussion of those categories relating to how the law interacts with a 
person’s gender seems to be a vital part of the core reasoning in the case. In deciding that sex 
should be regarded as “essential” in marriage it was necessary to draw a line between those 
cases where sex may be “essential” and those where it is not. Without this distinction Ormrod  
J would have been unable to explain why marriage should be treated differently from national 
insurance, which, as stated in the Corbett case, was already recognising the gender identities 
of some transgender people at the time of the case682. As such it seems most likely that the 
idea of different genders being recognised for different purposes in situations where gender is 
relevant but not essential forms a vital part of the core reasoning in the case and as such 
should be regarded as ratio decidendi and therefore as a part of English common law.  
 
681 A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 21 paragraph 3 
682 Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) (No.1) [1971] P. 83 at 86 
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Secondly, the Corbett and Tan cases can be read as being related to a specific purpose. As 
Ormrod  J. in Corbett explicitly states that the case is concerned only with marriage, and R v 
Tan only mentions sexual offences when talking about the “unacceptable situation” that 
recognising diverging legal genders in that case would create683, which may suggest that the 
case should be read as only referring to sexual offences. Whether it intended to place the 
offence at hand in that case into the realm of situations where sex is “essential” is unclear, but 
that reading does seem justified. Even if the intent in Tan was not to categorise sexual 
offences as one’s where sex is “essential”, it could still simply be an exercise of creating a set 
of criteria, linked to the set used in Corbett for gender recognition relating to a set off 
offences that exist in the “relevant but not essential” category. While it does talk about 
certainty, it seems as though nothing in R v Tan explicitly rules out the idea that multiple 
genders can be recognised for multiple purposes, rather it simply states that for the offences 
at hand an approach consistent with marriage should be taken. As such it may be the case that 
neither of the cases mentioned do actually assign to anyone a fixed legal gender for all 
purposes. 
 
The third reason one may treat this statement with scepticism comes from elsewhere in the 
same case. Lady Hale, in the same case, stated that: 
”As to domestic law, there might be good policy reasons for distinguishing between the 
different purposes for which the decision in Corbett [1971] P 83 may be invoked. Marriage 




“It is less clear why the immutability of birth gender for marriage purposes should apply for 
all other purposes, in particular to those criminal offences which used to depend upon the 
gender of the accused or the victim. Many of those distinctions were of historical origin 
having nothing to do with the different physical characteristics of the people concerned. It 
was a nonsense at the time of Tan [1983] QB 1053 that the offence of living on the immoral 
 
683 Regina v Tan and Others [1983] 3 W.L.R. 361 at 1064 
684 A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 21 paragraph 51 
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earnings of a prostitute could only be committed by a man and scarcely surprising that the 
Court of Appeal found it convenient to apply the Corbett reasoning in that case. On the other 
hand, in so far as criminal offences did depend upon sexual differences, it might be thought 
that the physical differences which enabled the various acts to be performed were more 
important than chromosomal similarities, so that a female-to-male trans person might be 
guilty of rape (as originally defined) and a male-to-female transsexual might be its victim. 
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to decide the point. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 
adopts a gender neutral approach which makes it much less important irrespective of the 
Gender Recognition Bill.”685 
 
This seems to make it clear that Lady Hale saw that it may be desirable for a person to be 
legally recognised as one gender for some purposes, but not for others. This section also 
argues that the Tan case may have partly been decided in the way that it was to produce a just 
result, as the gender distinction in that case was “nonsense” which would only have served to 
allow someone to evade conviction. 
It is worth noting that the final judgement in the West Yorkshire police case was that a 
transsexual woman should be treated as a woman and should not be discriminated against by 
being treated differently from other women. This is despite her not having a gender 
recognition certificate, as the Gender Recognition Act had not yet become law. Lord 
Bingham agreed with the result, but on different grounds686. As such it may be that this case 
should not be relied on as a definitive source as to whether a person can have different legal 
genders for different purposes, due to the disagreement between Lord Bingham and Lady 
Hale on the subject, and, because the it was not the central issue of the case, neither of their 
judgements is a minority dissenting judgement, so neither can be regarded as more 
authoritative on the subject than the other.  
 
The next major case on this issue was Goodwin v UK687. In this case the applicant was a 
transgender woman who encountered difficulties due to the state of the UK's gender 
recognition law. She had been sexually harassed at work from 1990-1992 but had lost her 
 
685 A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 21 paragraph 52 
686 A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 21 paragraph 24 
687 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 
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case at employment tribunal because she was deemed to be a man for the purposes of the law 
in that area688. She was unable to obtain a new national insurance number and was 
experiencing problems at her new job which she suspected might be due to her existing 
national insurance number being associated with records stating that she was male689. She 
was also treated as male for the purposes of retirement and pension but was eventually able to 
come to an agreement with the Department of Social Security690.  
 
Due to this her records were classified as sensitive, meaning they were only able to be read 
by employees at a certain rank or above. While this measure was intended to protect her 
privacy, it resulted in her being unable to deal with routine matters at the local office, instead 
having to make special appointments for everything. Despite these measures she still received 
letters from the Department of Social Security in her old name691. She had also been unable 
to receive certain entitlements which required a birth certificate as proof of identity due to her 
birth certificate recording her sex as male and her desire to not disclose this. Because of this 
she had been unable to receive a loan conditional upon life insurance, a re-mortgage offer and 
an entitlement to winter fuel allowance. She also felt unable to report a theft of 200 pounds 
due to fear that the police would become aware of her transgender status692. Because of this 
she alleged violations of article 8, 12, 13 and 14. 
 
With regards to article 8, the court stated that while the court had in the past deemed the UK's 
treatment of transsexuals to not be a violation of article 8, this was because measures had 
been taken to mitigate any harm done, for example recognising people as their “new” gender 
for the purposes of national insurance693. However, in this case, while the government had 
made special arrangements with the applicant, these special arrangements themselves caused 
inconvenience and may have increased the chance that her transsexual status was 
disclosed694. The court pointed out the harms of the facts of a person’s life not aligning with 
the legal category they were placed in695, as well as the seeming inconsistency that the NHS 
 
688 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 15 
689 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 16 
690 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 17 
691 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 18 
692 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 19 
693 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 73 
694 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 76 
695 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 77 
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carried out “sex change” procedures, but the UK was not willing to legally recognise the 
change in status these surgeries were intended to result in696. It was also pointed out how the 
poor treatment of transsexuals had been recognised domestically in Bellinger v Bellinger697, 
as well as the increasing international movement towards legal recognition of transgender 
people698. The court also found that the lack of medical consensus referred to in the Sheffield 
and Horsham cases was not relevant, as while transgender people cannot change all of their 
characteristics, the court was unconvinced that the unchangeable characteristics, such as 
chromosomes, should take precedence699 . 
 
Overall with regards to article 8 the court found that any burden imposed on the UK would be 
manageable700, as reinforced by the findings of the UK's own working group report on the 
issue701, and that such burdens would be justified to rectify the problems the current law was 
causing for transsexuals702. 
 
The court found that the UK had breached article 12. While the court acknowledged its 
previous rulings on the issue, it stated that the inability to reproduce should not be interpreted 
as preventing someone from participating in a marriage as protected by article 12703. The 
court found that because of this there was no basis for the claim that article 12 should be 
interpreted as requiring the terms “man” and “woman” in purely biological terms704. The 
court found there was no violation of article 14, as because it had found a breach of article 8 
and 12 there was no separate complaint705. It similarly found there was no violation of article 
13 as the lack of a domestic remedy against domestic law did not necessarily mean there was 
no effective remedy706. 
 
696 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 78 
697 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 79, Although this case found that the court 
could take no action in the absence of legislation. 
698 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraphs 84-85 
699 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 82 
700 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 91 
701 Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People, April 2000, Located at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_wwlG1k_tFAJ:www.oocities.org/transforum2000/Res
ources/wgtrans.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk accessed 10/01/2020 
702 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 93 
703 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 98 
704 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 100 
705 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 108 




At this stage it is worth noting the contrast between Goodwin, which represented arguably the 
most important case on this issue and Corbett, the cornerstone of British law on this issue. 
Both cases address the issue of gender recognition but they address it in somewhat different 
ways and with a different set of priorities. While Corbett focused on whether a transgender 
woman should have the right to be treated according to her gender identity for a specific 
purpose, Goodwin addressed the injustices caused by not having one’s gender recognised in a 
singular unified way. While this may seem to be merely a difference in scale, this difference 
can be seen in another way: the difference between a right to be seen, and a right to 
disappear. This can be seen by examining the focus in the Goodwin case on the injustices a 
trans person can be exposed to when their legal genders for various purposes do not match 
with each other or with their gender identity. In many ways the focus can be said to be less on 
the injustice of not being recognised as one’s gender, but on the injustice of being compelled 
by the systems in place to be seen as transgender in a social situation where this can expose 
one to prejudice. This is at its most apparent when one recalls that one of the key issues in the 
case was the article 8 right to privacy, specifically because the systems in place caused data, 
namely a person’s trans status, to be made public against their will and thus causing them 
harm. This is of interest because it represents a core tension at the heart of gender 
recognition, the conflict between the desire to be seen707, and the desire to avoid being seen to 




After the Goodwin case the issue of gender recognition was again addressed in the House of 
Lords in the case of Bellinger v Bellinger708. This case concerned a transgender woman who 
had married a man, and wanted a declaration that the marriage was valid709. The court found 
that while the present situation was “unsatisfactory” that it could not make a judgement as to 
when gender transition would be considered to be sufficient for the purposes of marriage 
 
707 Taking Public Responsibility for Gender: When Personal Identity and Institutional Feminist Politics Meet, 
Cooper, D. (2020), feminists@law, 10(2), page 15 
708 Bellinger v Bellinger (Attorney General intervening) [2002] Fam. 150 
709 Bellinger v Bellinger (Attorney General intervening) [2002] Fam. 150 para 1 
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without a clear statutory framework710. As such, because no legislation had been passed at the 
time, the appeal was dismissed. 
 
The dissenting judgement in this case, written by Thorpe LJ, is worth examining. In this 
dissent a number of the cornerstones of British law on this subject were questioned. This not 
only includes criticism of the Corbett judgement, particularly that that judgement seems to 
have ignored psychological factors in determining gender711, but also includes questioning 
the foundational case in this area, Hyde v Hyde712. While this dissent was critical of Hyde v 
Hyde, stating that it may not have a place in modern society due to social and economic 
changes713, the dissent rests on the notion that the court can and should be able to rule on who 
should be considered a man or a woman for the purposes of marriage, particularly as getting 
legislation passed on the issue would be likely to take some time714. With that established LJ 
Thorpe points out that our understanding of the issue, as well as the prevailing social 
environment, have changed significantly since Corbett v Corbett715, and that these changes 
should be taken into account for the law to meet the needs of society716. 
 
Following this the UK introduced the Gender Recognition Act in 2004717. The act was 
intended to remedy the issues which had resulted in the UK being found to be in breach off 
articles 8 and 12. It does so by creating a mechanism by which birth certificates can be 
altered to reflect a person’s gender. This is intended to solve the article 8 issues by allowing a 
transgender person to keep their gender assigned at birth a secret if they so desire718, and the 
article 12 issue is solved by the fact that once a person’s birth certificate is altered they are 
considered to be of that sex for all purposes, including marriage, which solves the issue of 
only recognising biological sex for the purposes of marriage post Corbett. 
 
 
710 Bellinger v Bellinger (Attorney General intervening) [2002] Fam. 150 para 109 
711 Bellinger v Bellinger (Attorney General intervening) [2002] Fam. 150 para 122 
712 Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P & D 130, 133 
713 Bellinger v Bellinger (Attorney General intervening) [2002] Fam. 150 para 127 
714 Bellinger v Bellinger (Attorney General intervening) [2002] Fam. 150 para 155 
715 Bellinger v Bellinger (Attorney General intervening) [2002] Fam. 150 para 155 
716 Bellinger v Bellinger (Attorney General intervening) [2002] Fam. 150 para 157 
717 Gender Recognition Act 2004 
718 Although the original version of the act allowed sports clubs to ask to see a certificate, so this secrecy would 
be contingent on the condition that the transgender person was prepared to commit to never play a sport where 
competitors are separated based on gender. 
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The act is substantively fairly simple, although a number of criticisms can be made of it, 
which will be discussed later. The act creates a panel, made up of legal and medical 
professionals, called the Gender Recognition Panel, to which applications may be made. To 
apply a person must either produce evidence of gender recognition from another jurisdiction, 
or demonstrate that they have gender dysphoria, have “lived in the acquired gender” for at 
least two years, intend to live in that gender for the rest of their life and must provide the 
relevant evidence719. Only people over the age of 18 may apply720. The evidence required 
takes the form of reports by a registered medical practitioner or psychologist and a statutory 
declaration that they meet the “living in the acquired gender” requirement, and any other 
evidence required721. Applications are done through a standard form722. Currently two 
medical reports are required, as well as a fee of 140 pounds. When the act was first 
introduced a person could not apply if they were married, and would have to end their 
marriage before a certificate could be issued. When a certificate was issued a person’s sex on 
their birth certificate would be altered and a note of the alteration would be made on a gender 
recognition registry, which would not be available to the public. A person’s legal sex and 
gender would then be considered to be the one noted on their birth certificate, for all 
purposes723. This replaced the previous system mentioned in the ECHR cases where a 
person’s gender could be recognised differently in different areas of life. 
 
It is worth briefly mentioning Grant v UK724, which concerned a transgender woman who 
sought gender recognition for the purpose of claiming a state pension. She was recognised as 
female for this purpose, and paid the female rate for contributions until the rates were 
equalised in 1975725. However, when she reached the age of 60, which was the retirement age 
for women at the time, she was told she would have to wait until she was 65, the age of 
eligibility for men726. She appealed against this decision twice, but was unsuccessful on both 
occasions727. Following the decision in the Goodwin case she sought a declaration from the 
Court of Appeal that she should be granted pension at the same age as cisgender women, 
 
719 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 2 
720 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 1 (1) 
721 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 3 
722 Form T450 available at https://formfinder.hmctsformfinder.justice.gov.uk/t450-eng.pdf 
723 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 4 
724 Grant v The United Kingdom [2006] ECHR 548  
725 Grant v The United Kingdom [2006] ECHR 548 para 7 
726 Grant v The United Kingdom [2006] ECHR 548 para 8 
727 Grant v The United Kingdom [2006] ECHR 548 para 10 
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However, her case was by mutual agreement held until the judgement in the, then pending, 
Bellinger case. She was advised that she was unlikely to receive this judgement given the 
view in Bellinger that the matter is best left for Parliament, and as such abandoned that case, 
as she could not continue to afford the legal costs728. She then applied to the ECHR in 2003, 
and was granted a gender recognition certificate in 2005 when it became possible to do so. 
The court found in this case that the UK was within the margin of appreciation in denying her 
a pension at 60 initially, however did violate article 8 by continuing to deny her the pension 
and gender recognition after the Goodwin case was decided until she was able to receive a 
gender recognition certificate under the Gender Recognition Act729. 
 
The Gender Recognition Act also contains evidence of the conflation of gender and sex in 
UK law. Gaining recognition of one’s gender results in one’s legal sex also changing730. This 
was explicitly discussed when the GRA was being initially debated in Parliament731. The 
justification given for this was that without this conflation rights could be denied to 
transgender people on the grounds that their sex had not been changed. So a gender 
recognition certificate alters a person’s sex to avoid the need to create a separate legal status 
for every combination of identity and phenotype732 and to prevent a situation in which the 
goalposts are constantly moved to deny transgender people equal treatment to their cisgender 
counterparts733. 
 
Following the Gender Recognition Act the next major piece of legislation concerning 
transgender people was the Equality Act 2010734. This act was designed to update and 
consolidate the UK's existing discrimination law, which up to this point was dealt with by a 
number of different acts and statutory instruments. While this is a large act, dealing with a 
 
728 Grant v The United Kingdom [2006] ECHR 548 para 14 
729 Grant v The United Kingdom [2006] ECHR 548 para 51 
730 Gender Recognition Act 2004 
731 Gender Recognition Bill in Standing Committee A, House of Commons, 2nd sitting 9th March 2004 
(afternoon), Located at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmstand/a/cmgend.htm, accessed 
26/11/2020, Column 63 
732 Gender Recognition Bill in Standing Committee A, House of Commons, 4th sitting 11th March 2004 
(afternoon)), Located at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmstand/a/st040311/pm/40311s01.htm, 
Column 137 
733 House of Commons, Gender Recognition Bill in Standing Committee A, 4th sitting 11th March 2004 
(afternoon), Located at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmstand/a/st040311/pm/40311s01.htm, 
Column 138 
734 Equality Act 2010 
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number of protected characteristics, the relevant one, when examining gender recognition, is 
the protected characteristic of “gender reassignment”. A person falls under the protection of 
this characteristic if: 
“...the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a 
process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological or other 
attributes of sex”735  
This replaces the previous measures found in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 added by the 
Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999736. While this provision 
contains some ambiguities, the explanatory notes and related content of Hansard are 
particularly useful in determining the intended effect of this section. The explanatory notes 
contain an example in which a person would fall under this characteristic, but has not sought 
medical treatment, instead they have decided to “live as a man”. The relevant sections of 
Hansard similarly make clear that this section is not intended to require a person to seek 
medical treatment737. Hansard also fleshes out what its creators believed would be the criteria 
for someone to be covered by it. For example it seems clear the envisaged the words 
“proposing to undergo” to require “a more definite decision point, at which the person’s 
protected characteristic would immediately come into being.”738 It also seems that the criteria 
for this protection to exist that this internal decision point in some way manifest externally, in 
a way evident to others  
“There are a lot of ways in which that can be manifested — for instance, by making their 
intention known. Even if they do not take a single further step, they will be protected straight 
away. 
Alternatively, a person might start to dress, or behave, like someone who is changing their 
gender or is living in an identity of the opposite sex. That, too, would mean that they were 
protected. If an employer is notified of that proposal, they will have a clear obligation not to 
discriminate against them. If anything, a good employer would help them. However, without 
a clear decision even to propose to do that, it is difficult to see how, practically, an employer 
will know that the assistance is necessary. If what is going on is an internal cogitation, with 
 
735 Equality Act 2010 Section 7 (1) 
736 The Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999, No.1102 
737 Hansard, HC Public Bill Committee, 6th Sitting, col.166 (June 11, 2009) 
738 HC Public Bill Committee, Hansard, 7th Sitting, col.204 (June 16, 2009) 
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no external manifestation, it is difficult to see how this can work practically. We want to 
ensure that people start their personal journey … 
As soon as there is a manifestation — as I have said already, and we discussed this last week 
too — the duty not to discriminate comes in.”739 
 
It is clear from this that the authors of this legislation viewed acts, such as a declaration or 
changing one’s mode of dress to be forms of “changing physiological or other attributes of 
sex”. Although sex is often understood as referring to a person’s physical state, it seems that 
here acts such as changing one’s mode of dress, which would normally be considered forms 
of gender expression, are considered to be a part of sex, thus continuing the conflation of 
gender and sex in the law of the UK. Those with non-binary genders are also protected by 
this section740, as clarified in a recent employment tribunal decision741. 
 
It is interesting to note that due to the wording of this section, intersex persons may be 
covered by this characteristic, despite not being mentioned in the legislation itself, nor in the 
explanatory notes or in Hansard. This is because the wording of section 7 requires a person to 
have undergone, be undergoing, or planning to undergo some process for changing 
physiological or other aspects of sex. While it is clear from the explanatory notes, wording 
used elsewhere in the section, and in Hansard, that the intent was gender and sex be 
conflated, It’s clear, because physiological changes are mentioned, that sex in this context 
means sex as it is normally understood, as a physiological classification, as well as being 
conflated with gender. As such intersex people could be covered by this section, so long as 
they had, at some point, undergone some alteration to their sexual characteristics. This is not 
particularly uncommon, as surgical procedures for making intersex people have a more 
normal genital appearance, as well as hormonal interventions, have been fairly common for a 
number of intersex conditions for several decades. Because of this, section 7 may 
inadvertently give discrimination protections to intersex persons, although it would be 
restricted to those who had experienced some kind of alteration of their sexual characteristics.  
 
 
739 HC Public Bill Committee, Hansard, 7th Sitting, col.204 (June 16, 2009) 
740 Gender reassignment: scope of statutory definition, Eversheds Sutherland, PLC Mag. 2020, 31(10), 70-71 
741  Taylor v Jaguar Land Rover Ltd [2020] 9 WLUK 200 
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Another section of note relating to transgender people in the Equality Act 2010 is section 28. 
This section prevents the use of the characteristic of gender reassignment in cases of 
discrimination with regards to provision of services, if those services are reserved for persons 
of a single sex or are provided differently for different sexes or if separate services are 
provided for each sex742. This may indicate that transgender people were not considered to be 
“full” members of their gender, as, due to this section, a transgender woman would be unable 
to pursue a claim for discrimination if she was denied a service for women.  
 
 
Also worth noting is that, while the section relating to transgender people does not mention 
gender or sex being binary, this can be found elsewhere in the Act. Section 11, which deals 
with the protected characteristic of sex states that: 
 
“In relation to the protected characteristic of sex— 
(a) a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a man 
or to a woman; 
(b) a reference to persons who share a protected characteristic is a reference to persons of the 
same sex.”743 
 
The terms “man” and “woman” are further defined in section 212 of the Act to be “a male of 
any age” and “a female of any age” respectively744. Because “man” and “woman” are often 
used to refer to a person’s gender, whereas “male” and “female” are more often used to refer 
to physical sex, this can be seen as another point where the entanglement of gender and sex in 
UK law is continued. The usage of these terms in section 11 seems to amount to a statement 
that the only permissible sexes/genders are man/male and woman/female, with no intersex or 
non-binary status being recognised. It is important to note that while an intersex category 
does not exist within this section an intersex person could count as a member of either the 
male or female sex due to UK case law745. While such a person would be protected from 
 
742 Equality Act 2010 Schedule 3 part 7 
743 Equality Act 2010 Section 11 
744 Equality Act 2010 Section 212 
745 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 
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discrimination due to their being or being considered a man or a woman, due to the lack of an 
intersex category section 11 would most likely not be usable by a person alleging 
discrimination due to being intersex rather than due to being considered a man or a woman. 
 
 
Following the Equality Act the next major relevant piece of legislation was the Marriage 
(Same-Sex Couples) Act746. This act extends the right to marry to same sex couples747, while 
leaving the existing system of civil unions intact. This essentially gives same sex couples a 
choice of whether they prefer a civil union or a marriage. Civil unions remained only 
assessable to same sex couples until amendments made by the Civil Partnership (Opposite-
sex Couples) Regulations 2019, which were produced in accordance with the Civil 
Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration etc) Act 2019748. The Marriage (Same-Sex 
Couples) Act is notable as while it could be seen as an implementation of the concept of 
“marriage equality”, it differs from similar pieces of legislation in other jurisdictions in a 
number of interesting ways, with the result that any equality obtained could be seen as 
imperfect, particularly in cases involving transgender or intersex people. 
 
The first notable feature of this act is that while it does extend the right to marry to same sex 
couples, it creates a number of situations in which same-sex marriages are to be treated as 
different from opposite-sex marriages. The act explicitly states that any duty so solemnise 
marriages does not extend to same-sex marriages, and that no one can be compelled to, 
through enforcement of a contract or other means, provide any of the “opt-in” services, 
necessary for a marriage to take place749. This means that same sex marriages are, in some 
way, fundamentally different, as protections exist within this Act allowing a person to refrain 
from providing necessary aspects of those marriages where no such protections exist for 
opposite-sex marriages. These differences may seem trivial, but it means that sex is still a 
relevant factor in marriage, so when gender recognition measure are absent, fail, or do not 
represent the reality of a person’s life, this will influence their ability to marry. The wording 
of section 1(1 is also relevant, as the wording “Marriage of same sex couples is lawful.” 
 
746 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 
747 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 Section 1 
748 Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration etc) Act 2019 Section 2 
749 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 Section 2 
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means that the Act does not aim to make gender or sex (as they are entangled concepts in 
British law) a non-factor in marriage. Instead it merely expands marriage to one additional set 
of sex-combinations, those which could be interpreted as “same sex couples”. The main 
impact of this is that it only permits a person to marry regardless of sex if only two sex 
categories exist. While UK law does not currently acknowledge more than two sex 
categories, this does mean that amendments would be necessary if one or more additional sex 
categories were to be acknowledged if persons in those categories are to be permitted to 
marry regardless of sex. It may be interesting to see what the response of the law would be to 
a person acknowledged as being intersex or having a non-binary gender in another 
jurisdiction attempted to marry in the UK. At the time of writing no case matching this 
description has been brought to court. 
 
The second notable aspect of this Act has come to be referred to as “the spousal veto”750. 
Section 12 of the Act751, combined with schedule 5, amend the Gender Recognition Act to 
include a number of new measures referring to marriage. Originally the Gender Recognition 
Act included a measure which meant that an applicant who was married would receive an 
interim gender recognition certificate rather than a full certificate. The interim certificate had 
no effect on a person’s legal sex or gender and did not cause an alteration of their birth 
certificate. Its sole function was to render a marriage voidable752. Once the marriage was 
dissolved a full certificate could be issued753.  This measure ensured that a person could not 
marry and then obtain a gender recognition certificate, which would result in a same-sex 
marriage being legally recognised. The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act altered this 
provision754. An applicant who is in a protected marriage must attach to their application a 
signed statement from their spouse stating that the spouse consents to the continuation of 
their marriage755. If the spouse does not sign such a document an interim certificate will be 
issued. There is currently no provision permitting the creation of a full certificate for a person 
whose spouse does not sign such a document. As such there is a concern that the spouse of a 
 
750 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390, House of commons Women and 
Equalities Committee, Published on 14 January 2016 located at 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, accessed 18/01/2021 
Para 49 
751 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 Section 12 
752 The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 Section 12 (1) (g) 
753 Gender Recognition Act 2014 Section 5 (as originally enacted) 
754 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 Schedule 5 
755 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 4 (2) (b) 
154 
 
person applying for a recognition certificate could use this provision to hold a person’s 
gender hostage. If a person did not want for their marriage to end, they would be forever 
unable to receive a full recognition certificate. This means that the person will be trapped in 
the legal gender they were assigned at birth. 
 
 
If a person has been issued an interim certificate they can be issued a full certificate once the 
marriage has ended756. If a person applying is in a civil partnership, they will be issued an 
interim certificate. They may then, within a 6 month window, apply to have their civil 
partnership converted to a marriage. If this occurs they will then be issued a full recognition 
certificate. If a person is in a civil partnership and they and their partner are both applying for 
gender recognition certificates at the same time they will both be issued full recognition 
certificates.  
 
The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act757 also introduced the alternate route, which allows a 
person to apply for a gender recognition certificate if a person meets the following criteria: 
 
“3) The first condition is that the applicant was a party to a protected marriage or a protected 
civil partnership on or before the date the application was made.  
(4) The second condition is that the applicant—  
(a)was living in the acquired gender six years before the commencement of section 12 of the 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013,  
(b)continued to live in the acquired gender until the date the application was made, and 
(c)intends to continue to live in the acquired gender until death. 
(5) The third condition is that the applicant— 
(a)has or has had gender dysphoria, or  
(b)has undergone surgical treatment for the purpose of modifying sexual characteristics.  
 
756 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 5 
757 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 Schedule 5 
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(6) The fourth condition is that the applicant is ordinarily resident in England, Wales or 
Scotland.”758 
 
It is also worth noting that a marriage is also voidable if one of the persons involved has had 
a gender recognition certificate issued at any point in the past759. 
 
The “spousal veto” has been criticised by a number of community and activist groups760.  
Perhaps due to this criticism in Scotland a person may have an interim certificate issued 
because they are in a marriage to be converted immediately into a full certificate761. As such 
the spousal veto cannot be said to exist in Scotland. 
 
The recent transgender equality report by the Women and Equalities Committee received a 
number of submissions relating to the spousal veto. Particularly notable is the submission 
from GIRES, which states:  
“Trans people are the only group that can have their civil rights delayed by another […] What 
is clear is that the effect of the veto is that the “feelings” of the non trans spouse are given 
more importance than the rights of the trans person to gain full civil participation. This is a 
clear indication that government considers trans people as less than equal “762 
 
This is an understandable position, as the right to gender recognition has been recognised as a 
fundamental right763. As such the spousal veto can be seen as a license for a person to violate 
one of their spouse’s fundamental rights. 
 
758 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 3A 
759 The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 section 12 (1) (h) 
760 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390, House of commons Women and 
Equalities Committee, Published on 14 January 2016 Located at 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf Para 61 
761 Gender Recognition Act 2004 c. 7 section 4E 
762 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390, House of commons Women and 
Equalities Committee, Published on 14 January 2016 Located at  
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf paragraph 49 
763 As recognised in the Goodwin case and in The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 - Additional Principles and 
State Obligation on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, 
Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics to Complement the Yogyakarta Principles, International 




The government responded, and explained the reasoning behind the measure: 
“[The requirement for consent] does not mean anyone will have a right to prevent their wife 
or husband obtaining a legal gender change; simply that they will be allowed to decide 
whether they want their marriage to continue before gender recognition is granted. Marriage 
is a contract between two individuals and it is right that both spouses should have an equal 
say in their future when there is a fundamental change […] The Ministry of Justice has 
committed to monitor issues arising from the spousal declaration of consent. Since the gender 
recognition provisions of the 2013 Act were only introduced in December 2014, there is not 
yet enough evidence to review the impact of these changes.”764 
 
The Minister of Justice also stated: 
“If we look at how this system works, nobody has the right to prevent their wife or husband 
from obtaining a legal gender change [...] This is a really careful balancing act between 
making sure we understand that any marriage contract is a contract between two people and a 
spouse’s transition can fundamentally change their relationship. For some people, that will 
not make any difference. For some people, they married a person; they did not marry a man 
or a woman [...] For others, that might make a difference, particularly because the law allows 
the new marriage certificate to show the name of the trans spouse, so it is important that they 
have given their indication that they are happy for that to go ahead.”765 
 
This reasoning can be distilled to the following: that marriage is an intimate contract, and in 
such a contract when circumstances change significantly there should be a prompting to re-
examine that relationship and terminate it. There is also the second notion, raised by the 
Minister for Justice, that because a gender recognition certificate results in a change of name 
on the marriage certificate that the spouse of the person seeking gender recognition should be 
entitled to block that. 
 
764 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390 Published on 14 January 2016, House of 
commons Women and Equalities Committee, Located at  
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf paragraph 55 
765 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390 Published on 14 January 2016, House of 
commons Women and Equalities Committee, Located at  




This reasoning seems somewhat flawed. If a marriage should be re-examined when 
circumstances change significantly, then why do similar measures not exist to prevent a 
spouse from changing to a less lucrative job, or undergoing any body modification 
procedure? It seems as though there are many significant life changes which similar measures 
do not exist for. As such it is curious as to why legal gender recognition was singled out 
among all of these changes. 
 
The secondary piece of reasoning is also similarly flawed, as a person’s name may be altered 
on multiple documents, including documents such as joint bank account statements, without 
the consent of the spouse. It is possible that the minister would respond that a marriage 
certificate is such a special document, that any alteration to it must be held to a higher 
standard than any other document. Ultimately no response can be offered to this, other than to 
question why this document should be considered more important than any other, and to ask 
if any purpose is served by this special status, as well as if this special status is being 
regarded in a proportional fashion when it comes into opposition with a person’s fundamental 
rights. 
 
There may be relevant ECHR case law on this matter. Hamalainen v Finland766 concerned a 
transgender woman who had had surgery and other medical treatment while married, and had 
changed her name despite the fact that her national identity number could not be changed. 
This number and her passport still referred to her as male767. She then applied to have these 
altered, but was told that this was not possible, as the relevant law required either that an 
applicant be unmarried or that the spouse give consent to have the marriage converted to a 
civil partnership. She alleged that this was in violation of article 8, as her spouse's refusal to 
give consent, combined with her religious convictions against divorce, meant that she was 
being denied the right to have her gender legally recognised768. The court agreed that article 8 
was engaged769, however did not find that there was a violation770. The court did as had been 
 
766 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) 
767 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraphs 9-12 
768 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 34 




done in previous cases relating to transgender people. It analysed the issue in terms of if a 
positive obligation on the member states could be justified771, the court also referred to the 
lack of consensus among the Council of Europe772. The court stated that the requirement for 
consent was a reasonable measure to protect one party from unilateral decisions made by the 
other773, and that the government was within the margin of appreciation to restrict marriage to 
heterosexual couples774. It also pointed out that the government, unlike most Council of 
Europe states, allowed a person to stay In their relationship and have their gender 
recognised775. The court also stated that the conversion to a civil partnership would not result 
in a significant change to the applicant’s life776. Particularly noteworthy is the courts 
summing up of its judgement: 
“While it is regrettable that the applicant faces daily situations in which the incorrect identity 
number creates inconvenience for her, the Court considers that the applicant has a genuine 
possibility of changing that state of affairs: her marriage can be converted at any time, ex 
lege, into a registered partnership with the consent of her spouse. If no such consent is 
obtained, the possibility of divorce, as in any marriage, is always open to her. In the Court’s 
view, it is not disproportionate to require, as a precondition to legal recognition of an 
acquired gender, that the applicant’s marriage be converted into a registered partnership as 
that is a genuine option which provides legal protection for same-sex couples that is almost 
identical to that of marriage (see Parry v. the United Kingdom (dec.), cited above). The minor 
differences between these two legal concepts are not capable of rendering the current Finnish 
system deficient from the point of view of the State’s positive obligation.”777 
 
Not only does this paragraph sum up the view of the court on this issue, but in setting out the 
issues the court states that it is weighing to determine proportionality, it may indicate more 
than objective weighing. In this paragraph the court describes issues faced by the applicant as 
“inconveniences”. This may be a minimising of the issue and a possible indication that the 
 
771 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 66 
772 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 73 
773 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 82 
774 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 81 
775 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 80 
776 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 83 
777 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 87 
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court may not have recognised the severity of such issues, which it had done in previously in 
the Goodwin case778. 
 
The dissent in this case is important, in particular the dissenting judges object to the framing 
of the question in terms of positive obligations779, which is reminiscent of judge Martens 
dissent in Cossey v United Kingdom. The dissenting judges also pointed out that the lack of 
consensus among states should not be treated as decisive780 and, importantly that the majority 
opinion did not take due regard of the issues faced by the applicant with regards to converting 
the marriage into a civil partnership781. The dissenting justices point out that that it is 
problematic to pit the rights to one’s civil status and gender identity against each other, and 
that the court had largely ignored the applicant’s religious objections to converting the 
marriage or divorce. The dissent also pointed out the minimizing language which was used to 
refer to the issues faced by the applicant as an “inconvenience”782. The dissenting justices 
also objected to the claim in the majority judgement that the interference with the article 8 
rights in question were justified: 
 
“When examining Article 8 separately, however, the Court must examine not whether a 
justification for a difference in treatment exists, but whether a restriction of rights is 
permissible in pursuit of one of the aims listed in Article 8 § 2. As the restriction in question 
is clearly not necessary in order to protect Finnish national security, public safety, or 
economic well-being, to prevent disorder or crime, or to protect health, the only two possible 
grounds for restriction are the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or of morals.  
We submit that the rights and freedoms of others would in no way be affected if the applicant 
and her wife were permitted to remain married despite the applicant’s legal change of gender. 
Their continued marital relationship would not have detrimental effects for the right of others 
to marry, or for existing marriages.  
 
778 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at paragraph 77 
779 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 4 of the dissent 
780 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 5 of the dissent 
781 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 6 of the dissent 
782 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraph 8 of the dissent 
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 Secondly, while we acknowledge that the protection of the traditional family may be 
justified by certain moral concerns, we consider that the protection of morals does not 
provide sufficient justification for the restriction of the applicant’s rights in this case.”783 
 
While Hamalainen v Finland may support the “spousal veto” measures, in so far as it may 
mean they are not a violation of article 8 of the convention, the dissenting judgement may be 
compelling. Particularly if cases arise where obtaining consent from the spouse or dissolving 
the marriage are “not an option” as the dissent claimed was the case in Hamalainen. It would 
be interesting to see what the majority in that case would have ruled if they had agreed with 
the dissent on the issue of whether or not the applicant had any viable options.  
 
Despite criticism of the reasoning supporting the existence of the spousal veto, and the 
criticisms of the measure itself, the Women and Equalities Committee ultimately did not 
recommend that it be amended or removed. Instead recommending that given the objections 
raised by the community that the government continually keep itself appraised of issues 
relating to the measure and possible ways of addressing these784. In its report the committee 
justified this by stating that:  
“the non-trans spouse does have a legal right to be consulted if it is proposed to change the 
terms of the marriage contract in consequence—and this right must also be given due 
weight”785 
This wording, which defends the existence of a right to be consulted is somewhat unusual, as 
the measure in question is more than a right to be consulted, it is a right to deny someone 
gender recognition. As such it may be that, if this wording can be seen as indicative of the 
view of the committee, and of those who support this measure in general, that reform which 
gains approval of those who support this measure may be possible provided that in some way 
the spouse is given some form of right to consultation which does not involve denying their 
partner their rights. 
 
783 Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) paragraphs 9-11 of the dissent 
784 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390 Published on 14 January 2016, 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Located at  
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf paragraph 63 
785 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390 Published on 14 January 2016, 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Located at  




Recently there have been a number of cases brought regarding practices in the UK relating to 
the treatment of transgender people. R(on the application of JK) v Registrar General for 
England and Wales concerned the ongoing practice of recording transgender women as a 
child’s “father” on that child’s birth certificate, regardless of if that person has a gender 
recognition certificate786. While the court did make an important statement in paragraph 71 of 
its judgement:  
 
“It is now uncontroversial that gender identity is an integral and important part of an 
individual's fundamental identity, and thus of that individual's private life. “787 
 
This is in line with the recent judicial treatment of the subject since the Goodwin case. 
However, the court found that there was no violation of article 8 of the ECHR, even though 
article 8 was clearly engaged. There was a factual disagreement on how often producing the 
long form birth certificate, which is the document which would name her as the father, would 
have to be produced, with the government stating it would almost never be necessary788. The 
court found that such instances would be rare and that, because in such instances the 
information would be given to someone in a professional capacity, it would be 
“inconceivable” for such a person to disclose someone's transgender status789. The court 
pointed out that the rights of the child to know who their “biological father” is should also be 
considered790. As such the court found that any interference with article 8 was justified, due 
to the rights of the child, as well as the interference being minimal, as well as the lack of a 
ECHR judgement on the issue and the lack of European consensus on the issue791. 
 
 
786 R(on the application of JK) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2015] H.R.L.R. 10; [2015] A.C.D. 
91 
787 R(on the application of JK) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2015] H.R.L.R. 10; [2015] A.C.D. 
91  paragraph 71 
788 R(on the application of JK) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2015] H.R.L.R. 10; [2015] A.C.D. 
91  paragraph 81 
789 R(on the application of JK) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2015] H.R.L.R. 10; [2015] A.C.D. 
91  paragraph 87 
790 R(on the application of JK) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2015] H.R.L.R. 10; [2015] A.C.D. 
91  paragraph 112 
791 R(on the application of JK) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2015] H.R.L.R. 10; [2015] A.C.D. 
91  paragraph 123 
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The Gender Recognition Act itself was challenged in Carpenter v Secretary of State for 
Justice on the grounds that it violated article 8 rights of transgender people seeking gender 
recognition792. In this case the applicant was a post-operative transgender woman who 
applied for a gender recognition certificate. Despite receiving the certificate she alleged that 
section 3(3) of the Gender Recognition Act was incompatible with his article 8 right to a 
private and family life793. The section in question states that the evidential requirements for 
an application are not satisfied if the applicant is receiving medical treatment for the purpose 
of modifying sexual characteristics, unless the statements required from medical 
professionals as a part of the application include details of that treatment794. The applicant 
argued that this constituted a violation of her right to a private life, as it required her to 
disclose personal medical details for a purpose which was not necessary or proportionate in a 
democratic society795. She also alleged that this violated article 14 of the ECHR796 as it 
discriminated against her on the grounds of “other status”. In this case the status of being a 
postoperative transgender woman797. The court found that this was not the case, on the 
grounds that if such information were withheld the panel would be making its decision on 
incomplete information which is required due to the far reaching impacts of granting or 
denying an application798. It is interesting to note that it was pointed out in this case that a 
person may still receive a recognition certificate having had no such treatment. While it is 
true that the decision without this information would be based on incomplete information, it 
is questionable whether this would pose a problem. This information is not decisive or even 
strictly necessary in the process of granting or denying an application, except that it is 
mandated by the statute. Despite this the court found that the evidential requirement in 
section 3(3) was not incompatible with the ECHR799.  
 
MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions800 concerns a transgender woman who 
married her partner after the passage of the Gender Recognition Act but before it was 
 
792 Carpenter v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 1 W.L.R. 4111 
793 Carpenter v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 1 W.L.R. 4111, para 1 
794 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 3 (3) 
795 Carpenter v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 1 W.L.R. 4111, para 13 
796 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by 
Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Article 14 
797 Carpenter v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 1 W.L.R. 4111, para 13 
798 Carpenter v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 1 W.L.R. 4111, para 24 
799 Carpenter v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 1 W.L.R. 4111, paras 28 and 36 
800 MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2017] 1 C.M.L.R. 13 
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amended by the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act. As such she was issued an interim gender 
recognition certificate, however neither she nor her wife wanted to dissolve the marriage. As 
such her legal gender is still considered to be male. She then applied for a state pension at 60, 
which was at that time the state pension age for women. Her application was refused, as she 
was still legally deemed to be a man. She then brought the case alleging a violation of 
directive 79/7801, which requires that states treat men and women equally. In particular she 
claimed that as someone with an interim certificate has otherwise met all the necessary 
gender recognition criteria, it is unlawful discrimination to refuse such recognition to married 
applicants. The Supreme Court found itself divided on the issue, and found that even though 
article 7.1 (a) of the directive permits a state to set differing pension ages, it is not clear if it is 
permitted to make a distinction between people who have had valid gender recognition and 
those who have been denied that recognition due to being married802. As such the case was 
referred to the ECJ on the question on whether this is permitted. The ECJ ultimately found 
that the Gender Recognition Act was discriminatory and in violation of directive 79/7, as the 
UK requires transgender people to annul their marriage to access their full state pension if 
they are transgender, but does not require the case of cisgender people803. 
Related to this case is P v P804. This case concerned a transgender man, who married a 
cisgender woman prior to receiving a gender recognition certificate. The court confirmed 
that, as per Corbett v Corbett, he was considered a woman for the purposes of marriage805. 
However the court also found that it was not empowered to make a declaration of nullity, as 
was done in Corbett, as same-sex marriage was now legal, the court was not able to declare 
the marriage void, even though it would not have been legally valid at the time of the 
ceremony806. The court also stated that “In the absence of a GRC, under domestic law, AP's 
legal sex is and always has been female”. This may contradict the notion, explained 
previously807, that a person’s legal gender in the UK may vary based on the purpose for 
which their gender is being recognised. However it should be noted that, like Corbett, this 
case was only concerned with marriage. As such this statement could be read as simply being 
a brief way of stating that the person’s sex for the purpose of marriage was female. 
 
801 Directive 79/7/EEC, Celex No. 379L0007, OJ 1979 L6/24 
802 MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2017] 1 C.M.L.R. 13 para 18 
803 MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (C-451/16) [2019] 1 C.M.L.R. 4 
804 P v P (Transgender Applicant for Declaration of Valid Marriage) [2019] EWHC 3105 (Fam) 
805 P v P (Transgender Applicant for Declaration of Valid Marriage) [2019] EWHC 3105 (Fam), paragraph 53 
806 P v P (Transgender Applicant for Declaration of Valid Marriage) [2019] EWHC 3105 (Fam), paragraph 75 
807 Discussion of this begins at page 125 
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Regardless of the intent of the statement, as this case is, like Corbett, about marriage, it 
appears to be a proper reading to confine its finding of a person’s legal sex also to marriage 
as was done in Corbett. 
 
Another notable recent case is R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions808. This case concerns a transgender woman who had obtained a gender recognition 
certificate, but found that records of her previous gender were still present at the Department 
of Work and Pensions and visible to employees in the Department. When the case was heard 
at first instance it was DWP policy to record a person’s name, sex, title and any previous sex, 
name and title. It also included a field which stated whether a person had received a gender 
recognition certificate. That field was removed before the appeal was heard, however the rest 
of the information is still present, making determining who has received a gender recognition 
certificate, and thus who is transgender, a simple matter of deduction809. The court agreed 
that the retention of this information engages article 8, however the issue was if this retention 
was justified810. The government stated that the law was justified on three grounds: to inform 
policy, to calculate state pensions and to enable fraud detection.  The first ground was found 
to be illegitimate at first instance, so the government no longer sought to rely on it811. The 
second ground exists because state pensions are paid on the basis of contributions, and how 
this effects how many contributions must be made and how a person will be paid depends on 
a person’s gender while making the contributions, whereas other characteristics, such as state 
pension age, depend on a person’s gender when making the claim812. The third ground was 
claimed to be justified as two cases had occurred of fraud linked to gender recognition 
certificates, and a person attempting to take on someone else’s pre-transition identity813. The 
case also concerned a system known as SCR, whereby data concerning people who have had 
a gender recognition certificate must be processed in a certain way, this takes more time and 
may cause delays, it was also claimed that this system does not  protect transgender people, 
instead it singles them out and draws attention to them814. The court found that the data 
retention policy was proportionate to achieve the two aims the government relied upon, as it 
 
808 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 
809 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 paragraph 5 
810 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 paragraph 6 
811 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 paragraph 8 
812 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 paragraph 9 
813 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 paragraph 10 
814 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 paragraph 27 
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found that it could reasonably be believed that fraud detection would be improved if front 
line staff have access to historical gender information815. The court also found that while the 
SCR system may cause some delays, these delays are not restricted just to transgender 
people, and that the existence of the SCR system is designed to pursue a legitimate aim, and 
that while it may cause attention to be drawn to a transgender person, the historical gender 
information may cause that anyway, and a person can opt out of the system, as such it was 
not a violation of article 8816. The court also agreed with the court of first instance that there 
was no evidence that these policies impacted transgender persons disproportionately when 
compared to non-transgender users of the SCR system817. The court also found against the 
argument that section 9 of the Gender Recognition Act was breached, as the claimant was not 
treated “for all purposes” as a woman, as the court stated that this should not be interpreted as 
to require a person to “re-write history”818. This case was appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which agreed with the conclusions of the High Court, in that while where was some 
interference with the right to privacy, it was in pursuit of a legitimate aim819. The Supreme 
Court also agreed that sections 9 and 22 of the Gender Recognition Act do not require the 
destruction of prior information, although section 22 does bar its disclosure in certain 
circumstances820. 
The recent case of R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General821 concerned one 
of the less obvious forms of gender recognition. While this case was about birth certificates, 
it concerned whether a trans man must be referred to as “mother” on the birth certificate of a 
child to whom he has given birth822. This case is particularly interesting as the appellant in 
this case (the transgender man) had obtained a gender recognition certificate, which, as 
discussed previously, is described as changing one’s legal gender “for all purposes”. 
However in addition to the “for all purposes” language in section 9 of the Gender 
Recognition Act, this case also concerned section 12, which states that: 
 
815 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 paragraph 60 
816 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 paragraphs 68-
69 
817 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 paragraph 75 
818 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] P.T.S.R. 1344 paragraph 79 
819 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2017] 1 W.L.R. 4127 paragraph 37 
820 R. (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2017] 1 W.L.R. 4127 paragraph 36 
821 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ 
822 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, para 1 
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“The fact that a person's gender has become the acquired gender under this Act does not 
affect the status of the person as the father or mother of a child.”823 
 
The appellant contended that this section of the Act referred to “status of the person as the 
father or mother of the father” in terms of assuring that the rights and responsibilities 
obtained by a person due to that status would not be altered or interrupted824. The court did 
not agree with this interpretation, noting that it originated from the Explanatory Notes of the 
Gender Recognition Act, stating: 
“Our task is to construe what Parliament has enacted, not what the Explanatory Notes say it 
enacted.”825 
The court explained that section 12 should be regarded as both retrospective and prospective, 
meaning that a gender recognition certificate should have no effect on one’s existing status as 
a mother or father when obtaining the certificate, nor on ones future status once one has 
already received the certificate826. 
The court did not address the meaning of the word “mother” specifically in a great deal of 
detail, other than to say that at common law it is held to mean “person who gives birth”, 
which was discussed at first instance to be supported mainly by The Ampthill Peerage case827 
which stated that “Motherhood, although also a legal relationship, is based on a fact, being 
proved demonstrably by parturition.”828 
The court also addressed the idea that the statute, and the word “mother” specifically should 
be interpreted in line with contemporary social and moral norms, by stating that this had 
already been done at first instance by defining motherhood as relating to the act of giving 
birth rather than a reference to gender and that interpreting it otherwise would be akin to 
defining the word “dog” as meaning cats829. The court also stated that allowing the use of an 
additional word such as “gestational parent” would not be acceptable, as it would amount to 
judicial legislation rather than interpretation830. The court did acknowledge that the word 
 
823 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 12 
824 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, para 36 
825 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, para 37 
826 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, paras 29-33 
827 R. (on the application of TT) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2020] Fam. 45, para 106 
828 The Ampthill Peerage [1977] AC 547, 577 




“mother” as not totally de-coupled from gender, is its usage remained connected to a persons 
gender assigned at birth due to the exception of section 9 of the GRA contained in section 
12831. 
 
This case also addressed the question as to whether section 12 of the GRA and the court’s 
interpretation of it in this case violate article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
concerning the right to a private and family life832. The court found that this right was 
engaged by section 12, as it created a similar interference in a person’s life to that in 
Goodwin, as it results in a document that will result in a person’s transgender status being 
revealed, which will necessarily interfere with their private life833. The court found, however, 
that this interference was justified and proportional, and thus not a violation of article 8834. 
This conclusion was reached for a number of reasons, in particular the fact that the words 
mother and parent have spesific meanings in various pieces of legislation835 and that there 
was currently no consensus among the Council of Europe on this issue836, and no supporting 
judgement from the European Court of Human Rights837.  
Although this case may be regarded as an example of the complexities of one of the less 
obvious situations in which gender recognition may occur, it revolved largely around the 
specifics of section 12 of the Gender Recognition Act. Because of this, while it is an 
interesting case, and certainly an important one in the UK, its reasoning may not be 
applicable to other jurisdictions, although many will inherit the common law definition of the 
word “mother” referred to in this case. It does however demonstrate the interactions between 
common law and statute, and how these can lead to a result which may be unpleasant for 
those involved. As such this case may serve as a reminder of the need to examine the many 
“moving parts” of a legal system and how they may interact. As discussed elsewhere in this 




831 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, para 52 
832 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, para 51 
833 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, para 55 
834 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, para 89 
835 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, paras 63-71 
836 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, para 79 
837 R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General [2020] EWCA Civ, para 72 





It may seem as though statute law in the UK ignores the existence of non-binary sex 
category. It uses language such as “opposite sex” and referring to sex discrimination as 
relating only to those categorised as men and women. However, intersex people are not left 
totally abandoned and outside of legal categories by the law in the UK. The law regarding 
intersex people in the UK comes mostly from case law, particularly the case of W v W839. This 
case concerned a woman who had been raised as a boy. She began to develop breasts and was 
forcibly given testosterone treatment, and fled home when her father threatened to increase 
the dosage. She eventually began receiving female hormones and had sexual reassignment 
surgery. She then married Mr W, who would later divorce her. When she announced her 
intent to file for ancillary relief, in response Mr W sought a decree that the marriage was void 
from the start, as it was not one between a man and a woman840. It was revealed that she (the 
respondent) had, prior to surgery, genitals which were “abnormal”841. The court, based on the 
expert testimony available, concluded that the respondent had a male chromosomal sex, and 
likely had a male gonadal sex, but never had a “normal” penis, and had lived in a female 
social role for as long as they had been able to choose842.  The court referred to the Corbett 
case extensively, as well as an address Ormrod J had given which referred to how difficult the 
Corbett case would have been if the case had been of “testicular failure syndrome” rather 
than of transexualism843. The court concluded that the test set out in Corbett could not be 
satisfied, and so the respondent could not be said to be male for the purposes of marriage844. 
However it was also found that it would be wrong to consider someone who does not satisfy 
the Corbett test to be neither man or woman, as it would be contrary to human rights and that: 
“Further, in my judgement such a result would create as many problems as it solved in the 
difficulties that already exist in defining a woman or a man, or a male or a female, for the 
purposes of marriage by creating a third category the boundaries of which would not be 
clear.”845 
 
839 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 
840 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 at 114 
841 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 117 para 3 
842 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 120 para 6 
843 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 140 para 2 
844 Ibid 
845 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 144 para 2 
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Ultimately the court found that the respondent could be considered to be a woman for the 
purposes of marriage. The court reiterated that the Corbett test is the one that should be used 
to determine sex for the purpose of marriage, but that it is possible for people with intersex 
conditions to not be categorized using that test, and that no one criteria, such as chromosomal 
sex, should be given more importance than any other846. There are two points made in the 
conclusion of this judgement which are particularly interesting. The first is that significant 
weight is given to the respondents “final choice” to live as a woman847. This seems to express 
that a person should, at least if their physical sex is ambiguous, be able to assert their gender 
as a matter of choice. This is particularly noteworthy as this judgement comes three years 
before the Gender Recognition Act would be introduced. The second interesting feature of 
the conclusion is expressed in the following quote: 
“Their assignment to a sex or gender in which they are to be brought up and live is a difficult 
one and it seems to me that in such cases (and in other cases where a decision as to the sex or 
gender in which a child should be brought up falls to be made by doctors and others) there is 
considerable force in the argument that it would be best to "wait and see". How long it would 
be appropriate to wait, and what tests would be appropriate, would vary from case to case.”848  
This is interesting because the law in the UK places a limit on how long doctors can “wait 
and see”, the upper limit being 41 days849, and only 21 days in Scotland850. After this a child 
must be assigned as male or female. Perhaps indicating a prioritisation of certainty as to a 
person’s sex over the wellbeing concerns which are caused by early and arguably 
unnecessary sex assignation in the case of intersex infants. 
 
It has been pointed out that, in addition to applying to intersex people, a number of aspects of 
the reasoning in WvW could be applied to gender recognition as applied to transgender 
people851. In particular the fact that the judgement in WvW acknowledges that gender identity 
should not be fixed at birth and not based on any given physical characteristic have been 
pointed to as being grounds for believing that WvW is not compatible with Corbett v 
 
846 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 141 para 4 
847 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 146 para 3 
848 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 146 para 1 
849 Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 section 2 
850 Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965 Section 14 
851 Defining, Assigning and Designing Sex, P.‐L. Chau, Jonathan Herring, International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family, Volume 16, Issue 3, December 2002, Pages 327–367 
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Corbett852. While the Gender Recognition Act now allows a person’s gender to be recognised 
other than the gender assigned at birth for all purposes853, and modern practice has moved 
away from the approach taken in Corbett, it is worth noting that it is still the law of the land 
with regards to gender recognition for certain purposes prior to the receipt of a gender 
recognition certificate. As such, these arguments as to why WvW may prompt us to revise the 
principle set down in Corbett may be kept in mind as we are faced with more opportunities to 
diverge from Corbett. 
 
As a result of WvW, while the UK does not make any specific provision for intersex persons 
in any of its gender recognition or discrimination law, they can exists within the current 
framework, as they are assigned to one sex based, at least partly, on how they choose to live 
their lives. However, while a person does have an element of choice, it is possible that an 
intersex person may find themselves “locked in” to a recognised gender/sex (as they are the 
same in UK law) that they have lived in for some time, much as how a person who was not 
born with an intersex condition is considered to be the sex/gender they are assigned at birth. 
Such a person would then have to use the same gender recognition process as someone who 
was not born with an intersex condition, although there has been no test case on this issue. 
 
While the law for transgender and intersex people appears to have diverged in the UK into 
two separate “streams”, with intersex people permitted to “choose” the gender they are 
recognised as per W v W854, while transgender people must use the Gender Recognition Act 
or associated mechanisms, it is worth noting that these were not always thought of as separate 
issues. The report of the working group on transsexual people released in April 2000855 
contains a number of mentions of trans people being likened to intersex people. The report 
mentions that there is a growing body of evidence to state that being transgender should be 
considered one of the many intersex conditions that exist856. It includes a statement from an 
 
852 Defining, Assigning and Designing Sex, P.‐L. Chau, Jonathan Herring, International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family, Volume 16, Issue 3, December 2002, Pages 327–367, Pages 347 and 349 
853 Gender Recognition Act 2009, Section 9 
854 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 146 para 3 
855 Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People, April 2000, Located at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_wwlG1k_tFAJ:www.oocities.org/transforum2000/Res
ources/wgtrans.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk accessed 10/01/2020 
856 Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People, April 2000, Located at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_wwlG1k_tFAJ:www.oocities.org/transforum2000/Res
ources/wgtrans.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk accessed 10/01/2020, page 36 
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expert stating that “Thus, I am obliged to advise that if a legal action were taken by the 
transsexual community, to assert their right to transsexualism being considered to be an 
intersex condition, then it would undoubtedly win.”857. This consideration of being 
transgender as a form of being intersex appears to be based on the understanding developing 
at the time that being transgender is not a choice, and it cannot be prevented or reversed by 
psychotherapy, and as such must be down to some unalterable aspect of the structure of the 
brain, and therefore, an intersex condition858. While in practice the approach taken in the case 
of transgender people in practice since this report has differed to the approach taken with 
intersex people it is interesting to observe a point where, in the thinking of the government, or 
at least a working group, these two issues were one and the same.  
 
Given this, why is it that such different approaches have been taken in the cases of 
transgender and intersex people? While it may not be possible to provide a definitive answer, 
there are a number of possible explanations. 
 
One possible explanation is that the concepts of transsexuality and intersexuality remained 
separate due to the use of explanations of transsexuality as being mental and social, in 
contrast with intersex conditions which are always understood as being physical859. This 
explanation depends on an understanding of the mental and physical as being separate, a view 
which appears to be contradicted by ever increasing amounts of evidence860. However, 
despite the poor evidential basis for this view of the mind and body, these explanations are 
still used for the sake of ease and clarity, as being transsexual does not impact one’s 
phenotype. This conceptual separation between the mind and body and thus transsexuality 
and intersex status may have impacted how transsexuality is perceived. It can be observed 
through physical examination if a person has an intersex condition, however, given current 
 
857 Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People, April 2000, Located at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_wwlG1k_tFAJ:www.oocities.org/transforum2000/Res
ources/wgtrans.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk accessed 10/01/2020, page 42 
858 Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People, April 2000, Located at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_wwlG1k_tFAJ:www.oocities.org/transforum2000/Res
ources/wgtrans.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk accessed 10/01/2020, page 40 
859 Understanding gender diversity: sex and gender are not the same thing, Fred McConnel, The Guardian, 
7/02/2014. Located at https://www.theguardian.com/media/mind-your-language/2014/feb/07/mind-your-
language-transgender , accessed 18/01/2020 
860 Fausto-Sterling, A. (2012). Sex/gender: Biology in a social world, (Routledge series integrating science and 
culture). page 67 para 3 
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technology the same cannot be done for a transgender person due to the complexity of the 
brain. Although some studies have indicated differences in brain structure between 
transgender and cisgender persons, there is not currently a brain scan that can determine if a 
person is transgender. Hence it may be that transsexuality being seen as rooted in the mind 
came to be seen as less empirically observable and thus less real in some senses than being 
intersex. This can be seen in current rhetoric against transgender people, which portrays 
transgender people as believing that gender is “just a feeling” due to it being rooted in the 
brain861. As such it may be that transgender people came to be seen as requiring special 
confirmation of their status, thus the need for gender recognition panels to confirm that a 
person is, in fact, the gender that they say they are. This view is still espoused by those who 
oppose “self-identification” models of gender recognition, who claim that expert evidence 
should be required to change a person’s legal gender862. It must be noted that, despite this 
opposition self-identification models remain regarded as best practice863. This is in part due to 
the fact that any expert confirmation of a person’s gender identity is not based on any sort of 
scan or physical examination, it relies solely on the account of the transgender person 
themselves. As such self-recognition models are regarded as allowing a person to rely 
directly on their account of their own identity rather than needing to tell a practitioner first 
and be subjected to unnecessary questioning, which can be regarded as invasive and “deeply 
traumatic and stressful”864.  
 
Another possible explanation, which may most closely match reality when combined with the 
first explanation, although each may have explanatory power on their own, is that the two 
“paths” do not diverge as much as it may at first appear. As previously discussed, the case of 
Corbett sets out three ways in which the law may interact with gender, with most laws that 
involve gender being situated in the “relevant” category. This category is characterised by 
being negotiable and variable. In practice this means that the vast majority of legal 
 
861 Kathleen Stock: life on the front line of transgender rights debate, Jack Grove, Times Higher Education, 
7/01/2020, Located at https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/kathleen-stock-life-front-line-transgender-
rights-debate, accessed 18/01/2020, paragraph 7 
862 Gender identity needs to be based on objective evidence rather than feelings, Debbie Hayton, Open Future, 
The Economist, 3/7/2018 Located at https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/07/03/gender-identity-
needs-to-be-based-on-objective-evidence-rather-than-feelings, accessed 18/01/2020 
863 TGEU Best Practice Catalogue, 22/02/2017, Located at https://tgeu.org/human-rights-gender-identity-best-
practice-catalogue/, Accessed 18/01/2020 
864 Statement on gender recognition, Scottish Government, 20/06/2019, Located at 
https://www.gov.scot/publications/statement-gender-recognition/, accessed 18/01/2020, paragraph 7 
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mechanisms a transgender person interacts with can recognise their gender identity long 
before a gender recognition certificate is required, as depicted in the graphic contained in this 
Equalities Office factsheet865. Because of this, most gender recognition is independent from 
the mechanisms contained in the Gender Recognition Act. As such it may be that, much as 
intersex people are permitted to choose a gender in which they live their lives, transgender 
people are also capable of this, with the act of choosing simply living one’s gender 
authentically and having it recognised by the various relevant organisations and individuals. 
While the Gender Recognition Act does represent a point of separation for the two “paths”, 
because it does not have a great deal of impact on a person’s everyday life, it is possible to 
see the two paths as only separated by a narrow margin, rather than being governed by 









While the law mentioned up to this point in this chapter focuses on gender recognition on 
birth certificates and for the purposes of marriage and for purposes of discrimination, a 
number of other areas of law in the UK do interact with a person’s gender and sex, and have 
different ways of recognising these, despite the attempted creation of a “legal gender” which 
would be effective in every area of life by the Gender Recognition Act. Of particular interest 
are other documents such as passport on which gender and sex are recorded, as well as how 
gender and sex are categorized in prisons. 
 
 
865 Trans People in the UK, Government Equalities Office, Located at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/721642/GEO-





In terms of documents on which gender is recognised, the two documents most often used are 
passports and driver’s licenses. 
The UK does allow a change of gender on its passports. To do so an applicant must cancel 
their existing passport and apply for a new one in the relevant gender. Additional information 
must be submitted, and an applicant must either show that they have a gender recognition 
certificate, a birth certificate in the relevant gender (presumably acquired through a gender 
recognition measure in another jurisdiction) or a letter from a doctor to confirm that their 
change of gender is most likely permanent, as well as evidence of any change of name866. 
This last criterion is of particular interest, as it allows a person to apply for a passport in a 
gender that they do not have recorded on their birth certificate, nor do they have a gender 
recognition certificate. This is important for two reasons. Firstly the current passport policy, 
allows a person’s gender to be recognised on a passport more easily than they can acquire a 
recognition certificate, as the recognition certificate has the additional requirement of “living 
in the acquired gender” for at least two years, and requires one more medical report than 
having one’s gender recognised on a passport. Secondly it is noteworthy because the Gender 
Recognition Act states that a person’s legal gender becomes the gender recognised on the 
recognition certificate for all purposes867. There is no other piece of legislation or instrument 
that refers to this state of “legal gender” and the Gender Recognition Act does not state what 
a person’s “Legal Gender” ought to be considered to be before a person receives a gender 
recognition certificate.  
 
Because of this one might assume, although it is not made explicit in the act, that a person’s 
legal gender is that recorded on their birth certificate until such a time that they receive a 
gender recognition certificate. As such a person could have a gender recognised on their 
passport which is not their “legal gender”. The legal implications of this are unclear. 
 
 
866 Applying for a passport: Additional information for transgender and transsexual customers, HMPO 20 10.13, 
HM Passport Office, Located at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251703/Applying_for_a_passport
_additional_information.PDF, accessed 17/01/2021 
867 Gender Recognition Act 2004 section 9 (1) 
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However, this is most likely not the case. As mentioned above the categorisation of the law 
relating to gender discussed in Corbett v Corbett is particularly helpful in understanding 
modern gender recognition law. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Corbett case divides 
the law into three categories: cases where gender is irrelevant, those where the law is relevant 
but not essential, and those where the law is essential. The category of situations where 
gender is relevant but not essential makes up the bulk of the law and is distinguished by being 
negotiable and variable between different purposes868. Given this the wording of the of the 
Gender Recognition Act, which states that upon receipt of a gender recognition certificate a 
person’s legal gender is set to the recognised gender “for all purposes”869 can be more easily 
understood. This language is used because up until that point a person’s recognised gender 
can vary from purpose to purpose and these varying genders are all rendered uniform by the 
receipt of a gender recognition certificate. If this is the correct interpretation of the Act and of 
Corbett then the situation regarding passports becomes much more clear. 
 
If understood with regards to the classification of laws in Corbett then the gender recognition 
mechanisms used in the case of passports can be seen as simply one of the many purposes for 
which a person’s gender can be recognised. For a person who does not have a gender 
recognition certificate a passport is simply one of the many purposes for which their gender 
can be recognised. In this case, as with all other situations in the “relevant” category, the 
recognising party, in this case the passport office, is free to set whatever criteria it wishes for 
gender recognition. The fact that the required criteria are lesser than those required by the 
Gender Recognition Act causes no conflict.  
 
If the notion of multiple recognised legal genders, each for a different purpose is, in fact, not 
a true representation of law in England and Wales as suggested by Lord Bingham in A v 




868 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 83 At 105 para 2 
869 Gender Recognition Act 2004 section 9 (1) 
870 A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 21 paragraph 3 
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According to this model if the gender recorded on a passport is intended to be or could 
reasonably considered to be a representation of a person’s “legal gender” then it is possible 
that applying for a passport if one does not have a recognition certificate could be considered 
somehow fraudulent. Fraud by false representation seems the closest match to this situation, 
but that offence would require the applicant to be intending to make some form of gain from 
the false representation871. While there is nothing obvious, it is hypothetically possible that 
the benefit simply from having a document that recognises one’s lived experience of one’s 
gender could be considered some form of gain, but this does not seem particularly likely.  
 
Beyond the consideration of what it practically means for a trans person who has a passport 
recognising one gender, but a birth certificate recognising another is that if a birth certificate 
is said to be a source of “legal” gender, there are also a number of other issues that are raised. 
In particular, if a birth certificate is representative of one’s “legal gender” at all times, why is 
it that a passport can recognise a different identity? 
 
There seem to be two probable explanations. The first is that passports recognise something 
other than legal gender, and the second is that this apparent conflict is unintentional and is 
indeed a real conflict of gender recognition systems.  
 
It may be that there is no genuine conflict as, despite appearances, a passport is not intended 
to be a representation of a person’s legal gender. If one is to suppose that birth certificates are 
the sole, constant authoritative source for legal gender, then the most convincing argument 
for birth certificates representing something other than legal gender is simply that if this was 
the intent then the sole criteria for having one’s gender recognised on one’s passport would 
be receipt of a GRC. This may be the case if the intent was for a passport to represent 
something more akin to the social gender in which a person actually lives rather than the 
more rigorous criteria required for a GRC. However, it is worth noting that to amend a 
passport does still require a letter from a doctor872, which would be an unusual requirement if 
 
871 Fraud Act 2006, Section 2 (1) (b) (i) 
872 Applying for a passport: Additional information for transgender and transsexual customers, HMPO 20 10.13, 





the intent was to recognise social gender. It is worth noting that this doctor’s letter does not 
require any particular treatment, so it is unlikely that this is for purposes related to intimate 
searches. It is difficult to find a consistent, practical reason why the requirements for 
passports would be less rigorous, but still require medical evidence. The most convincing 
possibility seems to be that the intent was to recognise a person’s social, practical gender, but 
it was deemed that some expert opinion was necessary to avoid the possibility of deception. 
This explanation seems most plausible as while a doctor’s letter would not be necessary on a 
practical level to recognise social gender, it seems plausible that it would be perceived 
necessary due to the perceived dangers of simply taking a person’s word for it, despite the 
existence of sanctions for fraud. 
 
The second possibility is that, as the passport rules were introduced after the Gender 
Recognition Act, that they merely represent the views on gender recognition of different 
governments, and, due to lack of public will or some other reason, the Gender Recognition 
Act has not been updated despite it not reflecting current views on gender recognition. Under 
this view there is a genuine conflict between these two methods of gender recognition, which 
would pose practical issues if the practice were ever challenged.  
 
However it is worth noting that these explanations are only necessary if birth certificates are 
regarded to be the sole, constant source of legal gender, which, as discussed previously, 
seems unlikely to be the case due to the number of inconsistencies one must grapple with to 
explain actual practice under this model, However, it is a possibility worth addressing due to 
Lord Bingham’s opinion in A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire. 
 
Because an applicant must apply for an entirely new passport in order to have their gender 
recognised, they must pay the relevant fee of £72.50873, which may be a financial obstacle to 
some transgender people with lower incomes. The UK also only recognises M (male) and F 
(female) as gender markers on its passports, despite X also being a valid option according to 
 




the international civil aviation authority874, the UK does not allow those with British 
passports to use that maker and does not recognise any indeterminate or non-binary status on 
its passports. In 2018 a judicial review case was initiated by Christie Elan-Cane alleging that 
this policy was unlawful, as it violated their right a private and family right under article 8 of 
the ECHR875. This case was later appealed, with the court confirming the judgment of the 
High court that while Article 8 was engaged, the policy was within the margin of appreciation 
and did not violate Article 8876. In its judgement the court cited an internal review conducted 
by the Passport Office in 2014877. This review is noteworthy as it can shed some light on the 
reasoning for the continued non-recognition of non-binary identities on passports. The review 
cites a number of issues with the recognition of non-binary genders. It discusses the relevant 
costs of various options, as well as the key legislative issues, particularly with regards to 
nationality and anti-discrimination, as the Equality Act refers only to men and women878. 
These legislative issues do not appear to be insurmountable, and, as a passport is not the 
definitive source of one’s gender under the law for all purposes, they do not seem particularly 
relevant. The key objection within the report, which seems more decisive and arguably more 
problematic than the other obstacles it discusses is that of social opinion and adjustment. The 
report points out that:  
“HMPO could introduce recognition of a third gender but it would be in isolation from the 
rest of government and society. There are likely to be so few applications for such a passport, 
but we would need to avoid issuing a document that was not recognised by other parts of 
government or wider UK society.”879 
While the notion that the number of such applications may be limited does not make a 
profound argument one way or the other, this statement illustrates a key issue in gender 
recognition in general, that of social recognition. The report is correct in saying that the 
usefulness of any document which recognises something recognised by no other parts of 
 
874 Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015, Part 4: Specifications for Machine 
Readable Passports (MRPs) and other TD3 Size MRTDs, International Civil Aviation Organisation, Located at 
https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p4_cons_en.pdf page 14 
875 Elan-Cane, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2018] EWHC 
1530 (Admin) 
876 R (Christie Elan-Cane) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 363 at 113 
877 R (Christie Elan-Cane) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 363 at 14 
878 Gender Marking in Passports: Internal Review of Existing Arrangements and Possible Future Options, 
London: HMPO, 2013, available at: http://www.complicity.co.uk/blog/wp-uploads/Gendermarkings290114.pdf. 
Accessed 12/12/2020 at 6 
879 Gender Marking in Passports: Internal Review of Existing Arrangements and Possible Future Options, 
London: HMPO, 2013, available at: http://www.complicity.co.uk/blog/wp-uploads/Gendermarkings290114.pdf. 
Accessed 12/12/2020 at 4.7 
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government or “wider society” may cause problems or have limited usefulness. It may well 
be the case that recognition of non-binary genders on official documents may well best be 
done in a coordinated fashion. However the most important aspect of this statement appears 
to be the mention of wider society. Due to the nature of gender recognition in the UK being 
divided between various purposes, many of which are outside direct government control in 
most situations, it may well be the case that substantive change will need to come from the 
“bottom up”, led by individuals and organisations applying their own criteria. In addition to 
providing recognition in most situations this approach also has the advantage that it 
necessarily reflects the views of society, as the rules of recognition would be made by those 
participating in society. It would also serve as a powerful method of demonstrating a public 
desire for recognition of non-binary gender identities, as well as making future governmental 
forms of recognition easier to implement, as there would already be a social framework for 






The UK does not have a gender field on its driver’s licenses. Gender is not recorded on the 
relevant form, neither is sex. However, the relevant form880 does include a section for a 
person’s title, which includes gendered title options. The government offer advice on 
changing one’s gender on one’s license, despite it not being a field on the license or on the 
application form. Although this advice is grouped together with changing one’s name and 
title recorded on one’s license, as they are done through the same process. 
 
This process involves applying for a new license881, although there is no fee unless one is also 
having one’s photo updated882. A person must send one of the valid proof of identity 
 
880 Application for a driving licence, D1, Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, Located at 
https://www.pdffiller.com/jsfiller-
desk15/?requestHash=fe7e2d4d20cf46591af6bc79acaf50c8e898e39dcfa0386a1c9f586bdef43781&et=l2f&proje
ctId=598677356#bd64c078f51a4f7ea15af0d17ea6e6d5, accessed 12/12/2020 
881 Change the name or gender on your driving licence, Gov.uk, Located at https://www.gov.uk/change-name-
driving-licence 
882 Driving licence fees, Gov.uk, Located at https://www.gov.uk/driving-licence-fees 
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documents that would be necessary for any application. These are: a current and valid 
passport, a biometric residence permit, previously known as the identity card for foreign 
nationals or a European Union or European Economic Area national identity card. UK birth, 
adoption and naturalization certificates may also be used, but additional documents must be 
submitted. These additional document may be: a P45, P60 or payslip, a marriage certificate or 
divorce papers, a photocopy of the front page of a benefits book or an original benefits claim 
letter, a gender recognition certificate or a college or university union card, education 
certificate or a PASS proof of age card883. If these documents record a person’s current name 
or gender then these documents alone are sufficient. If a person has changed their recognised 
name or gender since the issue of the documents that they submit, an additional piece of 
evidence must be submitted. This additional information may take the form of a gender 
recognition certificate, a deed poll or a marriage or civil partnership certificate. A decree nisi 
or decree absolute may also be submitted as one of these additional documents if a person’s 
name has changed, but must be submitted alongside a birth, adoption or naturalisation 
certificate884. 
 
An alternate process exists in Northern Ireland, which is largely the same, with the main 
differences being that the application is sent to a different address and may also be submitted 
in person at one of a number of Ministry of Transport facilities885. The identity document 
requirements are largely the same, with the exception that birth certificates do not require 
additional supporting documents to be used and that birth certificates from the Republic of 
Ireland are valid in addition to UK birth certificates886. The guidance for those living in 
Northern Ireland has no section for change of gender, and has no evidence requirements 
listed for those whose gender has changed, nor does it list a gender recognition certificate as a 
document required or accepted for evidential purposes. 
 
 
883 Identity documents needed for a driving licence application, Gov.uk, Located at https://www.gov.uk/id-for-
driving-licence, paragraph 2 
884 Identity documents needed for a driving licence application, Gov.uk, Located at https://www.gov.uk/id-for-
driving-licence paragraph 5 
885 Keeping your driving licence up to date, Ni Direct, Located at https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/articles/keeping-
your-driving-licence-date 




Because of these requirements drivers licenses, while they do not seem overly concerned with 
gender, seem to de-facto have the same gender recognition requirements as passports, or 
gender recognition certificates if a person chooses to submit a birth certificate as evidence 
rather than an updated passport. The only field that denotes a person’s gender, other than 
gendered names, is one’s title if a person does not have the ability to use a non-gendered title. 
Titles, according to the guidance for areas other than Northern Ireland, do not require any 
evidence to amend on a driver’s license unless the title in question is hereditary887. Because 
of this it is possible for a person, if they do not wish to change their name, to de-facto have a 






The housing and treatment of transgender prisoners in the UK was previously governed by 
PSI 07/2011888, which also governed the process by which a person’s gender for the purpose 
of their housing in prison is determined. Under the rules contained in this document the 
gender a person was to be treated as for the purposes of housing within prison was, by 
default, that persons legal gender889. This is the gender marked on a person’s birth certificate 
or gender recognition certificate, with the gender recognition certificate overriding the gender 
marked on the birth certificate890. It may be interesting to note that the instructions 
acknowledge that prisons are not entitled to ask for a gender recognition certificate, or even 
ask if a prisoner has one891 but still require a prisoner to produce a gender recognition 
certificate as evidence of their legal gender892. While the prison is not “asking”, disclosure of 
 
887 Change the name or gender on your driving licence, Gov.uk, Located at https://www.gov.uk/change-name-
driving-licence 
888 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 07/2011 
889 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 07/2011 D1 - D2 
890 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 07/2011 D3 
891 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 07/2011 D4 
892 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 07/2011, D2-D3 
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the presence of the certificate is still required for a person to access their rights. One could 
argue that while a prison would not necessarily be running afoul of legislation, there would 
be a form of implied “asking” taking place, much as how while a ticket barrier does not 
verbally ask for a ticket, the presentation of a ticket is necessary for a passenger to access 
their train. Under these rules if a prisoner acquires a gender recognition certificate while in 
prison, a multidisciplinary risk assessment must take place before they are transferred to the 
appropriate estate. The rules point out that due to the ruling in (R (on the application of AB) v 
Secretary of State for Justice893 that it is important to acknowledge that cisgender female 
prisoners are still accommodated in women's prisons even though they may have committed 
certain offences, including violent offences against women, as such a transgender woman 
should not be housed in a men’s prison when a cisgender woman with their offence history 
would not be. 
 
PSI 07/2011 did also allow for people to be housed according to a gender which was not their 
legally recognised gender, as there are a number of reasons why an otherwise eligible person 
would not have a gender recognition certificate894. A person may be housed and treated 
according to their “acquired gender” following a case conference similar to the one required 
to transfer someone who has received a gender recognition certificate895. However while this 
conference can make a recommendation, the final decision remains with the “relevant senior 
manager above establishment level”896. This case conference should consider if a person 
would otherwise meet the gender recognition criteria, as well as risk to the prisoner, risk 
posed to other prisoners, any input from a gender specialist or psychiatrist, where a prisoner 
would feel more comfortable housed, if the transfer would necessitate a period of extended 
segregation  and if they could complete their sentence plan, including offending behaviour 
programmes in the other estate, as some programmes related to sexual offending may not be 
possible to continue897.  
 
 
893 R (on the application of AB) v Secretary of State for Justice and another [2009] EWHC 2220 
894 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 07/2011, D11 
895 Ibid 
896 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 07/2011, D12 
897 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 07/2011, D13 
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Another interesting feature of PSI 07/2011 is its consideration of security, specifically how 
this differs between men and women. It states that a transgender woman who has a gender 
recognition certificate may only be refused housing in the female estate on security grounds, 
and the requirement for such a refusal is that a cisgender woman with a similar history and 
offending record would also need to be housed in the male estate898. However, transgender 
men cannot be refused housing in the male estate on such grounds as “This is because there 
are no security grounds that can prevent location in the male estate.”899. It seems reasonable 
to interpret the term “security grounds” in this part of the document to mean “security 
grounds resulting from concerns that the person in question may endanger the safety of 
prisoners and staff in the new estate”, as the document later points out that a transgender man 
may have valid reasons to choose not to transfer to the male estate due to being concerned for 
their personal safety900. It is worth noting that this part of the policy refers only to security 
grounds preventing a transfer, not a person requesting not to be transferred due to their 
personal concerns for their safety. This disparity between how security is to be considered 
between men and women seems to say a lot not only about how the society that produced this 
document sees men and women in terms of relative risk, but also says a great deal about how 
this perception of the genders has resulted in a lopsided system, in which a dangerous woman 
must be treated as a man because society could not envision such a woman as existing and as 
such could not prepare for such an individual.  
The rules contained within the 2011 PSI regarding the treatment of transgender prisoners 
were addressed in R (Green) v Secretary of State for Justice901. This case concerned a 
transgender woman who was housed in a men’s prison and denied access to various items, 
including tights and wigs due to security concerns902. The court found that the PSI had not 
been deviated from, and that the prison did have discretion to prohibit access to those 
items903. Furthermore the court also found that the denial of these items was not 
discriminatory904. The lack of a finding of discrimination in this case was because the court 
found that because the applicant did not have a gender recognition certificate that she was 
 
898 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 07/2011, 4.3 
899 National Offender Management Service instruction, Ministry of Justice, The care and management of 
transexual prisoners PSI 07/2011, 4.4 
900 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 07/2011, 4.13 
901 R (on the application of Green)  v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWHC 3491 (Admin) 
902 R (on the application of Green)  v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWHC 3491 (Admin), paragraph 20 
903 R (on the application of Green)  v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWHC 3491 (Admin), paragraph 50 
904 R (on the application of Green)  v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWHC 3491 (Admin), paragraph 68 
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legally male, and that the correct comparator would be a cisgender man, who would also have 
been denied those items, rather than a cisgender woman who would have been treated 
differently905. This reasoning has been criticised on the grounds that it would have the effect 
of rendering claims of discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment almost 
impossible, and cannot represent the intent of parliament when the Equality Act was 
passed906. This case can be contrasted with (R (on the application of AB) v Secretary of State 
for Justice907, which concerned the human rights of a transgender woman housed in the male 
estate. In that case it was found to be a violation of her right to privacy, which was not the 
issue raised in Green, which concerns discrimination and access to items important to a 
persons transition, rather than the right to be housed in a specific part of the estate. 
 
 
Following a number of high-profile cases of transgender women being housed in the male 
estate, and the suicides of three transgender women: Joanne Latham, Vikki Thompson and 
Jenny Swift908, a review into the treatment of transgender people in prisons was 
commissioned and was published in November 2016909. This review is notable as it stated 
that as not all transgender women place weight on legal or medical transition910, the relevant 
rules should adapt, and that the dealt presumption is that a person should be housed according 
to the gender they identify is, with all deviations from this requiring justification911. However 
it does state that evidence as to a person’s gender identity would still be necessary for a 
person to be housed appropriately912. It also states that risk assessments should be free of 
 
905 Ibid 
906 Will Gender Self‐Declaration Undermine Women's Rights and Lead to an Increase in Harms?, Sharpe, A, 
(2020), The Modern Law Review, 83: 539-557. 
907 R (on the application of AB) v Secretary of State for Justice and another [2009] EWHC 2220 
908 Transgender prison deaths: Watchdog calls for action, BBC news, 10th January 2017, located at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38562714 
909 Review on the Care and Management of Transgender Offenders, Ministry of Justice, November 2016, 
located at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/566828/transgender-
review-findings-web.PDF 
910 Review on the Care and Management of Transgender Offenders, Ministry of Justice, November 2016, 
located at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/566828/transgender-
review-findings-web.PDF page 4 para 2 
911 Ibid 
912 Review on the Care and Management of Transgender Offenders, Ministry of Justice, November 2016, 
Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/566828/transgender-
review-findings-web.PDF page 5 para 3 
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stereotyping913 and that isolation, including segregation, should be minimized914. The review 
also recommended that all relevant staff receive training on dealing with transgender 
people915 and that more data should be collected on transgender people in prison, due to the 
lack of data up to that point916. 
 
Following this review the rules for the treatment of transgender prisoners were revised, 
resulting in the creation of PSI 17/2016917. While this document can be said to some progress 
from the 2011 PSI, it is uncertain how much of a change it actually represents. One change 
which may indicate an approach similar to self-identification is that transgender prisoners 
must now be asked what their view is on where they would like to be housed and what their 
gender is918. While asking a person to express their view as to their gender identity and where 
they should be housed may be seen as a shift to a more person centred approach, the rest of 
the policy seems to contradict this, particularly regarding the evidential requirements. It then 
states that those with legal gender recognition will be automatically housed in the gender 
recognised on their documentation unless there are security concerns. Those without legal 
gender recognition must produce evidence as to their gender and may only be transferred to 
the other estate following a decision by a transgender case board919. This procedure seems 
almost identical to the previous procedure in the 2011 document. However, while the 
previous policy required that a person would be likely to meet the criteria for a gender 
recognition certificate, the new policy is more generous as to what it considers as evidence920, 
however it is not clear how much evidence is required. Notably the chart used to present 
 
913 Review on the Care and Management of Transgender Offenders, Ministry of Justice, November 2016, 
Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/566828/transgender-
review-findings-web.PDF page 6 para 5 
914 Review on the Care and Management of Transgender Offenders, Ministry of Justice, November 2016, 
Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/566828/transgender-
review-findings-web.PDF page 7 para 3 
915 Review on the Care and Management of Transgender Offenders, Ministry of Justice, November 2016, 
Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/566828/transgender-
review-findings-web.PDF page 7 para 7 
916 Review on the Care and Management of Transgender Offenders, November 2016, Ministry of Justice, 
Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/566828/transgender-
review-findings-web.PDF page 8 para 3 
917 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 17/2016 
918 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 17/2016 at 4.6 
919 Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 17/2016 at 4.7 and 4.8 
920 Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 17/2016 at Annex A 
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which types of evidence are permissible and their relative values indicates that the absence of 
“actual life” evidence will be considered counter evidence. Actual life evidence is defined as 
including a change of name, use of prosthetics, consistent use of gendered spaces and 
whether a person “presents as the gender identified with”. These criteria not only raise the 
question of “presenting as a gender” means, as it is not defined in the document, which may 
lead to the entrenchment of stereotypes as a means of “demonstrating” one’s gender and may 
also pose problems for those who have difficulty performing the actions often associated with 
this, such as those who may lack confidence or not have a home or work situation which 
enables them to do so. The forms of evidence accepted also mentions that the 
recommendation of medical professionals may be taken into account. It seems as though the 
evidence used to determine a person’s gender paints a picture of a recognition method that 
resembles a less formalised version of the model of gender recognition used in the case of 
passports, which while less formal than that used for GRC's still uses the input of medical 
professionals, possibly as they are seen more objective than the expressed view of the 
individual. 
 
Another apparent advancement which may not be as progressive as it appears is that the 
policy now explicitly includes people with non-binary or fluid gender identities and intersex 
people921. However, the policy later states that they will always be housed according to their 
legal gender, unless they intend to “permanently transition to a different gender”922. This is 
somewhat problematic because, given that services are divided into male and female, this 
means that only binary genders can be recognised. There is no mention of how this interacts 
with the possibility that a person may have a legally recognised gender from another 
jurisdiction which is non-binary. It is also notable that a person who has a non-binary gender 
will, by default, be searched according to their legal gender unless a voluntary agreement has 
been made923. The document also, in its “sentence management: community only” section, 
 
921 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice,  PSI 17/2016 at 3.3 
922 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 17/2016  at 6.7 
923 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 17/2016 at 6.14 
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states that people with non-binary or fluid genders will be housed according to their legal 
gender apart from in exceptional circumstances924. 
 
While emphasis may have shifted from solely considering a person’s legal gender to also 
considering a person’s self-identified gender, the system for managing transgender prisoners 
following the 2016 PSI, particularly non-binary prisoners still very much relied on a flawed 
system of gender recognition, to the extent that there is no way for a person, regardless of any 
of the relevant factors in their life, identity or circumstances, to guarantee that they will be 
housed anywhere other than the estate dictated by their legal gender, even before security 
concerns are taken into account. Despite this, it is worth mentioning that as shown previously 
in this chapter, passports do have lesser gender recognition criteria than the 2004 Act. This 
indicates that it is possible for less rigorous criteria to be used. It could be that the prison 
system is implementing less rigorous criteria by merely requiring “evidence”, some of which 
can be lived rather than documentary in nature, but retains the references to legal gender to 
provide some certainty to those who have undergone the process, although this does not 
explain the reliance on legal gender for non-binary and gender fluid people. In that case the 
reliance on legal gender could simply be because recognising non-binary or fluid identities 
would be complex, so adhering to a legal mechanism which only acknowledges binary 
genders provides not only a reason to not recognise these identities, but also provides a 
structural framework to refer to that does not need to be otherwise justified, as it is assumed 
to already be justified by the fact that it was passed by Parliament. 
 
Following the introduction of the 2016 PSI a number of articles were published in the press 
regarding transgender people, many of them negative925. Several of these articles concerned 
the case of Karen White, a transgender prisoner who had sexually assaulted another woman 
while housed in the female estate926. Following this reporting the government announced the 
opening of a new unit in HMP Downview, specifically for housing transgender inmates, who 
 
924 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 17/2016 at 7.6 
925 Trans "extremists" and "rapists": How the media reported on trans people in 2018, Pink News, Ella 
Braidwood, December 31 2018, Located at https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2018/12/31/trans-extremists-media-
press-headlines/, accessed 02/11/2019 
926 Karen White: how "manipulative" transgender inmate attacked again, The Guardian, Nazia Parveen, 11 Oct 
2018,  Located at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/oct/11/karen-white-how-manipulative-and-
controlling-offender-attacked-again-transgender-prison, accessed 02/11/2019 
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have no contact with the general population of that prison927, although contradictory reports 
claim they do interact with other prisoners for some activities928. At the time of the most 
recent reports this unit houses 3 prisoners, all of whom are transgender women who have 
gender recognition certificates929. The case of Karen White has been cited as motivating the 
decision to open this unit930. The creation or operation of such a unit is not discussed in the 
2016 PSI nor the subsequent Transgender Policy Framework.  
 
Despite support for the 2016 PSI among professionals931, and possibly due to the increased 
negative portrayal of transgender prisoners by the media932 it was replaced in 2019 by the 
Transgender Policy Framework933.  
 
The Transgender Policy Framework makes a number of changes from the 2016 PSI. The 
power to transfer a prisoner to the other estate was removed from the transgender case 
boards934, with more specific requirements given as to their composition. The timeframe to 
convene a local transgender case board was also extended from 3 days to 14 days935, which 
now deals mostly with voluntary arrangements936. In order to be housed in the estate that does 
 
927 First UK Transgender prison unit to open, BBC News, 3 March 2019, Located at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-47434730 accessed 02/11/2019 
928 "High-risk" transgender inmates at Downview mix with women, The Times, Andrew Gilligan, March 17 
2019, Located at https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/high-risk-transgender-inmates-at-downview-mix-with-
women-zt33zb2ks accessed 02/11/2019 
929 First UK Transgender prison unit to open, BBC News, 3 March 2019, Located at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-47434730 accessed 02/11/2019 
930 Government considers the option of special transgender prisoner wings, Sunday Times, Andrew Gilligan, 10 
February 2019 
931 Learning Lessons bulletin, Transgender prisoners, Prisons & probation Ombudsman, January 2017, Located 
at https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/ppo-dev-storage-4dvljl6iqfyh/uploads/2017/01/PPO-Learning-Lessons-
Bulletin_Transgender-prisoners_Final_WEB_Jan-17.pdf accessed 01/11/2019 
932 Trans "extremists" and "rapists": How the media reported on trans people in 2018, Pink News, Ella 
Braidwood, December 31 2018, Located at https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2018/12/31/trans-extremists-media-
press-headlines/, accessed 02/11/2019 
933 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 
934 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 4.14 
935 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 1.15 
The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 4.12 
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not correspond with the gender listed on their birth certificate, such a transfer must now be 
approved by a complex case board937, which was previously only used for prisoners who 
posed particular risk938. There is no required timeframe given for a complex case board to sit. 
Prisoners held on remand are now to be housed according to the gender listed on their birth 
certificate, unless permitted to be housed in the other estate by a complex case board939. This 
represents a significant change from the 2016 PSI which previously allowed for discretion to 
be used if it was in the best interests of safety and well-being and for a person to be re housed 
following a transgender case board after 3 days940. The Policy Framework also specifies a 
more explicit list of factors to be considered when deciding where a trans person should be 
housed. A number of the items may be considered unusual such as the use of transition 
related medication being considered a risk posed by the individual to others, as well as the 
consideration of allegations of behaviour that have not been proven but have been found 
“credible”941. The Policy Framework also allows for consideration of “anatomy” as a factor 
when considering the dangers that the transgender prisoner may pose to others942. This seems 
to embed the idea that transgender bodies, particularly those of transgender women may be 
inherently more dangerous than those of cisgender people. This is particularly interesting 
when contrasted with the transgender prisoners policy in place in Scotland, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
 
In addition to these substantive changes there are a number of changes in the material 
covered in the document. For example it omits the language from the 2016 PSI stating that 
“Women offenders who present a high risk of harm to other women are managed safely in the 
female estate. Transgender women who pose similar risks should be managed in a similar 
 
937 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 4.6 
938 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 17/2016 at 5.19 
939 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 1.5 
940 National Offender Management Service instruction, The care and management of transexual prisoners, 
Ministry of Justice, PSI 17/2016 at 5.10 
941 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 4.18 
942 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 4.18 
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way in the female estate”943. Instead the policy framework repeatedly emphasises the need to 
consider possible dangerousness of the transgender person, with the closest language to that 
in the 2016 PSI quoted above being: 
 
“When considering whether to hold a transgender woman with a GRC with other women, or 
in separate accommodation, all risks need to be taken into account. Any significant risks 
posed by a transgender woman with a GRC to other women, or by other prisoners to the 
individual, should be assessed in order to make sure that appropriate accommodation, regime 
and supervision is provided to manage such risks appropriately. 
4.66 If risk is particularly high, it may not be appropriate to hold a transgender woman with a 
GRC in the women’s estate, either with the general population, or on a bespoke unit.  
1. It may then be necessary to locate a transgender (male to female) woman with a 
GRC in the men’s estate. This can only happen if the risk concerns surrounding 
the transgender individual are at the equivalent level to those that would apply to 
any other women that may need to be held in the male estate. 
2. If a transgender woman with a GRC must be placed in the male estate, she must 
be treated as a female prisoner in the men’s estate. She must be held separately 
and according to a women’s regime as set out in the Women’s Policy Framework. 
This provision exists as the men’s estate has greater capacity to manage 
individuals in custody who pose an exceptionally high risk of harm to others.”944 
 
This change seems to be more than merely a matter of emphasis, and represents a change in 
evaluation of the capacity of the gendered estates to deal with dangerous inmates. At the time 
of writing reference to housing women in the men's estate could not be found in the Women's 
Policy Framework, with the only reference to transgender prisoners being to refer to the 2016 
 
943 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 6.2 
944 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 4.65-4.68 
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PSI945. It is not clear what data was used in reaching this conclusion that it was no longer 
correct to state that the women's estate is equipped to deal with dangerous women prisoners.  
 
The Transgender Policy Framework continues to refer to “legal gender”, and states that this 
can be determined by examining a person’s birth certificate946. It is unclear if this reflects an 
understanding of legal gender in which a person’s legal gender is singular for all purposes 
and the birth certificate is authoritative in all circumstances. The alternative may be that after 
every mention of “legal gender” in the document, there is an unspoken “for the purposes of 
imprisonment”, which may be reasonable to imply. However, there is no particular evidence 
for this reading. It is worth noting that treating birth certificates as authoritative may simply 
be a product of legislation. Because prison staff need to be able to determine if a person has a 
GRC, however asking for a GRC is not regarded as good practice947, they must use some 
other way of discovering this. It is true that in the case of persons with a GRC their birth 
certificate can be regarded as authoritative of their legal gender for all purposes due to the 
language in the Gender Recognition Act948. However it seems that, for reasons discussed 
previously in this chapter, practice and the relevant case law indicate that until a person 
receives a GRC they do not have a single unified legal gender that may be determined by 
looking at their birth certificate. It is thus unclear if the prison service has some other 
understanding of the functioning of the law in this area, or if they choose to use the birth 
certificate as a metric for everyone, not because they are legally compelled, but out of 
convenience, as they are able to do if one regards imprisonment as being within the “relevant 
but not essential” category of legal situations. Indeed, it would seem strange to claim that 
imprisonment would fall into the “essential” category, as even the current policy allows a 
person to be housed contrary to their sex assigned at birth in some situations. As such it 
seems that either the prison service is operating on the understanding that legal gender is 
singular and emanates from birth certificates, or that a person can have multiple legal 
 
945 Women's Policy Framework, HM Prison & Probation Service, Ministry of Justice, Published 21 December 
2018, Located at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/767304/wome
n_s-policy-framework.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019 
946 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 2.8 
947 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at Annex B 
948 Gender Recognition Act 2004, Section 9 
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genders, but the GRC criteria are being used in this situation voluntarily, but this could 
change in the future. It is not clear which of these possibilities is the case.  
 
It is also worth noting the consequences of the changes in the Transgender Policy Framework 
on those held on remand or on short sentences. This is due to local transgender case boards 
being convened in 14 days rather than 3 days and the fact that transfers to the other estate are 
now dealt with by complex case boards, which have no requirement as to how quickly they 
are convened. When combined with the removal of discretion as to the housing of those held 
on remand this may result on certain prisoners being unable to be housed according to their 
gender identity, not due to their particular circumstances or doubts as to their authenticity, but 
simply due to the procedures put in place.  
 
In various parts of the UK law making powers regarding certain issues are devolved to 
regional governments. While the focus of this chapter is on the law in England and Wales, it 
is worth noting that prisons are a devolved issue in Scotland. The Scottish prison service has 
its own rules regarding transgender prisoners949 which can be contrasted with the 
Transgender Policy Framework. While it will not be addressed in depth, the contrasting 
approaches are worth commenting on. The Scottish policy places significantly more emphasis 
on social gender rather than the “legal gender” first approach present in all of the English 
policies. It emphasises that the social gender in which a person lives should form the basis of 
their treatment, whether they have a GRC or not950. It emphasises that social gender should 
form the basis for how a person is searched951 and that initial as well as subsequent housing 
decisions should also be based on the social gender in which a person actually lives952. While 
 
949 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019 
950 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019, at 3.3 
951 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019, at 3.7 
952 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019, at 4.1 
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it does state that the risks the transgender prisoner may pose must be considered953, it also 
states that:  
 
“A male-to-female person in custody living permanently as a woman without genital surgery 
should be allocated to a female establishment. She should not be automatically regarded as 
posing a high sexual offence risk to other people in custody and should not be subject to any 
automatic restrictions of her association with other people in custody. However, if there is 
clear evidence that she, as an individual, may pose a sexual offence risk, then this should be 
dealt with as for any other person in custody posing a risk.”954 
 
This places emphasis on social gender, and on treating transgender people as any other 
person of their gender rather than someone who’s gender expression must be weighed against 
possible dangers they may pose. This is a stark contrast when compared to the approach in 
England, particularly given that the current Policy Framework allows for “anatomy” to be 
considered a possibly dangerous characteristic of a transgender person955. It is worth noting 
that the Scottish policy was implemented in 2014, before the 2016 PSIs and the highly 
publicised suicides that prompted it. It was also created in conjunction with transgender 
community groups and provides contact details for these groups in the “further information” 
section of the document956. In contrast there is no evidence of such collaboration with the 
transgender community regarding the English Transgender Policy Framework.  
 
 
953 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019, at 6.3 
954 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019, at 6.4 
955 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation 
Service, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 4.18 
956 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019, at Appendix C 
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While intersex people and those with non-binary gender identities are mentioned in the 
Scottish policy, there are no specific measures regarding their treatment957. Presumably the 
“social gender” approach taken to prisoners in general could be applied to intersex people 
with minimal issues. However it is less clear how such an approach would apply to a person 
with a non-binary social gender. However, the policy does refer to the “predominant 
gender”958 in which a person is living, so it is possible that a non-binary person may be 
assigned a binary “social gender” on the basis of “predominance” or perceived 
predominance.  
 
Prisons also interact with gender recognition systems in other ways, in addition to gender 
recognition impacting where a person may be housed. For example in the case of Jay959 a 
transgender woman spent a portion of her life in and out of prison. During this period she 
applied for a gender recognition certificate three times, and was denied each time due to 
providing insufficient evidence960. The court found that the gender recognition panel had 
considered irrelevant factors and made the decisions to deny her a GRC on a flawed basis, so 
allowed the appeal961. Jay also alleged that her article 8 right to privacy and article 14 right to 
non-discrimination had been violated on the grounds that the process had been invasive, 
restricted her ability to live her life and had been unequally applied in her case due to her 
status as a prisoner962. While the court did not issue a judgement on that issue963, the 
difficulties experienced by Jay are still worth considering as an example of the difficulties 
that can be faced disproportionally by those seeking gender recognition while in prison.  
Jay claimed that she had particular trouble in complying with the evidential requirements due 
to her status as a prisoner, and she demonstrated this to the gender recognition panel, which 
inflexibly insisted on compliance with the requirements. As a result of this Jay claimed she 
had been discriminated against by being denied gender recognition, which is an article 8 
 
957 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019, at 1.4 
958 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019, at 6.4 
959 Jay [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) 
960 Jay [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) para 20-52 
961 Jay [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) para 97 
962 Jay [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) para 71 
963 Jay [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) para 97 
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right, on the grounds of her status as a prisoner964. This was because unable to obtain the 
necessary medical evidence, due to the prison doctors not being qualified in transgender 
health and having been denied permission to see an outside specialist965. This should serve as 
a reminder of how prison rules can thwart gender recognition systems and result in persons 
being denied their right to legal gender recognition, and that the probability of this occurring 





Any discussion of gender recognition in the UK must take into account the recent review 
conducted by the Women and Equalities Committee and the related calls for reform966. The 
review focused on four areas, the Gender Recognition Act 2004, the Equality Act 2010, NHS 
services, and anti-trans prejudice.  
 
With regards to gender recognition the committee concluded that the Gender Recognition Act 
should be reviewed, as while it was ahead of its time when introduced, a number of its 
features including its medicalised approach are now recognised as flawed967. The committee 
also recommended reducing the age requirement for a gender recognition certificate to 16, 
but were reluctant to recommend reducing it below that age968. The review was also critical 
of the inappropriate use of gender recognition certificates by a number of bodies and noted 
that no prosecutions have been brought under section 22 of the Gender Recognition Act 
 
964 Jay [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) para 77 
965 Jay [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) para 25 
966 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf 
967 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 44 and 45 
968 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 70-71 
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which prohibits the disclosure of a person’s gender history or gender recognition process, 
despite evidence that breaches of this section have occurred969. 
 
The report also recommended that the protected characteristic of gender reassignment be 
amended to be gender identity970 and that the measures relating to single sex services be 
amended so as to not apply to those who have received a gender recognition certificate, 
although they did not extend this recommendation to those who have not received a 
recognition certificate but would meet the same criteria971. The committee acknowledges that 
turning away a person with a GRC from such a service would be unreasonable, but this 
requirement for a GRC may serve to exclude those without one from those services. It cannot 
be that the mere acquisition of paperwork is what makes it unreasonable to turn someone 
away from such a service. It must be that a person can possess qualities other than having the 
correct paperwork which would make turning them away unreasonable. It may be that in 
making a recommendation based on paperwork, rather than characteristics the committee has 
done a disservice to those who cannot easily interface with the gender recognition system. 
 
This report is also notable for recommending that the UK introduce a third “x” category to 
the gender field on its passports. In a particularly strong statement the report stated: 




969 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 87 
970 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 108 
971 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 132 
972 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 289 
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While little space is devoted to passports in the report, it seems from context as though the 
committee intends for such a field to recognise non-binary gender identities973. 
The report also mentions prisons at some length, and welcomed the review of the 2011 PSI 
However as the report was written before the creation of  PSI 17/2016 the discussion here of 
this section of the report will be limited. Some sections, however, may have value regardless 
of the current PSI, for example, the report notes that many of the issues faced by trans people 
in prisons are a reflection of general ignorance and societal views of trans people, which 
affects the implementation of the prison service instructions despite not being a product of 
them974. The report also mentioned that ambiguity in a prison service instruction is counter-
productive975, and that media coverage on this issue has been unhelpful976. The report also 
pointed out a key difficulty that can be faced no matter what the content of the current PSI is, 
that of non-implementation977.This can serve as an important reminder that any legal 
measures can be rendered irrelevant if those expected to implement them are not adequately 
trained and held accountable for its implementation. Another example of this issue can be 
found in the committee’s remarks on the situation regarding transgender participation in 
sports. While the Equality Act did include some measures which may prevent transgender 
people from participating, the committee found that a far bigger issue was public 
misunderstanding of the statute resulting in people being unnecessarily and possibly 
unlawfully being barred from participating in sports978. 
 
Following this review Jeremy Corbyn, former leader of the Labour party at the time of 
writing, announced his support for a gender recognition system which would allow a person 
 
973 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 285 
974 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 285 
Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 8 
December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 308 
976 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 310 
Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 8 
December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 309 
978 Transgender Equality, Women and Equalities Committee, First Report of Session 2015-16, HC 390, Printed 
8 December 2015, House of Commons, Located at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, at 143 
198 
 
to self-identify their gender979. It is not clear if this would result in the abandonment of the 
gender recognition panels in favour of a system similar to that used in Malta, which simply 
requires a signed declaration980, or if it would include legal recognition for non-binary gender 
identities. In response to this the government announced a review of the Act to be concluded 
in Autumn 2017981. In July 2018 the government launched a consultation into possible 
reforms of the Gender Recognition Act982. The consultation was initially scheduled to end on 
the 19th of October 2019, but was extended until the 22 October following reports of users 
being unable to submit responses due to website slowdowns and crashes close to the deadline 
due to the volume of users attempting to submit responses at the same time. During the 
consultation period the government felt the need to issue a response to misleading reporting 
in order to remind the public that the consultation was not pushing for any specific reforms at 
this stage and that changes to the Gender Recognition Act would have no impact on the 
allowances for single sex services contained in the Equality Act983. When the writing of this 
chapter began the web page for the consultation stated that the government was currently 
analysing the feedback from the consultation984. On 5 October 2019 a government minister 
was reported as saying that plans to reform the GRA had been "kicked into the long grass"985. 
During the period of delay in responding to the consultation a number of LGBT advocacy 
groups wrote a joint letter stating that trans people will be harmed by such delays due to 
being exposed to unnecessary and invasive medical requirements986. Following this period of 
delay the government released an official ministerial response to the consultation on 22 
 
979 Jeremy Corbyn wants trans rights overhaul - and will support the conservatives to make it happen, Mayer 
Nissim, Pink News, 19th July 2017, located at www.pinknews.co.uk/2017/07/19/jeremy-corbyn-wants-trans-
rights-overhaul-and-will-support-the-conservatives-to-make-it-happen/, accessed 17/01/2021 
980 Malta: Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act [Malta], CAP. 540., 14 April 2015, 
Section 4(3) 
981 Changing gender set to become easier as "demeaning" medical checks are reviewed, Ben Riley-Smith, The 
Telegraph, July 22nd 2017 Located at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/22/changing-gender-set-become-
easier-demeaning-medical-checks-reviewed/, accessed 17/01/2021, paragraph 15 
982 Reform of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, Government Equalities office, Gov.uk, Located at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/reform-of-the-gender-recognition-act-2004, accessed 06/11/2019 
983 Government response, Facts about the Gender Recognition Act consultation, Government Equalities Office, 
Gov.uk, Published 14th October 2018, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/facts-about-the-gender-
recognition-act-consultation, accessed 07/11/2019 
984 Reform of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, Government Equalities office, Gov.uk, Located at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/reform-of-the-gender-recognition-act-2004, accessed 06/11/2019 
985 'Pick your own sex' plans are shelved: Equalities minister Liz Truss abandons drive to relax laws around 
changing gender, Daily Mail, Glen Owen, 5th October 2019, Located at 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7542003/Equalities-minister-Liz-Truss-abandons-drive-relax-laws-
changing-gender.html, accessed 13/12/2010 
986 Sexual health of trans people at risk due to self-ID delay, charities warn, Lily Wakefeild, Pink news,  12 July 
2019, Located at https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2019/07/12/sexual-health-trans-people-risk-self-id-delay-
charities-warn/, accessed 06/11/2019 
199 
 
September 2020987, as well as an analysis of the responses988. This response did not 
demonstrate any intent to reform the substance of the Gender Recognition Act, instead 
proposing that the gender recognition certificate process be moved online and that the 





Overall UK law on this issue is characterised by a tension between two different rationales 
for gender recognition.  The first is the right to be recognised and treated by the law 
according to one’s gender. This is the core issue in the cases in the Corbett and Tan cases, 
although the results of these cases may have been far from satisfactory from this perspective. 
This can be contrasted with the other rationale for gender recognition, namely the right to 
blend in, as embodied by the human rights cases concluding in Goodwin v UK. It is worth 
noting that these two rationales are not totally separate. As the right to be recognised as one’s 
gender identity can include the right to be recognised for all purposes, as provided for by the 
Gender Recognition Act, which allows one to blend in in this fashion. This may be why the 
differences between these two lines of thinking are often conflated, as both their aims are 
accomplished, to varying degrees, by similar legal measures. However, there are some 
situations in which the differences become more, apparent, particularly in the cases of those 
with non-binary gender identities. 
 
The desire to be recognised, as well as the desire to be indistinguishable as a trans person and 
“blend in” can be satisfied in part by the Gender Recognition Act. The desire to be 
recognised is satisfied by the fact that it allows a person to change their legal gender in a way 
that must be recognised by all for all purposes. This avoids many of the issues with having to 
 
987 Written statement to Parliament, Written Ministerial Statement: Response to Gender Recognition Act 2004 
consultation, Government Equalities Office, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/response-to-
gender-recognition-act-2004-consultation, accessed 10/11/2020 
988 Gender Recognition Act Analysis of consultation responses, Government Equalities Office, Located at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/919890/Analy
sis_of_responses_Gender_Recognition_Act.pdf, accessed 10/11/2020 
Written statement to Parliament, Written Ministerial Statement: Response to Gender Recognition Act 2004 
consultation, Government Equalities Office, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/response-to-
gender-recognition-act-2004-consultation, accessed 10/11/2020 
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negotiate gender recognition separately for many purposes, particularly if social values make 
this difficult. This is useful from this perspective mainly because it sets a social minimum and 
leaves very few situations in which it is outright impossible to have one’s gender recognised. 
However, the Act may be seen as somewhat wanting from this perspective, as it only permits 
recognition of those with binary genders, and places a number of restrictions on recognition, 
including the need for a diagnosis of gender dysphoria. 
 
When considering the desire to have one’s gender recognised but to be unrecognisable as a 
transgender person some of these features of the act may become desirable. Particularly the 
lack of recognition for non-binary genders would not be important to a person who prioritises 
being indistinguishable from a cisgender person, as being recognised as non-binary would 
give one a legal status that no cisgender person could have, as assigning non-binary genders 
at birth is not common practice. From this perspective the most important features of the Act 
are those that provide for changing one’s birth certificate and for criminal sanction for a 
person who discloses that a person has a GRC if they came into this knowledge in an official 
capacity.  
 
It may be possible for a reformed Gender Recognition Act that uses a self-declaration model, 
as seen in Malta, to satisfy both drives for recognition. However this may be harder in the 
cases of non-binary people and intersex people. As mentioned above, it is difficult for 
recognition of a non-binary person to allow them to no longer be recognisable as transgender. 
However, if one merely seeks recognition rather than the ability to “become invisible”, 
recognition of non-binary genders becomes much easier, especially if one considers that it is, 
on some levels, already occurring in those legal relationships where gender is relevant but not 
essential. This is evident as non-binary titles become recognised by various institutions, 
including banks and institutions of higher education.  
  
This tension is also seen in intersex activism. While some Intersex people, such as Norrie in 
Australia seek to have their intersex identity officially recognised as distinct from male or 
female990, many prominent intersex organisations do not promote “third sex” legal status for 
 
990 See page 69 
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intersex people, and actively oppose labelling an intersex infant as such, but support self-
identification in general so long as gender / sex differentiation remains legally necessary.991 
 
The other major tension in the UK concerns how the concept of legal gender works or should 
work rather than the objectives gender recognition measures should meet. This is the tension 
between the model discussed in Corbett, in which a person, for purposes where law is 
relevant but not essential, may have different genders recognised according to different 
criteria for each purpose and the model in which a person has a single unified legal gender, 
defined by their birth certificate until such a time as they receive a GRC. For purposes of 
convenience these shall be referred to as the Corbett model and the unitary model. As 
discussed previously in this chapter the Corbett model appears most likely to be an accurate 
representation of the law on this matter in the UK for a number of factors including how 
gender recognition is done for the purpose of passports and everyday matters such as banking 
as well as Lady Hale's opinion in Chief Constable of West Yorkshire. However the unitary 
model does have some evidence supporting it including R v Tan and Lord Bingham’s opinion 
in A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire as well as references to “legal gender” in the prison 
service instructions and transgender policy framework, which seem to imply that this is 
understood to derive sole from a person’s birth certificate rather than being flexible 
depending on the purpose. This tension manifests in instruments such as the Transgender 
Policy Framework, which seem to understand legal gender as unitary, which, if this model is 
not an accurate reflection of the law, unessential fetters the discretion of the government to 
use different criteria to recognise a person’s gender that may avoid the injustices inherent in 
relying on birth certificates.  
 
The UK is also notable in how some pieces of legislation resist any trend that may be present 
towards “de-gendering” legal systems. For example whereas in many jurisdictions such as 
Australia992 and New Zealand993 have introduced same-sex marriage by simply rendering 
gender a non-factor, it remains very much an issue in the UK. This is because of the aspects 
of the GRA that reference marriage, including the spousal veto discussed previously994, as 
 
991 See for example The Darlington Statement, 10/3/2017, Located at https://darlington.org.au/statement/, 
accessed 14/12/2020 
992 Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious Freedoms) Act 2017 
993 Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, Public Act 2013 No 20 
994 Discussed at page 153 
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well as certain measures such as the fact that only heterosexual relations are considered to be 
adultery for the purposes of divorce995. Civil partnerships were also only available to 
homosexual couples996, however this has been amended by the Civil Partnership (Opposite-
sex Couples) Regulations 2019997 issued as per the Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths 
(Registration) Act 2019998.This difference in approach means that despite achieving marriage 
equality for the most part, the way this was achieved means that one’s gender / sex remains 
more of a factor than in other jurisdictions. However this may soon change, in addition to the 
recent de-gendering of civil partnerships the women and equalities committee is also 
currently engaged in a consultation on proposed reforms to gender recognition in the UK, 
including the removal of the fee for a gender recognition certificate and making the process 
available online. Among the issues being examined in the consultation are the possibility of 
reform to gender recognition with regards to marriage, in particular the use of interim gender 
recognition certificates and the spousal veto. 
 
De-gendering may also ease a number of the tensions that characterise UK law should this 
approach be pursued, while de-gendering policies will be discussed in more detail in the final 
chapter, it is worth briefly mentioning. For example pursuing recognition of one’s expressed 
identity may be easier if there are fewer practical implications, so such recognition would be 
trivially easy. Similarly, those wanting recognition in order to avoid discrimination may find 
it much easier if gender interacts with fewer aspects of their lives, thus offering fewer 
relevant purposes which may contradict and thus reveal their trans status. As others have 
discussed, any future reductions in the relevance of gender will necessarily interact with 
whatever gender recognition system is in place at the time, and serious thought will need to 





995 The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 Section 1 (6) 
996 Civil Partnership Act 2004, S3 (1) (a) 
997 The Civil Partnership (Opposite-sex Couples) Regulations 2019 2019 No. 1458, Regulation 3 
998 Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration etc) Act 2019, S2 (1) 
999 (De)regulating Transgender identities, Flora Renz, featured in Research handbook on gender, sexuality and 


























As the details of specific jurisdictions have been addressed in the previous chapter, this 
chapter will use these jurisdictions to compare how legal gender and sex recognition within 
them works and the strengths and weaknesses of the various characteristics of each system. 
Due to the complexity of the task, the aspects of the laws being examined will be addressed 
in a number of stages examining different aspects of the law. Each section will include a 
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critical look at the relevant aspect of the law in the four jurisdictions and examine why this is 
the case and the advantages and disadvantages of the status quo. As summarising each aspect 
of each jurisdiction would render a large section of the material repetitive, each topic will be 
addressed with individual jurisdictions being discussed to illustrate various issues or to 




How is recognition done? 
 
 
In terms of how recognition is done there are two key aspects worthy of attention which, 
while notionally separate do impact each other, these being: To what extent do the 
jurisdictions examined recognise sex and gender as being separated? Secondly, do these 
jurisdictions recognize a single legal gender or recognise different gender identities for 
different purposes? This section examines how recognition is done with regards to how it is 
conceptualized by the jurisdictions, how recognition is done practically will be addressed in 





Separation / entanglement of sex and gender: 
 
In general the jurisdictions examined do not recognise sex and gender as being separate1000. 
This is, in large part due to the legacy of colonialism resulting in the gender recognition 
systems in each of the jurisdictions resembling, at least until recent years, that of the UK. The 
UK has, in terms of its legal system, had an interesting relationship with this concept. The 
idea that sex and gender were separate was mentioned in Corbett v Corbett1001, as the result 
of that case was justified based on the “essential nature of marriage” being related to physical 
 
1000 See the chapters corresponding to each jurisdiction for details. 
1001 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8, at 106 
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characteristics and thus rooted in sex1002. However it may be pointed out that marriage is an 
essentially social relationship, and physical characteristics are not, in fact at the core of 
marriage as a legal concept1003, as can be justified by the introduction of marriage 
equality1004. Additionally Corbett v Corbett itself mentions some of the complexities of this 
separation, as some of the experts in that case raised the idea that a transgender person may 
be a type of intersex person1005, an idea which was mentioned in a later law review report1006. 
While it may seem at odds with how sex and gender are normally explained, it is worth 
noting that the relationship between sex and gender can be complex. Anne Fausto Sterling 
refers to “sex/gender” in acknowledgement of how gender and sex have a complex and 
entangled relationship with gender1007, while other writers have pointed out that gender as an 
identity and phenomena constructed by interaction with others is always related in some ways 
to one’s body. This is not necessarily a direct connection, one’s sex does not always match 
their gender identity or gender expression, however how one experiences one’s gender will 
depend on one’s relationship to their own body, and other peoples interactions with, and 
perceptions of, one’s body. For this reason gender has been referred to as an “embodied 
process of becoming”1008, as one’s experience of one’s gender is constantly developing in 
relation to society and self-perception. This complex relationship between the body and 
gender may perhaps be one of the reasons why the law has been reluctant to separate the two. 
 
There are of course other possible explanations to why this is the case. It may be that the law 
on this topic originates at a time when social and scientific understanding of sex and gender 
was in a lesser state that it is currently, and that the law has simply been slow to adjust to 
modern science and our evolving social understanding of gender. For example, as will be 
discussed on more detail shortly, the Australian government has adopted a unified set of 
 
1002 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8, at 106 
1003 Individuals may have differing views on marriage as a religious relationship / institution, however analysis 
of this is beyond the scope of this document. 
1004 Marriage (same sex couples) Act 2013 
1005 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8, at 97 
1006 Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People, April 2000, Located at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_wwlG1k_tFAJ:www.oocities.org/transforum2000/Res
ources/wgtrans.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk accessed 10/01/2020 
1007 Sex/gender: Biology in a social world, (Routledge series integrating science and culture, Anne Fausto-
Sterling, 2012. 
1008 Clinical intervention and embodied subjectivity: atypically sexed Children and their Parents, Katrina Roen, 




guidelines on gender and sex recognition1009 which recognise sex and gender as being 
separate1010. This may be an indication that the law in other jurisdictions may simply be 
lagging behind, which may explain by the model of sex and marriage used in Corbett has not 
been used in other jurisdictions1011. 
 
However it is also possible that the reason for the legal conflation of sex and gender serves a 
functional purpose. During the discussion of the Equality Act 2010, it was discussed how the 
words sex and gender being conflated serves to protect the rights of transgender people1012. 
This is because during that discussion it was mentioned that changing rooms may be regarded 
as sex segregated facilities, rather than gender segregated1013. If this were the case it could be 
stated that because a transgender person may have transitioned in terms of gender, they 
cannot change their biological sex, using similar reasoning to Corbett, but applied far more 
broadly. This argument may not reflect our understanding of sex, given that it is determined 
based on a number of factors1014, and has a complex connection with gender and phenotype 
and genotype, as well as karyotype1015. Regardless of whether this argument has any basis in 
science, one can see how a disentanglement of gender and sex may be used to deny a 
transgender person access to gendered facilities, by simply re-designating gender segregated 
facilities as sex segregated facilities. As such during the discussion of this issue in parliament 
it was pointed out that doing so would essentially amount to playing semantic games to bar 
trans people from such facilities1016. However it may be possible to recognise sex and gender 
as being distinct in the law without encountering such problems. For an example of this, we 
can examine the practices in Australia.  
 
1009 Australian Government Guidelines on the Recognition of Sex and Gender, July 2013, Located at 
https://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Documents/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexand
Gender/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGender.pdf, accessed 26/03/2020  
1010 Australian Government Guidelines on the Recognition of Sex and Gender, July 2013, Located at 
https://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Documents/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGe
nder/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGender.pdf, page 4 
1011 For example see the judgement in M v. M, [1991] NZFLR 337 
1012 Gender Recognition Bill in Standing Committee A, House of Commons, 2nd sitting 9th March 2004 
(afternoon), Located at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmstand/a/cmgend.htm, accessed 
26/11/2020, Column 63 
1013 Ibid 
1014 Including social factors, as discussed in Negotiating intersex: A case for revising the theory of social 
diagnosis, Jenkins TM, Short SE, Soc Sci Med. 2017 Feb;175:91-98 
1015 Gender and sex-time to bridge the gap, Dotto G. P. (2019), EMBO molecular medicine, 11(5), e10668 
1016 Gender Recognition Bill in Standing Committee A, House of Commons, 2nd sitting 9th March 2004 
(afternoon), Located at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmstand/a/cmgend.htm, accessed 




As mentioned previously, Australia is in many ways the exception to the notion that the 
jurisdictions examined do not identify sex and gender as being separated. The Australian 
federal government has a unified set of guidelines on gender and sex recognition1017. These 
guidelines define sex and gender in the following manner: 
 
“sex refers to the chromosomal, gonadal and anatomical characteristics associated with 
biological sex.”1018 
 
“Gender is part of a person’s personal and social identity. It refers to the way a person feels, 
presents and is recognised within the community. A person’s gender may be reflected in 
outward social markers, including their name, outward appearance, mannerisms and 
dress.”1019 
 
Such definitions reflect the more standard definitions of sex and gender1020 and, as these 
guidelines are focused on data collection, allow for the collection of more representative, 
accurate and granular data, as they allow for more categories of refinement by which the data 
can be examined and the clarity of definitions removes potential ambiguities. More recently 
statistics New Zealand has also adopted similar guidelines1021 
 
It is worth noting that these guidelines only apply to the federal government of Australia, and 
as such the governments of each state and territory is free to make its own rules regarding 
 
1017 Australian Government Guidelines on the Recognition of Sex and Gender, July 2013, Located at 
https://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Documents/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexand
Gender/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGender.pdf, accessed 26/03/2020 
1018 Australian Government Guidelines on the Recognition of Sex and Gender, July 2013, Located at 
https://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Documents/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGe
nder/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGender.pdf, accessed 26/03/2020, paragraph 
11 
1019 Australian Government Guidelines on the Recognition of Sex and Gender, July 2013, Located at 
https://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Documents/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGe
nder/AustralianGovernmentGuidelinesontheRecognitionofSexandGender.pdf, accessed 26/03/2020 paragraph 
13 
1020 Glossary of terms, Stonewall, Located at https://www.stonewall.org.uk/help-advice/faqs-and-
glossary/glossary-terms, accessed 11/01/2021 
1021 Sex, gender and sexual orientation, Stats NZ, 24th September 2019, Located at 
https://www.stats.govt.nz/reports/sex-gender-and-sexual-orientation, accessed 26/03/2020 
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such data collection. Regarding the law beyond guidelines that acknowledge a difference 
between sex and gender there are some hints at this separation existing in substantive law in 
Australia, for example intersex status is recognised as a protected characteristic in the 
national law, separately from gender identity and sex, which are also protected 
characteristics1022. It is worth noting that discrimination law is not discussed in depth in this 
document, as while it can have practical impacts on how a person’s gender is interacted with 
in practice, due to time and space limitations this document focuses on gender and sex 
recognition and classification. As such this piece of discrimination law will not be examined 
in detail, but merely serves to illustrate a separation of gender and sex in the law of Australia. 
With regards to gender and sex recognition and classification, while some aspects are 
managed by the federal government, such as passports, others such as such as birth 
certificates and prisons are managed by the individual states and territories.  
 
The law in Tasmania is particularly noteworthy in this regard, for a number of reasons, but 
particularly due to how it handles a distinction between sex and gender, which may be 
illustrative of how a distinction between sex and gender can be implemented in law, while 
accomplishing a number of goals and circumventing a number of problems. In 2019 
legislation was introduced that amended a number of aspects of Tasmanian law relating to 
gender and sex recognition1023. For the purposes of this section the most relevant amendments 
were made to the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, although other 
amended pieces of legislation will be discussed later. The amended Act recognises both sex 
and gender as separate, but overlapping in some respects. It requires sex to be registered 
within 60 days of birth, or 120 days if the “sex characteristics do not allow for easy 
assignment of sex”1024. Sex is also only to be registered as male or female, which cannot be 
changed except to correct an error1025. However, the law also states that references to a 
person’s sex in any law in the state shall be interpreted as referring to a person’s registered 
sex, or registered gender1026. A person can register their gender by submitting the appropriate 
for and a declaration and notably does not require medical evidence1027 and can be registered 
as male, female, indeterminate gender, non-binary or “a word, or a phrase, that is used to 
 
1022 Sex Discrimination Act 1984, compilation No 41, Compilation date: 9 December 2018 
1023 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019 
1024 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999 Section 15 
1025 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999 Section 16 
1026 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999 Section 28D 
1027 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999 Section 28A (2) 
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indicate a person's perception of the person's self as being neither entirely male nor entirely 
female”1028.Once a person’s gender has been registered their registered sex ceases to be their 
registered sex and any previously registered gender is replaced by the gender registered by 
the most recent successful application1029. The result of this is that everyone has a registered 
sex, however this is essentially replaced by their registered gender should they choose to 
register one. 
 
This arrangement serves a number of functions. Firstly by assigning everyone a legal sex at 
birth it essentially allows the current laws which rely on this classification to continue 
functioning. It also acknowledges that what is assigned at birth is sex, rather than gender, as 
knowing a person’s gender at that stage may well be impossible and avoids the cis-normative 
assumption that gender will correspond to sex. Restricting this to male or female caters to 
intersex groups which have asked that intersex not be made a new category (if such 
categories remain on legal documents) that be assigned to children for fears that it would be 
stigmatizing1030. Allowing gender to be registered based on declaration reflects current best 
practice1031, removes procedural barriers to accessing recognition and acknowledges that the 
individual is the person best placed to be expert on their own experience of their gender 
identity1032. The system whereby registering one’s gender to remove and essentially replace 
one’s registered sex, in function if not in name allows for transgender people to have their 
genders recognised in as legally valid a form as cisgender people. This system also 
circumvents the problem mentioned in the UK, whereby separating sex and gender would 
amount to a use of semantics to exclude transgender people from gendered spaces1033. This is 
because sex is defined as being either registered sex or registered gender, and one’s registered 
sex ceases to be once a gender is registered. As such one is never in a situation where one’s 
registered sex is different to their registered gender, and one replaces the other and substitutes 
for all legal situations within the state.  As such the approach taken in Tasmania may be a 
 
1028 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999 Section 3A (1) (f) 
1029 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999 Section 28C (7) 
1030 The Darlington Statement, 10/3/2017, Located at https://darlington.org.au/statement/, accessed 14/12/2020, 
para 8 (b) 
1031 TGEU Best Practice Catalogue, 22/02/2017, Located at https://tgeu.org/human-rights-gender-identity-best-
practice-catalogue/, Accessed 18/01/2020 
1032 TGEU Best Practice Catalogue, 22/02/2017, Located at https://tgeu.org/human-rights-gender-identity-best-
practice-catalogue/, Accessed 18/01/2020 
1033 As discussed in Gender Recognition Bill in Standing Committee A, House of Commons, 2nd sitting 9th 
March 2004 (afternoon), Located at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmstand/a/cmgend.htm, 
accessed 26/11/2020, Column 63 
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useful model for other states that wish to acknowledge the separation of sex and gender, cater 
to the needs of the intersex community and provide recognition and full legal protections to 
transgender people.  
 
Multiple / fragmented legal genders. 
 
It is also worth acknowledging that all of the jurisdictions examined feature multiple legal 
genders. This is again due to the modern law in these jurisdictions having a common ancestor 
in the UK due to colonialism. The UK as discussed in the chapter relating to that jurisdiction, 
did not, in law, have a single legal gender for all purposes until the introduction of the Gender 
Recognition Act in 2004. The complexities of this in the UK, including relevant caselaw can 
also be found in the chapter concerning the UK, as can elaboration on the idea of recognising 
different legal genders for different purposes. New Zealand explicitly states that it does not 
have a single legal definition of gender1034, whereas in Australia, the UK and India the 
existence of multiple legal genders can be deduced from practice. This is possible because in 
each of these jurisdictions, as discussed in their corresponding chapters, different services 
recognise a person’s gender for different purposes separately based on their own criteria, 
which do not necessarily confirm to a unified single legal gender.  
 
It is worth noting that while the law in these jurisdiction features the existence of different 
legal genders for different purposes this does not necessarily mean that all recognised genders 
are as substantive or as useful as others. There are two situations in which one recognised 
gender can have greater validity or usefulness than another. The first can be seen in the UK, 
where the Gender Recognition Act states that upon receipt of a gender recognition certificate 
that persons legal gender becomes as stated on the certificate for all purposes1035. In this way 
a gender recognition certificate “trumps” all other forms of legal gender and removes 
possible disparity of genders for different purposes. It may be of interest to note that this 
explicit “for all purposes” language is not found in any of the other jurisdictions examined.  
 
1034 Human rights commission report: to be who I am, Report of the inquiry into discrimination experienced by 
transgender people 2007 located at https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/5714/2378/7661/15-Jan-2008_14-56-
48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf, accessed 17/12/2020 at 8.5 




The other situation can be seen in Australia, where to change one’s gender recognised on 
one’s passport one can use either medical evidence or a valid gender recognition certificate or 
an amended birth certificate. As such while recognition for the purpose of passport sets its 
own criteria, separate from other forms of recognition, it also permits other forms of 
recognition to be used as evidence for the purpose of passports1036. This results in a de-facto 
hierarchy of gender recognition documents, where some documents can be used as “master 
documents” for the purposes of other forms of recognition.  
 
The reason for this de-facto hierarchy despite multiple legal genders existing for different 
purposes can be seen as being due to two of the objectives that gender recognition laws seek 
to achieve. As discussed in the chapter related to the UK, there can be a tension in gender 
recognition laws between the right to be seen vs the right to disappear1037. The right to be 
seen is catered to by allowing for different purposes to have different criteria, which, at least 
notionally, allows for as many people to be recognised according to the particular 
requirements of each purpose. It also allows for criteria for recognition to change according 
to changes in social ideas of gender faster than a legislature would be able to implement 
criteria for a single unified legal gender. The right to disappear, as discussed in the UK 
chapter, which can be required to prevent discrimination or other negative outcomes, is in 
turn catered to by the ability for certain documents to function as “master documents” such as 
gender recognition certificates. In this way these systems, with varying degrees of clarity and 
certainty, cater to both needs which both seem to be required for a gender recognition system 
to function free from a number of undesirable consequences.  
 
 




1036 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Sex and gender diverse passport 
applicants, Located at https://www.passports.gov.au/passports-explained/how-apply/eligibility-citizenship-and-
identity/sex-and-gender-diverse-passport, accessed 27/03/2020 
1037 Discussed at page 194 
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How gender recognition is managed can have a profound impact on how they system behaves 
in practice. This section will examine how jurisdictions manage gender recognition, which 
persons or agencies have responsibility for it, and how this may change the system as a whole 
 
As discussed earlier all of the jurisdictions discussed recognise a person as having different 
genders for different purposes1038 which necessarily results in the powers to determine gender 
for different purposes resting with various individuals or agencies depending on the 
circumstance. This is due to the majority of cases in which the law recognises gender 
occurring within the “relevant but not essential” category discussed in Corbett1039. The result 
of this is that gender recognition is not just a matter of determining who has the authority to 
recognise a person’s gender, it is also a matter of when may particular persons recognise 
one’s gender.  
 
All of the jurisdictions recognised have different criteria for various purposes, with the ability 
to change these criteria resting with the recognising individual or agencies1040. This can be 
demonstrated by the fact that one can observe recognition criteria that differ from legislation, 
can be obtained before obtaining recognition from legislation and that these criteria in a 
number of cases were implemented before legislation1041. The result of this is that individuals 
in these jurisdictions are, in many cases, able to exert a significant amount of control of how 
gender is recognised in their communities. For example in the UK schools can, and do, 
recognise the identities of their transgender students1042 who are too young to be able to 
obtain legal gender recognition1043. This can not only be a caring compassionate gesture, but 
can be shown to help improve a transgender persons mental health, which can help reduce the 
chances of transgender people in that community of committing suicide1044. However despite 
 
1038 See page 209 
1039 Discussed starting on page 125 
1040 See chapters on individual jurisdictions for details 
1041 As was the case in Australia and India  
1042 Schools Transgender Guidance, Cornwall Council, 2015, Located at 
https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/13620644/schools-transgender_guidance_booklet-2015.pdf, accessed 
07/01/2021, page 13 
1043 Gender Recognition Act 2004, Section 1(1) requires that a person be aged at least 18 to receive a gender 
recognition certificate 
1044 Legal gender marker and name change is associated with lower negative emotional response to gender-
based mistreatment and improve mental health outcomes among trans populations, Arjee Restar, Harry Jin, 
Aaron Breslow, Sari L. Reisner, MatthewMimiaga, SeanCahill, Jaclyn M.W.Hughto, SSM - Population Health 
11 (2020) 100595, Located at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352827320302329?via%3Dihub, accessed 08/01/2021 
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this notional degree of latitude this flexibility may not always exist in practice. In some cases 
social norms may be sufficiently uniform within the jurisdiction so as to render any flexibility 
unused, as individuals may not wish to use it or think to use it. Additionally sometimes this 
flexibility goes unused not because people would not wish to use it, but because they do not 
know that they can. As pointed out by the 2016 UK review, individuals may see national 
legislation as a rule that applies to all, rather than as a minimum standard with individuals 
and agencies remaining free to adopt lesser criteria in most situations1045.  
 
This style of recognition serves a number of purposes. Recognition done in this way allows 
for social norms and standards of recognition to potentially change before legislatures can 
act, which may take some time, as can be seen in India1046 and the UK1047. It also avoids a 
“one size fits all” solution. This can be important, as gender and sex, as categories are used 
for a number of different purposes, and the same definitions of those categories may not be 
equally suitable for every purpose. For example when introducing a policy to test women 
over a certain age for cervical cancer a government may have a set of features they expect / 
desire in the term “woman” than a bank would when asking for gender to avoid misgendering 
a client in correspondence. In this way allowing different organisations to set their own 
recognition criteria serves to allow these categories to be used in ways that make sense for 
organisations with different purposes in mind. However it is possible that many situations in 
which gender categories are used would be better served by using different categories that 
may be more granular. To return to the example of cervical cancer screening, because some 
people who may be at risk for this kind of cancer may be transgender men, and as such would 
be disposed not to identify as women when asked. Even though a custom definition of the 
term woman could be used and explained, this would still misgender transgender men or non-
binary people. As such it may be better in such a case to use the category of “persons with a 
cervix”, and to explain that this includes most women and trans men and non-binary people 
who were assigned female at birth. Because of situations like this, where more granular 
categories may be more useful than using the male and female categories which may not 
 
1045 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390, House of Commons Women and 
Equalities Committee, Published on 14 January 2016 located at  
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, accessed 07/01/2021, 
paragraph 143 
1046 6 years passed between the 2014 NSLA ruling and the 2019 legislation 




correspond exactly to what one intends, the idea of “de-gendering” , adopting policies which 
render gender less relevant, has been proposed1048, as has the idea of eliminating the official 
registration of gender all together1049. While this will be discussed in more detail later it is 
worth mentioning at this stage to serve as a reminder that while flexible gender recognition 
criteria can be useful, the categories used may not always be useful. Additionally the 
purposes for which gender recognition is granted may be less well served by flexible 
recognition criteria than they would be by simply ceasing to categorize people by gender for 
that purpose.  
 
In the UK gender is “set” by the final legislation “for all purposes”1050, as such while multiple 
genders may be recognised for a person for various purposes, their legal gender becomes 
unified for all purposes at the moment of receiving a gender recognition certificate. Similarly, 
in all of the jurisdictions examined, as mentioned previously in this chapter, different forms 
of gender recognition can be seen as forming a hierarchy, as one form can be used as 
evidence for other purposes. Both of these mechanisms can serve to unify a person’s legal 
genders for all purposes once they have met a certain evidential threshold. This does not act 
contrary to the recognition as multiple genders and can be seen as complimentary to it. As 
discussed previously the ability to ensure that if a person meets certain criteria they can 
always have their gender recognised has benefits that curb some of the disadvantages of the 
recognition of differing genders for differing purposes1051. It allows a person to effectively 
conceal their transgender status to escape possible discrimination1052. In a situation in which 
one must negotiate one’s gender with each agency separately, it may be that a transgender 
person faces a significant burden, as on each occasion they must content with social notions 
of gender in addition to the requirements of a specific purpose. The ability to ensure 
recognition for all purposes if a certain standard of evidence is met may serve to lessen this 
burden and ensure that the less progressive elements of society find their ability to 
disadvantage transgender people to be limited.  
 
1048 Discussed as “de-emphasising sex” in "No Man's Land': Non-binary Sex Identification in Australian Law 
and Policy", Bennett, Theodore,(2014) 37 University of New South Wales Law Journal 847  
1049 The Abolition of Sex/Gender Registration in the Age of Gender Self-Determination: An Interdisciplinary, 
Queer, Feminist and Human Rights Analysis, Cannoot, P and Decoster, M, (2020) 1 International Journal of 
Gender, Sexuality and Law 26. 
1050 Gender Recognition Act 2006 Section 9 (1) 
1051 See page 210 




Contrary to the above, it is worth noting that some jurisdictions, such as Tasmania, recognise 
a legal sex at birth, which is ones legal sex for the purpose of all law in that jurisdiction1053, 
and as such functions as one’s “legal gender” in a more unified manner than in other 
jurisdictions. However it is worth noting that Tasmania is a part of Australia, which is a 
federal jurisdiction1054. As such a person living in Tasmania must interact with matters 
reserved for the national government, such as passports. Australian passport rules allow for a 
person to have their gender recognised if they submit sufficient medical evidence, regardless 
of if they have a recognition certificate issues by their state1055. As such it is possible for a 
person living in Tasmania to have different legal genders for different purposes, as this is a 
feature of gender recognition law retained on the federal level. It is worth noting that this may 
have minimal impact in practice. This is because having one’s gender recognised in Tasmania 
has less rigorous evidential requirements than are used for passports, so it is more likely that 
a person will have their gender registered by the Tasmanian government which will then 
suffice on its own as evidence for passport purposes. As such Tasmania is still an example of 
a jurisdiction in which a person can have multiple recognised legal genders despite being the 
closest of the jurisdictions examined to having a single defined legal gender.  
 
 
This consideration of Tasmania raises another important issue with regards to how gender 
recognition is managed, that of federal jurisdictions. Out of the jurisdictions examined both 
Australia1056 and India1057 are federal jurisdictions. Different countries often reserve different 
powers of national and regional governments. This can particularly complicate matters 
regarding gender recognition and one’s “legal identity”, particularly when different levels of 
government control different forms of recognition and follow different rules. For example 
while one’s birth certificate may be governed by the national government, one’s driving 
licence may be governed by the state or territory. Not only may control of various recognition 
 
1053 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999 Section 28C (7) 
1054 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, Section 107 
1055 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Passports explained, Sex and gender 
diverse passport applicants, Located at https://www.passports.gov.au/passports-explained/how-apply/eligibility-
citizenship-and-identity/sex-and-gender-diverse-passport accessed 07/08/2019 
1056 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 
1057 The Constitution of India, 1949, located at 
https://www.india.gov.in/sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf, accessed 08/01/2021 
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documents be governed differently due to this, but this can also apply to the institutions that 
interact with one’s legal gender, particularly prisons which may also be governed differently 
depending on the region they are located in. Furthermore the division of gender recognition 
types and methods is not consistent between jurisdictions. For example in Australia birth 
certificates are dealt with at the state / territory level, whereas in the UK they are dealt with 
nationally. Although it is worth noting that in the UK due to devolution some matters differ, 
for example in Scotland parts of the Gender Recognition Act are different1058, particularly the 
spousal veto. As such the law in the UK can be a somewhat complex, as different devolved 
regions have different powers, as can be seen by the fact that welsh prisons are governed by 
the English prison rules1059, in contrast with Scotland which has its own rules regarding trans 
people in prisons1060.  
 
This distribution of gender recognition related powers and responsibilities can have a number 
of impacts on individuals seeking recognition. Having to communicate with multiple 
agencies all with different rules and requirements can be time consuming and confusing, 
especially as one has to learn which agencies have responsibility over recognition in which 
aspects of one’s life. This also has the same negative impacts as can be produced by 
recognising different legal genders for different purposes, in so much as different standards 
among recognising bodies can result in a person having different genders recorded in 
different documents, which can cause a person to be outed and can have a number of other of 
negative pacts on their life1061. 
 
However it is possible that this method of governance of gender / sex recognition issues can 
have positive aspects. One of the purposes of such governance in general is to give residents 
of a particular reason more say in how their lives are governed, as such regulating gender in 
this way may allow more progressive rules to be put in place more easily in more progressive 
areas. Of course the inverse may also be true, that less progressive areas may find it easier to 
 
1058 Gender Recognition Act 2006 Section 3C 
1059 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, HM Prisons and Probation Service, Ministry 
of Justice, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 
1060 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019 
1061 Discussed on page 142 
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institute less progressive rules. Additionally, as different documents are used with different 
frequencies and have different measures of impact on a person’s lives it may be desirable to 
distribute these measures so that locals have as much say as possible about how their lives are 
lived on a day to day basis, while allowing some documents to be governed by national rules 
to maintain a degree of consistency. Reserving some powers for the national government in 
this way may also be used to guarantee that no matter what is done on a local level, citizens 
will always have a right to recognition if certain minimum criteria are met, with states free to 
experiment with less restrictive evidential requirements if they desire. This may also allow 
for regional governments to “experiment” with whatever rules they believe will work best for 
them, and to function as “laboratories of democracy”, while allowing a guarantee of 




In addition to differing in terms of which level of government controls which aspects of 
gender and sex recognition jurisdictions also differ in terms of how particular documents are 
governed. This is most evident when looking at birth certificates, which tend to have specific 
pieces of legislation governing their creation and amendment, rather than this being decided 
by rules made at the executive level. As such the rules regarding birth certificates are subject 
to a greater degree of legislative scrutiny, which may reflect a perceived higher degree of 
importance. This perception can also be observed from the fact that a birth certificate will 
usually serve as evidence of one’s gender for the purpose of changing any other recognising 
document1062. Perhaps due to this perceived higher degree of importance birth certificates 
tend to be the focus of much of the formal regulation on legal gender and sex identity so can 
serve as good examples of differing approaches to regulating gender and sex identity when 
this is deemed particularly important. This regulation is done in a number of different ways, 
with one of the largest and most readily observable differences being between jurisdictions 
that use special panels for gender recognition, those that use declarations from the court, and 
those that use individual declarations (sometimes referred to as “self-dentification”) 
 
 
1062 See examples discussed earlier, including passports and drivers licences. 
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It is also important to note that the body which governs gender recognition does not always 
have the final say in setting the rules of recognition. An example of this can be seen in the 
case of Norrie, in which the high court found that intersex individuals were entitled to be 
recognised as having a “non-specific” sex1063. This decision arguably paved the way for more 
widespread recognition of genders and sex more broadly throughout Australia. Similarly the 
Rights of Transgender Persons Act 20191064 and the previous bills attempting to accomplish 
similar goals1065 were responses to the outcome of National Legal Services Authority v. 
Union of India1066. The demonstrates an important relevant issue, the power and role of the 
legislature. In some jurisdictions the courts are able to compel the legislature to make law or 
to strike down unconstitutional laws. However some jurisdictions maintain a doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy, which means that the courts cannot strike down law which is 
passed by parliament through a valid procedure regardless of the content of the law1067. Out 
of the states examined Australia and India do not have parliamentary supremacy1068 1069, 
while New Zealand and the UK do1070 1071. The result of this is that it must be acknowledged 
that in some jurisdictions changes in gender recognition systems can originate from the 
courts, whereas in others the recognition must be initiated by parliament. The UK is 
interesting in this regard, particularly in terms of gender recognition, due to its history. While 
the UK does maintain parliamentary supremacy, it did not legislate on gender recognition 
until 2004 after being found in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
Goodwin v UK in 20021072. This can serve to demonstrate that, particularly when it comes to 
human rights, states which do have a doctrine of parliamentary supremacy can be responsive 
to issues raised by the courts, rather than the legislature. 
 
This can be significant, as courts and parliaments are fundamentally different bodies, with 
different procedures, compositions and purposes. For example a court necessarily responds to 
real disputes or injustices raised by individual cases, whereas parliament legislates based 
 
1063 NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v Norrie [2014] HCA 11 
1064 The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act 2019 No 40 of 2019 
1065 The Transgender Persons (protection of rights) Bill, 2016 
1066 National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others WP (Civil) No 400 of 2012 
1067 An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, A.V. Dicey, 8th edition, 1915, pages 3-4 
1068 The Constitution of India, 1950 
1069 Goss, Ryan, What Do Australians Talk About When They Talk About ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty'?, Public 
Law Conference (Melbourne, July 2018) 
1070 Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v A-G [1991] 2 NZLR 323 at 330 
1071 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, para 9 
1072 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, Application no. 28957/95 
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largely on the agenda of the government of the day. The result of this is that courts and 
legislatures will respond differently to societal conditions and at different rates. From 
examining the jurisdictions discussed thus far it is possible to observe that three out of the 
four of them have implemented gender recognition measures after being prompted by the 
courts. While this sample size is very small, it may indicate that courts seem to be able to 
create change on this issue more quickly than legislatures are able to. This may be because 
courts are necessarily more responsive to individual injustices, whereas parliaments require 
the issue to be on the legislative agenda of the government, which may require a threshold of 
attention, awareness and perceived importance that certain issues, particularly those 
concerning small minorities of the population may struggle to reach.  
 
Not only may courts, legislatures and executive bodies be responsive at different speeds and 
to different stimuli, but they may also differ in how the law made by these bodies are dealt 
with by the public. This is because not only do these bodies work differently, but they are 
themselves perceived differently by the public. For example a legislature made up by elected 
members of parliament, voted for by the citizens of the jurisdiction may be perceived as more 
representative of the will of the people than a court composed of unelected judges. As such 
there is a risk of law made by a court may be perceived, by those who disagree with the 
ruling, as being an illegitimate dictate imposed on the populous by an unelected elite.  While 
a court may respond more quickly to a problem in the law this possibility of perceived 
illegitimacy may keep an issue under active debate in the public discourse1073. This 
perception of the law not being truly settled in a legitimate way leading to active public 
debate is particularly relevant with regards to the law related to the rights of those who are 
vulnerable to being discriminated against. While constant debate and discussion can be 
perceived as positive and a mechanism through which liberal societies can come to converge 
on positive answers to social issues, it is worth noting that in the case of the rights of 
minorities this debate can come at a cost. Continued debate about the legitimacy of their 
rights or even the nature of their existence itself can be experienced as a form of 
“hammering”, a source of stress due to one’s constant feeling of having one’s fundamental 
rights being under siege1074. While constant stress may be dismissed as a regrettable but 
 
1073 For example see the ongoing debates about Roe v Wade in the United States,  Roe v Wade at 40: if the law 
was settled in 1973, the controversy is anything but, Dahlia Lithwich, The Guardian, 22 Jan 2013, Located at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/22/roe-v-wade-40-law-controversy, accessed 19/05/2020 
1074 Sara Ahmed; An Affinity of Hammers. TSQ 1 May 2016; 3 (1-2): 22–34. 
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ultimately not particularly meaningful cost, it is worth nothing that stress can have a number 
of profound impacts on a person’s health and wellbeing1075 as well as their ability to function 
in society, this is compounded by the fact that this group is particularly vulnerable to 
discrimination, hate crimes and lower incomes which can all lead to worse material 
conditions which may leave them less able to cope with the aforementioned stress. Given that 
this cost due to this continued debate may be harmful as well as leading to possible future 
reversal of positive changes in the law, it may be worth considering legislative action may be 
desirable to “back up” any law made by the courts. This could accomplish a number of goals, 
including improved specificity and precision, as well as providing more certainty as to the 
relevant legal rights. This approach has been taken by the majority of the jurisdictions 
examined which began to recognise transgender and intersex identities due to court 
judgements. While a complete analysis of the issue of perceived legitimacy of court 
judgements relating to minority rights is better addressed in other works, it is still worth 
considering here as a part of the many factors that may be relevant when evaluating the pros 
and cons of different approaches to legal gender and sex classification. 
 
In addition to examining which bodies may make rules regarding gender recognition, it is 
also interesting to examine differences in which bodies govern individual gender recognition 
decisions. The examined jurisdictions have approached this in a variety of ways, the UK has 
opted for gender recognition panels1076, in New Zealand one must apply to the court1077, 
Australian states and territories have opted for a number of different approaches including 
panels1078, courts1079 and “self-identification”1080. In India a person must make an application 
to the district magistrate to be recognised as transgender, and apply a second time to be 
recognised as male or female after having surgery1081 or through the new process introduced 
in the 2020 rules, which is more akin to self-recognition1082. The differences in procedure and 
 
1075 Minority stress and physical health among sexual minority individuals, David M. Frost, Keren Lehavot, Ilan 
H. Meyer, J Behav Med. 2015 Feb; 38(1): 1–8. 
1076 Gender Recognition Act 2004, Schedule 1 
1077 Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995, Public Act 1995 No.16 s.28 
1078 Gender Reassignment Act 2000, Located at www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/wa/consol_act/gra2000200/, accessed 23/08/2019 
1079 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996, Located at 
https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/Births%20Deaths%20and%20Marriages%20Registration%20Act%2
01996.aspx, accessed 22/08/2019 
1080 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019 
1081 The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act 2019 No 40 of 2019 Sections 4-7 
1082 Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules, 2020 
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evidence will be addressed later, but differences in who manages the process are worth 
mentioning here. In jurisdictions which use panels or applications to the court the purpose of 
these bodies seems to be to assess if the evidential requirements listed in the statute have been 
met1083, although in the UK the panel does seem to do more than simply checking that the 
process has been followed, and contains medical personnel who do seem to scrutinise the 
medical evidence provided as can be seen in the Jay case1084. As that case shows, this level of 
scrutiny has, in that case at least, been misguided in its focus1085. It is beyond the scope of 
this piece of work to fully examine the appropriateness of these bodies however it should be 
noted that a number of organisations and individuals have made well reasoned cases as to 
why these models should be replaced with a self-recognition model1086, as ultimately they 
represent an attempt to objectively determine something which the individual remains the 
person best placed to evaluate. However, it has been pointed out that self-declaration models 
cannot solve all the problems faced by transgender and intersex people without addressing 








Every jurisdiction which has a gender or sex recognition process has some sort of limitation 
on who may be recognised by that process. Even in the jurisdictions with the fewest 
restrictions recognition may be limited to those who are willing to sign a legally binding 
declaration of their identity1088, may not recognise non-binary or intersex identities1089 or be 
 
1083 The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 NO. 40 of 2019 
1084 Jay v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) 
1085 Jay v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) paragraph 94 
1086 Ten Years of Gender Recognition in the United Kingdom: Still a “Model for Reform”?, Dunne, Peter, 2015, 
Public Law (4): 530–539. 
1087 Governing Legal Embodiment: On the Limits of Self-Declaration, Dietz, C, Fem Leg Stud 26, 185–204 
(2018) 
1088 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019 
1089 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 located at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/bdamra1996383/, accessed 23/08/2019 
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restricted to those of a certain age1090. However, as discussed previously in the discussion of 
Corbett v Corbett the vast majority of gender recognition occurs in situations where gender is 
“relevant but not essential” where gender recognition is negotiable and therefore largely 
unregulated. As such in these situations those recognising the gender may recognise whoever 
they wish in whatever way they wish. Because of this limitations on who is recognised apply 
only to situations where the mechanism of recognition is regulated by the government, 
whether this is due to a decision by the executive (as is usually the case with passports), or by 
legislation (as is usually the case with birth certificates). 
 
A number of jurisdictions place restrictions on the gender recognition methods available to a 
person based on their age. This can be done by barring access to certain processes, such as 
the UK preventing those under 18 from acquiring a GRC1091 or by requiring their parents to 
apply for them1092. While there are a number of ongoing complex discussions regarding 
transgender and intersex children and what their rights should be there is simply not space 
within this work to deal with this issue in great depth. This is mainly because ideas about to 
what degree a child should have autonomy from their parents differ significantly and to 
engage with this issue would involve a level of engagement with the philosophical and ethical 
issues which would not be viable. From the legal perspective there are a number of issues 
regarding age that are worth remarking on.  
 
Firstly, as gender recognition is, in most cases, granted to cisgender children at birth, it may 
be potentially unjust to withhold this same right from their transgender peers for a number of 
years. This difference in treatment must be justified, which is complicated by many common 
arguments used to justify it appear to be somewhat flawed. For example the notion that a 
child cannot be trusted to know their own identity with any certainty ignores that if this is the 
case then it would also be the case for a cisgender child, and is thus at best not a good 
argument for differential treatment, but for withholding gender recognition from all children, 
including based on sex assigned at birth.  
 
1090 Gender Recognition Act 2004, Section 1 
1091 Gender Recognition Act 2006 Section 1 (1) 






Secondly it is worth noting that the nature and consequences of legal gender recognition are 
entirely determined by the governing body. As such any claim that children should not have 
their gender recognised due to the consequences of such a decision cannot be an argument 
against gender recognition, but is rather an argument against a specific gender recognition 
system. For example in some jurisdictions a person must have surgery prior to 
recognition1093.The decision to undergo gender recognition in such a jurisdiction would 
therefore have much more serious consequences than on a jurisdiction that does not have this 
requirement. The same can be said regarding jurisdictions requiring a person to state that they 
intend to live in the recognised gender until death1094. This is indeed a serious decision, but 
this decision is not an intrinsic part of gender recognition. As such any argument from 
consequences must also examine if the consequences in the relevant jurisdiction are a 
necessary part of gender recognition or an addition that may not be necessary.  
 
Thirdly it should be noted that gender recognition at various levels, including being addressed 
by their name and pronouns is suggested by evidence to be just as beneficial to the wellbeing 
of transgender children as it is to transgender adults1095. As such it may be appropriate to ask 
whether or not withholding a beneficial intervention, which, depending on the jurisdiction 
may be reversable, on the basis of age can be justified.  
 
 
A number of jurisdictions only provide gender recognition for those with binary genders. Out 
of those jurisdictions that do provide gender recognition for non-binary genders it appears 
that it is most common to allow for this form of recognition on passports before other 
documents. For example in India it was possible to have a passport with the sex marked as 
“T” before it was possible to be recognised as transgender as per the Transgender persons 
Act. Similarly in Australia the first documents to allow non-binary recognition were 
 
1093 The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act 2019 No 40 of 2019 Section 7 
1094 Gender Recognition Act 2006 Section 2 (1) 
1095 Chosen Name Use is Linked to Reduced Depressive Symptoms, Suicidal Ideation and Behavior among 
Transgender Youth, Stephen T. Russell, Amanda M. Pollitt, Gu Li, Arnold H. Grossman, J Adolesc Health. 




passports, which allowed an applicant to have their sex marked as “X”. The crucial question 
regarding “once this category has been recognised, what should it mean in practice”. Will be 
discussed later in this chapter. For the purposes of this section it is sufficient to note that 
many jurisdictions restrict gender recognition for some purposes to binary genders. 
Additionally it is interesting to note that while it seems to be most common for jurisdictions 
to recognise “non-binary” as a unified category, which is interesting given that non-binary 
describes a diversity of different gender identities. As such it remains to be seen if this option 
can provide sufficient specificity to provide the benefits of recognition it may seek to 
provide, as opposed to a system as implemented in Tasmania1096 which allows for a diverse 
array of genders.  
 
 
A number of jurisdictions do not recognise sex and gender as separate1097. As such the ability 
of these jurisdictions to recognise intersex status is limited. However it must be noted that 
those with intersex characteristics have diverse gender identities1098, and while some may 
wish to be recognised as “intersex” as an identity1099 they largely interact with gender 
recognition systems in the same way as the general population. As mentioned previously it 
may not be desirable to recognise gender and sex as separate from a legal perspective in 
many situations. The recognition of separate sex and gender categories may cause a number 
of issues, in addition to the fact that it may not be necessary. As such in terms of access to 
gender recognition it seems as though the needs of intersex people in this regard can be met 
by gender recognition systems which cater to the needs of persons who’s gender assigned at 
birth may not match their identity in general. Similarly, while there have been cases regarding 
intersex people seeking to be recognised as such1100, it appears to be the case that this may be 
catered for by generally applicable gender recognition systems which cater to non-binary 
genders in general. This is because the only difference in these cases is the particular physical 
characteristics of the individual, however if the gender recognition system is sufficiently 
accessible and does not have anatomical or surgical requirements, these cases would seem to 
 
1096 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019 
1097 Out of those examined in this thesis only Australia recognises them as separate formally, although New 
Zealand does in some respects.  
1098 The “Normalization” of Intersex Bodies and “Othering” of Intersex Identities in Australia, Carpenter, M. 
Bioethical Inquiry 15, 487–495 (2018). 




be rendered no different from that of a person with any other non-binary gender identity 






How is recognition accessed?  
 
The reason to examine the practical requirements is due to concern for accessibility. A 
system, no matter how well designed will be of limited usefulness if it cannot be accessed by 
those it is intended for. Additionally the practical issue of the nature of the requirements for 
recognition is relevant to how the system of recognition behaves. A system with no evidential 
requirements is arguably not recognising the same thing as a system with rigorous 
requirements. As such the question of who may be recognised and how that recognition 
functions in practice is very much linked to how that how that recognition is accessed and 
what the requirements to access it are.  
 
If the gender recognition system requires evidence this will have a significant impact on who 
will be able to use the system. Evidential requirements can result in exclusion, for example a 
system which requires surgery will exclude all those who have not had surgery including 
those who cannot access it. Because of this, evidential requirements reflect the answers 
devised in that jurisdiction to two questions: Who should be recognised and what shall be 
sufficient to demonstrate their identity.  
 
The jurisdictions examined reflect a diverse array of answers to these questions. For example 
India is the only jurisdiction among those examined which requires surgery for someone 
seeking binary gender recognition1101. It is also the only jurisdiction to recognise a separate 
“transgender” status1102, which seems to reflect a difference in how being transgender is 
conceptualized. Similarly the jurisdictions differ between requiring merely a signed statement 
 




confirming one’s identity1103 and requiring a medical diagnosis1104 (or surgery in the case of 
India).  
 
While ideas about who is deserving of recognition may vary between jurisdictions, not all 
choices regarding evidential requirements are regarded equally. Surgical requirements have 
been condemned by the UN and referred to as forced sterilization1105, as well as being found 
to be a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights. How a jurisdiction chooses to 
recognise gender can be rooted in a number of ideas about gender, from how many genders 
exist to the extent to which one’s legally recognised sex / gender should be linked to 
anatomical characteristics. While the full scope of these ideas is beyond the scope of this 
piece of work it is worth noting that compelling cases have been made by a number of 
academics and organisations for reducing evidential requirements for a number of reasons1106. 
 
It is worth noting that evidential requirements make the process more bureaucratic and thus 
may make it harder to access. The process of gathering evidence and filling in forms is must 
come out of a person’s free time, and because only transgender people need to undergo this 
process policy makers must be mindful of the unevenly distributed cost in terms of time and 
effort that such a process entails.  
 
In addition to barriers posed by the process itself specific evidential requirements may pose 
additional difficulties. Medical requirements may be particularly problematic. In addition to 
the ethical and human rights1107 based objections to surgical requirements may deny 
recognition from those who want to have surgery but who cannot obtain it due to a lack of 
availability, as was the case in New Zealand where such surgeries were unavailable until 
 
1103 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019 
1104 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 3 
1105 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
Juan E. Méndez, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Twenty-second session, February 
2013, Located at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.53_English.pdf
, accessed 09/01/2021 
1106 Ten Years of Gender Recognition in the United Kingdom: Still a “Model for Reform”?, Dunne, Peter, 2015, 
Public Law (4): 530–539. 
1107 See the recent case of X and Y v Romania, Applications - 2145/16 and 20607/16 where surgical 
requirements were found to be in contravention of article 8 of the ECHR 
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recently1108. Even lesser medical requirements may still pose significant problems. A 2017 
survey showed 24% of transgender people surveyed are prevented from seeking the medical 
interventions they require due to fear of discrimination1109. A transgender person seeking 
gender recognition may be unable to find or access a medical practitioner willing or able to 
provide them with the required medical evidence. A particularly striking example of this can 
be seen in the recent Jay case in England. In this case Jay’s attempts to seek recognition were 
frustrated by the fact that she was in prison1110. This can be a poignant example of evidential 
requirements interacting with other elements of the legal system to create an unjust outcome.  
 
Additionally medical requirements may pose problems due to the overlap of requiring gender 
recognition and other characteristics. For example, in jurisdictions where the recognition 
process is the same for transgender and intersex people, an intersex person seeking 
recognition may have to grapple with additional trauma related to their past treatment in order 
to obtain such evidence1111. Additionally there may be financial implications, particularly if 
the jurisdiction does not have a public health service or if it is not available to everyone. As a 
result those who lack financial means may find themselves unable to access the recognition 
they would otherwise be entitled to. This also occurs when a jurisdiction implements a fee to 
access gender recognition. 
 
The cost of obtaining gender recognition, either through a fee, through time invested in 
complying with a bureaucratic process or through the cost of obtaining medical evidence or 
legal assistance raises another issue. If recognition of one’s gender identity is to be regarded 
as a right1112, then one should recognise that the majority of the population is given access to 
that right almost automatically, as soon as their sex is assigned at birth. As such, any fee or 
 
1108 New Zealand reduces 30-year wait for gender reassignment surgery, Eleanor Ainge Roy, 19/10/2018, 
Located at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/oct/19/new-zealand-reduces-30-year-wait-for-gender-
reassignment-surgery, accessed 07/09/2019 
1109 LGBT in Britain Trans Report, Stonewall, 2017, Located at 
https://www.stonewall.org.uk/system/files/lgbt_in_britain_-_trans_report_final.pdf, accessed 09/01/2021, page 
19 
1110 Jay v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) 
1111 Intersex Treatment and the Promise of Trauma,  Iain Morland, collected in Gender and the science of 
difference cultural politics of contemporary science and medicine, Jill A. Fisher  Rutgers University Press, 2011 
1112  As per The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 - Additional Principles and State Obligation on the Application 
of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Expression and Sex 




other cost of gender charges a fee for an essential right but only for a particular minority 
group. While such a fee may be defended by the idea that those who use a service should 
cover its cost, if one regards recognition as a right, then one can see that everyone receives 
the service, but only some are charged a fee. While it could be argued that that service being 
charged for is the managing of paperwork and evaluating of evidence and other requirements 
of the system, it should be noted that this system is optional, and could be replaced by one 
with a much lower cost for the state. Additionally the person who must use this process has 
not asked for the process to be bureaucratic, it is simply deemed that this process is the one 
they must undergo because of the circumstances of their birth. As such any defence of a fee 
on the ground that the service must be paid for must justify this against the discriminatory 
impact of any system which requires that one group must pay to access a right that others 
need not pay for, particularly when the group that must pay to access the right is also often 





How does recognition behave in practice? 
 
 
Some jurisdictions, appear to have had some difficulty reconciling the desire to recognise 
transgender identities with the existing law on marriage. A key example can be seen in the 
case of the marriage of C1113. This case quite clearly shows the core difficulty regarding 
marriage; that jurisdictions that define marriage as between one man and one woman de-facto 
exclude everyone who is neither a man nor a woman, such as those with non-binary genders, 
and those who cannot be easily classified as men or women, such as some intersex people. 
Legal systems have attempted a number of solutions to this issue. 
 
In chronological order the first solution attempted was to decide that a person could not exist 
who could not be classified, so deciding the validity of a marriage involving such a person 
 
1113 In the marriage of C and D (falsely called C) (1979) 35 FLR 340 
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was simply a matter of deciding “which sex predominates”1114. Hall’s case must be 
mentioned at this juncture, an early case in which it was decided that the individual in 
question could not be cleanly classified as a man or a woman, so aspects of the dress and 
conduct of men and women were merged to create a third distinct category to them1115.  
 
Following this more modern legal solutions have been attempted. Following the conclusion 
in the marriage of C, which was seen to be unsatisfactory the court in W v W reached a 
conclusion somewhat similar to the approach of determining “which sex predominates”. In 
this case the court decided that that the gender in which a person actually lives their life 
should be decisive1116. In a way this can be seen to be similar to the approach of determining 
predominance, but rather than attempting to gauge biological predominance, it focuses on 
which gender / sex is predominant from a social perspective. This can be contrasted with 
cases addressing transgender people, which decided to focus on sex assigned at birth and 
biological characteristics1117. This contrast is particularly interesting in jurisdictions which in 
other aspects of the law focus more on a transgender persons social existence than their 
biological characteristics, such as in Scotland where how one lives in society determines 
where one will be housed if sent to prison1118, but where one requires a diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria, but not surgery to receive a gender recognition certificate1119. The result is a 
somewhat muddled approach, where transgender and intersex people are treated 
inconsistently, and transgender policy does not always appear to be consistent with itself.  
 
There is another solution to the issue of marriage, which has been simply to replace the 
requirement for a man and a woman with a requirement that the participants be two 
competent consenting adults regardless of gender or sex. Such an approach has been taken in 
 
1114 A Mechanical and Critical Enquiry into the Nature of Hermaphrodites, James Parsons, Sagwan Press, 1741 
1115 Impossible Hermaphrodites: Intersex in America, 1620–1960 Elizabeth Reis September 2005 The Journal of 
American History 411, Located at 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/healarts/studies/alternatives/Alt%20PDFs/Hermaphrodites_Reis.pdf, page 419, 
paragraph 1 
1116 W v W (Physical Inter-Sex) [2001] Fam 111 
1117 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8 
1118 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019 
1119 Gender Recognition Act 2004 Section 3 
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Australia1120 and New Zealand1121. This appears to eliminate the issue of individuals who do 
not conform to a gender/ sex binary being excluded from the institution of marriage, but does 
require  the community to have a more accepting attitude regarding gender and sexual 
orientation, so may not be viable at the moment in every jurisdiction.  
 
The UK has taken a somewhat different approach. When the UK first introduced the Gender 
Recognition Act it was necessary to dissolve one’s marriage in order to obtain recognition in 
order to avoid non-heterosexual marriages being possible de-facto1122. Following this the UK 
introduced civil partnerships, in order to allow homosexual couples to enter into a legal 
relationship akin to marriage. This introduced a level of complexity, as marriage was 
exclusively heterosexual and civil partnerships were exclusively homosexual. Following this 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act extended the right to marry to same sex couples, which 
meant that it was possible for a person who changed their legal gender to remain in a valid 
marriage. The Gender Recognition Act was amended to include the measure referred to as the 
spousal veto, which replaced a previous measure which required a person seeking gender 
recognition to either dissolve their marriage or to convert it to a civil partnership1123. The 
issues regarding the spousal veto have been discussed previously1124. At the time of writing, 
even though same-sex marriage1125 and heterosexual civil partnerships1126 are possible in the 
UK, the spousal veto remains. As such due to the evolution of marriage in the UK occurring 
in a number of steps, with each step involving compromises, and leaving behind some of 
those compromises even when the half measure itself is replaced, the introduction of 
marriage equality in the UK can be said to not have fully extended to transgender people. 
While proponents of the spousal veto state that it is necessary as a transgender person coming 
out is an important juncture in a relationship which should prompt serious thought and 
require both parties to confirm that they are happy to continue with the relationship1127. This 
is manifested by interim gender recognition certificates, which do not provide gender 
 
1120 Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious Freedoms) Act 2017 
1121 Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, Public Act 2013 No 20 
1122 Gender Recognition Act 2004 as originally enacted, Schedule 4. 
1123 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, Schedule 5, part 1 
1124 Discussed at page 154 
1125 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 
1126 Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration etc) Act 2019 
1127 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390 House of commons Women and 
Equalities Committee, Published on 14 January 2016 located at  




recognition but render the applicant’s marriage voidable. This allows for a person who finds 
themselves unexpectedly in a relationship with a person’s whose gender is not what they 
thought it was to leave the marriage, which may be understandable for certain individuals. 
However the implementation whereby the cisgender partner can effectively withhold gender 
recognition from their partner seems to be a questionable means of achieving the stated 
objective.  
 
It may be possible to address this concern through other methods, such as reform to the 
divorce system in the UK, which has historically not allowed for a “no fault” divorce1128. 
Reform of this which will allow people to leave marriages which they no longer wish to be in 
due to unexpected circumstances more easily in general is already in progress. The Women 
and Equalities Committee recently issued a call for evidence regarding transgender rights 
which specifically requested evidence on the possible removal of the spousal consent 
requirement1129. In 2020 legislation was introduced which removes the requirement for one of 
the previously required factual situations to be present, replacing it with a notice 
requirement1130. This has the effect of introducing “no fault” divorce to the UK, without the 
previously required 2 or 5 year separation requirements. This may make the elimination of 









Through the previous examination of the functioning of gender and sex recognition in the 
examined jurisdictions one can see a wide array of different approaches to the issue being 
 
1128 The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Section 1 (2) 
1129 Call for evidence, Women and Equalities Committee, UK Parliament, Located at 
https://committees.parliament.uk/call-for-evidence/291/reform-of-the-gender-recognition-act/, accessed 
09/11/2020 
1130 Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020 
232 
 
implemented in a variety of contexts. Further collection of data will be necessary to draw 
certain conclusions about these different approaches. For example there does not appear to 
currently be sufficient data to draw conclusions on the impacts of gender recognition via 
court applications vs application to a gender recognition panel. The availability of data in this 
area of study is somewhat poor in general. For example the UK had not conducted a national 
survey of the experiences of its transgender population until 20191131. So, while outcomes on 
certain metrics cannot be compared comparisons are possible on other grounds. This thesis 
has focused on analysis and comparison of the legal regimes in terms of their foundations, the 
legal reasoning behind their implementation and possible implications of the decision making 
processes involved, with a particular focus on human rights. Based on this analysis this 
section will present a number of recommendations for those responsible for implementing 




The process of recognition: 
 
 
As with any legal measure, it is important to consider exactly what the purpose the 
recognition is being granted. As discussed previously recognition systems and criteria may 
differ within the same jurisdiction based on the purpose for which recognition is being 
granted1132. This has a number of advantages to a single unified approach and allows 
measures to be proportionate to the needs of the purpose in question, it is also the approach 
taken by all of the jurisdictions examined in this thesis to varying degrees. As such a 
recognition measure should be tailored for the purpose that it serves. This ensures that this is 
not unnecessarily restrictive and that the needs of the purpose are also satisfied. In addition to 
this it is important to be critical about what the needs of the purpose actually are. For example 
in England prisoners are generally housed according to the gender on their birth 
 
1131 National LGBT Survey Research Report, Government Equalities Office 2018, Located at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/721704/LGB
T-survey-research-report.pdf, accessed 10/01/2021 
1132 Discussed on page 209 
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certificate1133, however in Scotland more emphasis is placed on how the individuals live their 
lives in practice1134. While it has been argued that with regards to prison’s gender assigned at 
birth, or possessions of certain anatomical features should be decisive it is important that 
these decisions be based in a full understanding of the forces at work. There does not, at the 
time or writing, seem to be any evidence to suggest that measures in prisons based on lived 
identity increase rates of assaults in prison. Additionally, as stated in the 2016 PSI, the 
women’s estate should be equipped to deal with such assaults, and measures put in place to 
protect prisoners from each other should not cease to function simply because a prisoner is 
transgender1135. As prisons are in many ways the most “extreme” situation in which gender 
recognition can become relevant this should serve as an example of how restrictions on 
gender recognition in some situations may seem superficially to be justified, but may not be 
necessary or justified in practice.  
 
Additionally, it is important that in addition to being tailored for a specific purpose it may be 
useful to consider that it may be counterproductive to use gender as a shorthand for other 
characteristics. Having a single unified “legal gender” may run the risk of using this category 
as shorthand when actually more specific measures may be called for. This is because sex and 
gender categories contain so much diversity that they can be said to be “fatally 
imprecise”1136. For example, a public health initiative may wish to encourage screening for 
cervical cancer. If this is implemented by allocating funds for testing of “women” this may 
create a number of problems depending on how gender recognition is implemented. It may 
risk excluding trans men who may still need to be screened for cervical cancer or may force 
transgender women to out themselves as transgender when they are offered testing that does 
not apply to them. However such an initiative can be implemented without making reference 
to gender at all, by simply saying that those with a cervix are entitled to the testing. Being 
specific in this way can avoid a number of gender recognition complications, however it does 
 
1133 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, HM Prisons and Probation Service, Ministry 
of Justice, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 1.5 
1134 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, accessed 05/11/2019 
1135 The care and management of individuals who are transgender, HM Prisons and Probation Service, Ministry 
of Justice, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at 6.2 
1136 Mutilating gender. Spade, D. (2006). In S. Stryker & S. Whittle (Eds.), The transgender studies reader (pp. 
315–332). New York and London: Routledge. 
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require those implementing policy to be mindful of the exact requirements of the police and 
of the complexities of gender and sex. An example of this approach being implemented can 
be seen in Tasmania where legislation was amended to replace reference to gender or 
gendered roles with more generally applicable terms1137.  
 
This specificity can be beneficial in ways more generally applicable than the transgender or 
intersex populations. Replacing the use of gender with reference to specifics can also 
contribute to reducing the emphasis on sex and gender in a legal system, without reducing 
access to legal rights, as those rights will still be available to those who need them, but 
gender will no longer being used as a shorthand to describe that category of persons. This, 
when combined with a willingness to be critical about when gender or sex are actually 
relevant to a situation may help prevent an injustice where rights are unjustly distributed due 
to a flawed system of categorization.  
However it is important not to be too reductionist, while particular characteristics may be 
more useful than sex categories in the vast majority of situations, it is import to note that 
gender, as it is a social category, may be applicable in more situations, particularly when the 
issue at hand is related to interactions between members of society. For example in situations 
involving domestic abuse, gender categorization may be useful, although it is important not 
to ignore the existence of men who experience such abuse. Similarly with regards to 
bathrooms, any interaction in that space occurs at a social, not biological level. While 
concern has been expressed regarding the risk of impropriety from those with “male 
anatomy”1138, it is worth noting that such impropriety is already unlawful regardless of the 
sex of the perpetrator, as such the only situations in which sex may become relevant are 
already crimes, regardless of the sex of the perpetrator.  
 
In situations where sex and gender categories are used, it is important that all those who 
policy makers anticipate to be included by a category are, in fact, included by the category. 
As such if a jurisdiction recognises that someone is entitled to be considered to be a member 
of a category, but must go through a process to be recognised as such it is important that this 
 
1137 Discussed on page 58 
1138 The toilet debate: Stalling trans possibilities and defending ‘women’s protected spaces.’ Jones C, Slater J, 
The Sociological Review. 2020;68(4):834-851. 
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process contain as few barriers and be as easy to navigate as possible. So long as a situation 
continues where someone meets the relevant criteria, but is not recognised for practical 
reasons, such as lacking time or money, this person is de-facto being recognised as a member 
of the wrong category. This may mean for example that a transgender woman who cannot 
afford a fee for gender recognition, who otherwise meets all the relevant criteria, and thus is 
recognised by the state as being correctly categorised as a woman, remains incorrectly 
classified, which may carry a number of practical implications. As such it seems beneficial 
for recognition systems to have as few barriers to access as possible. This is also necessary 
from a human rights perspective, as gender recognition has been recognised as an essential 
part of a person’s human rights, and thus should be readily accessible to them. From a 
practical perspective this may mean ensuring that standard forms are provided, as well as 
clear guidance to make the process as simple as possible. Additionally removing fees would 
result in access to this right no longer being limited based on financial means.  
 
In addition to reducing barriers to access to those who are otherwise eligible for recognition, 
policy makers should also be willing to examine the degree to which restrictions on eligibility 
are justified. Restrictions based on age or marital status may well be based on concerns which 
can be more proportionately remedied through other means or which may not be based in 








Practical implications of various recognition systems will be examined in two parts, first 
examining the practical implications of gender / sex recognition in general, then examining 




When discussing the practical concerns a few key issues are particularly relevant. What do 
gender recognition systems look like in practice, and what features allow them to function in 
such a way that they provide the necessary recognition to those who are eligible? 
 
As described in Corbett v Corbett1139 and discussed previously, situations in which gender is 
relevant in the law can be divided into situations where gender is essential and situations 
where it is relevant but not essential1140. The Gender Recognition Act in the UK can serve as 
an example of how the two situations related to each other. In most situations where gender is 
relevant but not essential, the participants are free to agree whatever criteria they wish for 
gender recognition. For example a bank is free to set any criteria it pleases1141 for amending 
the gender listed on its customer records. This extends to the vast majority of situations where 
gender or sex are involved, including passports and national insurance. As mentioned when 
addressing the case in more detail, sex was only deemed essential in a few situations, and in 
most of these situations the law has since changed1142.  
 It is worth noting that while gender recognition in these situations can be characterised as a 
negotiation, like many negotiations there is a significant imbalance of power between the 
parties.  
The party seeking recognition is always at somewhat at a disadvantage. This is because while 
it may be thought of as a negotiation, it is somewhat different to other negotiations. Rather 
than negotiating the exchange of one thing of value for another, the person seeking 
recognition is seeking a thing of value, but the thing they give in exchange is somewhat more 
abstract. While a fee may be paid, this fee is normally not so much the price for recognition 
as an administration fee. Instead the price of recognition is normally some degree of 
conformity with the ideas about gender possessed by the recognising agent. For example in 
jurisdictions with laws requiring surgery for those seeking gender recognition such surgery is 
the price of recognition. Similarly if one wishes to change one’s account details at their bank 
and the manager of the bank believes that trans people should only receive gender recognition 
if they conform to certain gendered norms, it is the managers views of gender that must be 
negotiated with. This results in a situation where the “opposing force” in this sort of 
 
1139 Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1971] P. 8 
1140 That judgement referred to sex, however the same reasoning can apply to both gender and sex and appears 
to reflect practice in relevant jurisdictions.  
1141 Subject to anti-discrimination legislation 
1142 Discussed on page 124 
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negotiation is the views of the individual on gender, which are shaped by the views of the 
society on gender and what is acceptable regarding gender recognition. This poses some 
particular difficulties, but also may suggest a number of possible avenues for reform which 
would not be otherwise possible. 
 
The fact that one must negotiate against individual and social ideas about gender means that 
without antidiscrimination legislation that interactions relating to this sort of gender 
recognition can be particularly vulnerable to individual malice on the part of those who 
choose not to grant recognition, as well as individual essentialist views. However if anti-
discrimination legislation is present in the jurisdiction this can have a number of positive 
effects. Not only can help provide people a remedy against denial of recognition which 
results in unjust harm, but it may also assist those seeking recognition by reframing the 
negotiation. A common assertion by those who believe that transgender identities should not 
be recognised is that it is simply a matter of objective biology, and only those who meet 
specific objective biological criteria should be recognised as belonging to one gender/sex or 
the other. This can result in a somewhat inflexible negotiating partner, as in many cases a 
trans person will never be able to satisfy these criteria. However anti-discrimination 
legislation can help to reframe the issue. It does this by framing situations where a person’s 
gender may be recognised not as a case of rights being attached to inflexible criteria, but as 
being a matter of fairness. As such the question changes from “does this person possess the 
anatomy required to be seen as a woman” to “is it unfair for this person to be treated 
differently from a cisgender woman”. This does not grant blanket recognition, for example in 
the UK there are exceptions in which a transgender person may be treated differently if to do 
so is a proportionate means to achieve a legitimate aim. However an anti-discrimination law 
of this kind almost by necessity can introduce some measure of flexibility into otherwise 
inflexible “negotiating positions” regarding gender recognition, as well as fulfilling its 
primary objective of preventing harmful discriminatory treatment.  
 
In addition to anti-discrimination legislation, other legal measures may impact how 
recognition functions in those situations where gender and sex are relevant but not essential. 
Gender recognition legislation, such as the Gender Recognition Act in the UK can also play a 
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key role. Such legislation, using language such as the “for all purposes”1143 language in the 
GRA impacts all forms of recognition, not only those for which a recognition certificate is 
required, such as changing sex on a birth certificate. As such, while the criteria for 
recognition used when gender is relevant but not essential are negotiable before a person is 
given a recognition certificate, the certificate renders their legal gender absolute1144 for all 
purposes, rendering negotiation impossible. This means that while gender recognition for the 
vast majority of purposes is negotiable, recognition legislation creates a guarantee that even a 
party disposed to deny recognition they must recognise a person’s gender if the statutory 
requirements are met. This can function as a “safety valve” of sorts, allowing a person’s 
gender to be recognised if they meet certain criteria regardless of the beliefs of the 
recognising party, thus reducing the extent to which a person seeking recognition is at the 
mercy of social norms and beliefs. This can allow a society to improve access to gender 
recognition even if transphobic or otherwise ignorant views are still commonplace within 
their culture. However it is worth being aware that the effectiveness of gender recognition 
legislation may be limited in such situations, as people may be afraid to ask for gender 
recognition if they perceive that doing so may put them in danger of transphobic abuse or 
violence1145. An example of this in practice can be found in the case of schools. It has been 
pointed out that single sex schools, when making decisions regarding admitting persons of 
differing gender identities, tend to use legislation as a baseline, but make practical decisions 
on a more discressionary basis, without formal rulemaking1146. This shows both how anti-
discrimination legislation can be vital in shaping recognition practices, but also how 
legislation can set norms beyond the specific measures contained within it, and form a basis 
for more individualised judgements. 
 
Gender recognition legislation can also be important as it facilitates the ability to disappear. 
As discussed previously, this is a key function of gender recognition legislation, with a 
number of justifications discussed in the ECHR caselaw, mostly related to protecting 
transgender people from possible discrimination and violence if they are outed by their 
 
1143 Gender Recognition Act 2004, Section 9 
1144 Apart from exceptions, such as those found in the Equality Act 2010 
1145 See the difficulties associated with coming out under stigma reported in Report of the Expert Committee on 
Issues Relating to Transgender Persons, located at socialjustice.nic.in/writereaddata/UploadFile/Binder2.pdf, 
accessed 28/12/20, page 47 
1146 The challenge of same sex provision: How many girls does a girls’ school need?, Renz, F. (2020),10(2) 
feminists@law, page 17 
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identity documents. Without such legislation, while a person may be able to negotiate 
recognition for specific purposes, even to have their birth certificate changed, it may not be 
possible to obtain the uniformity of identity which would allow a person’s transgender 
history to disappear. Without gender recognition “for all purposes” there is always a risk that 
one important document may remain unchangeable and reveal a person’s gender assigned at 
birth.  
 
As with any piece of legislation, public education is important for the successful 
implementation of gender recognition legislation. This is particularly the case for gender 
recognition legislation as it fundamentally relates to how a minority population should be 
treated, particularly a minority which most people may not be particularly knowledgeable 
about, and such lack of knowledge can have a profound negative impact on how a person 
acts. As such it is important that the rational for the legislation be clearly explained and that 
the population are aware of how the legislation works, to ensure that they understand their 
obligations with regards to gender recognition. An example of this can be seen in the UK, 
where a review in 2016 found that a lack of public understanding regarding gender 
recognition and non-discrimination legislation had led to a number of organisations refusing 
to recognise a person’s gender due to believing that no gender recognition could be done for 
any purpose before a person had received a gender recognition certificate1147. This shows 
how without sufficient public education the role of recognition legislation can be 
misunderstood, and used as a requirement for all recognition rather than as a guarantee of 
recognition if certain criteria are met.  
 
 
As discussed previously, gender recognition legislation can facilitate both being seen and 
disappearing1148. Being seen allows a person to be perceived by society and official systems 
according to how they identify. This can make a number of services and spaces more 
 
1147 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390, House of Commons Women and 
Equalities Committee,  Published on 14 January 2016 located at  
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, accessed 07/01/2021, 
paragraph 143 
1148 See page 199 
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assessable and less alienating, as well as having a number of mental health benefits1149. The 
ability to disappear allows a transgender person to become, in terms of documentation of 
their gender, indistinguishable from a cisgender person. The importance of this was 
emphasised in Goodwin v UK1150, where it was discussed how vital it can be to have a 
uniform legal gender to avoid discrimination or being outed as a transgender person against 
one’s will. Without both of these elements a gender recognition system cannot be considered 
to be complete.  
 
A system that does not grant the ability to be seen, in many ways defeats the purpose of a 
gender recognition system, as it denies people the right to be recognised. Rather than being 
totally lacking it appears to be more common for systems to restrict the right to be seen rather 
than to totally eliminate the right to be seen. For example many jurisdictions restrict the right 
to be seen by only granting recognition to binary genders or those of a certain age or marital 
status. Evidential requirements appear to be the most common restriction on the right to be 
seen, as they are overtly restrictions on recognition designed to recognise only those deemed 
worthy of recognition. A more specific example can be found in India, where the right to be 
seen is restricted by requiring surgery for a person to be recognised as having a binary 
gender1151, a practice which has been condemned by a number of organisations including the 
UN1152 and the ECHR1153. Until the individual is able to get surgery they are only able to be 
registered as a transgender person. As a result of this a person can be seen, but can only be 
seen as transgender, not necessarily as their personal gender identity. Gender recognition 
systems which function in this way can serve as a reminder that when examining the right to 
be seen respecting the autonomy of the individual is crucial, as a person should be recognised 
 
1149 Legal gender marker and name change is associated with lower negative emotional response to gender-
based mistreatment and improve mental health outcomes among trans populations, Arjee Restar, Harry Jin, 
Aaron Breslow, Sari L. Reisner, Matthew Mimiaga, Sean Cahill, Jaclyn M.W.Hughto, SSM - Population Health 
11 (2020) 100595, Located at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352827320302329?via%3Dihub, accessed 08/01/2021 
1150 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18, Paragraph 77 
1151 The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act 2019 No 40 of 2019 
1152 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
Juan E. Méndez, United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Twenty-second session, February 
2013, Located at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.53_English.pdf
, accessed 09/01/2021 
1153 A.P., Garcon and Nicot v France applications 79885/12, 52471/13 and 52596/13 text located at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172913 accessed 21/07/2018, and X and Y v Romania, Applications - 
2145/16 and 20607/16 
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as their authentic identity, rather than the identity imposed upon them by the categorisation 
system1154.  
 
A system that does not grant the ability to disappear may grant gender recognition in some 
form, but does not provide gender recognition that applies in all areas of life and may leave a 
“paper trail” that allows a person to be identified as being transgender. An example can be 
seen in the Tasmanian law which, prior to the 2019 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage 
and Gender Amendments) Act required that after a person’s birth certificate was changed that 
a record be kept noting that a person was previously registered as another sex1155. In addition 
to making a note that a person is trans a gender recognition system can fail to allow a person 
“total” gender recognition. An example of this can be seen in the UK prior to the Gender 
Recognition Act, where while it was possible for one gender to be recognised in individual 
situations through negotiation there was no universal recognition, which necessitated the 
cases leading to Goodwin v UK. 
 
In addition to the analysis within this work, the importance of ensuring that gender 
recognition systems enable both being seen and “disappearing” is also discussed in the recent 
EU gender recognition report1156 which states that member states should: 
 
“Take all necessary measures to ‘ensure that procedures exist whereby all State issued 
identity papers which indicate a person’s gender/sex — including birth certificates, passports, 
 
1154 See Yogyakarta Principles - Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to 
sexual orientation and gender identity, International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), March 2007, Located at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/48244e602.html, accessed 13/08/2020, principle 3 and The Yogyakarta 
Principles Plus 10 - Additional Principles and State Obligation on the Application of International Human 
Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics to Complement the 
Yogyakarta Principles, International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 10 November 2017, Located at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5c5d4e2e4.html , accessed 13/09 2020, principle 31 
1155 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1999, Version from 1 July 2010 – present, Section 28D 
Located at https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1999-058, accessed 23/08/2019 
1156  Legal gender recognition in the EU, The journeys of trans people towards full equality, European 
Commission, Located at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/legal_gender_recognition_in_the_eu_the_journeys_of_trans_people_to
wards_full_equality_web.pdf, accessed 14/08/2020 
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“Ensure that changes to identity documents will be recognised in all contexts where the 




The functioning of legal gender recognition as it relates to non-binary people. 
 
 
As with any recognition of non-binary identities one of the concerns raised regarding such 
recognition is primarily what will these categories mean in practice. Gender recognition often 
has practical consequences, and it is not immediately clear what the consequences of having a 
passport marked “X”, or any other identity document with anon-binary gender or sex 
descriptor would or should be. The most simple answer to this is that the consequences are 
what we decide they are. This response is correct, as the relevant legal systems can be 
modified to adjust the consequences to whatever is desired, but may not be particularly useful 
in assisting someone deciding how they should implement a gender recognition system. The 
question remains: if a non-binary category is recognised, what should this mean in practice? 
The answer depends on the purposes of gender recognition. As discussed previously, there is  
tension in the case law and activism on the topic is that gender recognition can serve two 
seemingly conflicting purposes, to enable a person to be seen and to enable a person to 
 
1157 Legal gender recognition in the EU, The journeys of trans people towards full equality, European 
Commission, Located at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/legal_gender_recognition_in_the_eu_the_journeys_of_trans_people_to
wards_full_equality_web.pdf, accessed 14/08/2020, page 15 
1158 Legal gender recognition in the EU, The journeys of trans people towards full equality, European 
Commission, Located at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/legal_gender_recognition_in_the_eu_the_journeys_of_trans_people_to
wards_full_equality_web.pdf, accessed 14/08/2020, page 16 
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disappear to avoid discrimination1159. Non-binary recognition enables a person to be seen. 
This can have a number of benefits including allowing a person to be treated according to 
their identity, which may improve their access to services and have mental health benefits1160. 
Recognition of a non-binary gender cannot, at this point, provide the ability to “disappear”, as 
a person recognised as non-binary cannot be indistinguishable from a cisgender person in a 
society which only assigns male and female genders at birth. This form of recognition cannot 
allow a person to evade discrimination by being perceived to be cisgender. However, in both 
the case of binary and non-binary individuals gender recognition can, depending on the rules 
of the jurisdiction make an aspect of their “history” disappear: their gender assigned at birth. 
While someone recognised as non-binary can be deduced to be transgender, it would not 
necessarily be possible to determine their sex assigned at birth, which may be useful or 
psychologically beneficial to the individual.  While this form of recognition cannot allow a 
person to be indistinguishable from a cisgender person, it can still serve the useful functions 
of “being seen” which recognition serves for binary transgender people.  
 
Because non-binary genders are not assigned at birth the issue of what legal rights are 
attached to the status becomes somewhat different. Because the status will always be optional 
it may be sufficient to create the legal status simply to allow people to be seen, to then 
prohibit discrimination against those who identify as such, and then to allow society to 
develop an understanding on what this category should mean in practice. This is in many 
ways already happening, as the jurisdictions examined that recognise non-binary genders do 
not tend to have rules within their prison system to deal with this. Although few policies 
mention non-binary or intersex identities specifically, those that do demonstrate a variety of 
approaches. New Zealand’s policy does not refer to non-binary identity, but with regards to 
those who have intersex birth certificates the decision must be made on a case by case basis 
by the relevant minister, with no guidance given as to how this choice is made1161. Kerala 
makes use of a separate facility for transgender people including those with non-binary 
 
1159 Discussed at page 235 
1160 Legal gender marker and name change is associated with lower negative emotional response to gender-
based mistreatment and improve mental health outcomes among trans populations, Arjee Restar, Harry Jin, 
Aaron Breslow, Sari L. Reisner, Matthew Mimiaga, Sean Cahill, Jaclyn M.W.Hughto, SSM - Population Health 
11 (2020) 100595, Located at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352827320302329?via%3Dihub, accessed 08/01/2021 
1161 See page 37 
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identities1162. The UK mentions non-binary people but does not make any special 
accommodation for them, instead stating that they will be used according to their legal gender 
and categorizes non-binary genders alongside those who do not have sufficient evidence or 
intention of transitioning to the “opposite gender assigned at birth” as having limited 
evidence of living in the gender which they identify as1163. The Scottish prison service 
mentions non-binary people1164 in its policy, but while its policy in general places more 
emphasis on autonomy rather than biological determinations by housing people according to 
the gender in which they live, this does not necessarily extend to non-binary people. The 
policy refers to intersex and non-binary people as “non-reassigned trans people”1165. And 
there are no other mentions or provisions for their accommodation, as such this suggests that 
it considers those not fully transitioning to a binary gender to be “non reassigned” and thus 
not qualifying for housing other than that allocated on the basis of sex assigned at birth.  
There is also the category of jurisdictions which do not have specific rules for those who 
identify as non-binary or intersex, but which have general rules that can be easily applied to 
them. For example Victoria considers a number of factors, including where a person believes 
they would best be housed1166. While these jurisdictions may not have a “non-binary estate” 
akin to the male and female estates , they can still formulate general rules on where a person 
should be housed, such as allowing the non-binary person to choose, subject to safety 
considerations. These jurisdictions may provide another possible model for addressing the 
gender recognition needs of non-binary and intersex persons.  
Conceptualizing non-binary and intersex identities as single identities, as a “third category” 
fails to recognise the inherent diversity of characteristics and identities of those within these 
categories. Any way of defining either how this category behaves or how to tell which 
individuals should fall within it risks being reductionist, based on a flawed understanding of 
sex, gender, transition and identities and failing to meet the needs of individuals. Similarly 
creating “third category” prisons or wings for all transgender people not only risks treating all 
 
1162 See page 117 
1163 Ministry of Justice, HM Prisons and Probation Service, The care and management of individuals who are 
transgender, Published 22 July 2019, Located at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-care-and-
management-of-individuals-who-are-transgender, accessed 03/11/2019 at page 32 
1164 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, page 9 accessed 05/11/2019 
1165 Scottish Prison Service Gender Identity and Gender Reassignment Policy, March 2014, Located at 
http://www.sps.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?fileName=SPSGenderIdentityandGenderReassignmentPo
licy20142562_1392.pdf, page 9 accessed 05/11/2019 
1166 See page 74 
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trans people as a monolith but also perpetuates the idea that trans men and women are 
something other than their own genders, separate from cis people in a way that warrants 
differential treatment based solely on their transgender status. Examples of this can be seen in 
the UK and India. The UK chooses to classify non-binary persons as “non-reassigned” or 
chooses to only recognise those with a binary gender as having housing needs that may need 
more than is available using voluntary agreements. This appears to be due to a commitment 
to a binary model of sex and gender. Because the system only acknowledges 
accommodations for men and women, non-binary and intersex people must be classified in 
that system, normally according to sex assigned at birth. Kerala in India has instead chosen to 
adopt a model which classifies transgender prisoners as a separate third gender category, 
which risks erasing the needs and identities of those with binary gender identities, as well as 
the diversity inherent in non-binary and intersex identities.  
Because of this it may be the case that the model used in Victoria may be more useful and do 
a better job at protecting the rights of transgender and intersex people. The built in respect for 
autonomy present in taking where an individual wishes to be housed into account means that 
the system is not refusing to acknowledge a person’s identity, even if the accommodations 
available may not feature a category that precisely matches their own gender identity. It may 
be the case that so long as general principles such as autonomy, safety and non-discrimination 
are observed, it may be sufficient to create the category first, and then allow society to decide 
the legal meaning of that category. This would mean that a person would be recognised as 
non-binary, allowing them to access the benefits of being seen as their own gender identity. It 
would then be up to individual recognising agents to decide how a non-binary person should 
be treated. In a number of ways this is already the case even in jurisdictions that do not have 
legislation regarding non-binary identities. This is because people already identify as having 
non-binary gender identities, and various bodies such as banks, universities, medical 
institutions, sports bodies and prisons must decide how these people should be treated, with 
many organisations, including public bodies, already recognising non-binary identities in 
various respects, and perceiving this recognition as being vital to their core mission1167. This 
is rendered somewhat complicated as this may involve fairly complex decisions and the 
ability and information to make these decisions is not necessarily possessed by those in a 
position to make them.  As noted in the UK, gender recognition is often misunderstood, 
 
1167 Taking Public Responsibility for Gender: When Personal Identity and Institutional Feminist Politics Meet, 
Cooper, D. (2020), feminists@law, 10(2), page 16 
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which can result in individual agents being reluctant to recognise gender without a 
recognition certificate1168, which does not allow for the recognition of non-binary people and 
may thus result in people being misgendered by those under the misapprehension that they 
are legally obliged to do so. As such legal clarity may be desirable to ensure that those 
responsible for gender recognition in the “relevant but not essential category” are aware of 
the existence of non-binary identities and the options available to them regarding recognition. 
This could be done through informational campaigns without changing existing laws, 
however for reasons previously discussed the formal addition of the category into legislation, 
particularly that regarding identity documents, may be desirable1169. 
 
At the present moment non-binary gender identity appears to be treated as a category of 
exclusion. This means that being non-binary does not grant one special “non-binary rights”, 
such as the right to enter non-binary only restrooms, but it means that one does not wish to be 
treated as a man or a woman. Because non-binary is such a broad category, it seems unlikely 
that non-binary will ever be a “third gender” with its own restrooms etc. Current practice 
does not seem to be proceeding in that direction. Rather than toilets reserved for those who 
identify as non-binary it is becoming increasingly common to see gender neutral toilets, that 
may be used regardless of gender in addition to men’s and women’s toilets1170.  
What may be more likely is a form of de-emphasising the role of sex or gender, sometimes 
referred to as de-gendering. De-gendering has been discussed as a means by which laws 
cease to regard gender as a matter of relevance, which may result in improved equality and 
inclusion of non-binary identities, as these identities would not have legal relevance, so 
would only provide the benefits of “being seen”1171. This has been described as a positive 
option, as it provides “an alternative to the proliferation of categories”1172. Some have 
 
1168 Transgender equality, first report of the session 2015-2016 HC 390, House of Commons Women and 
Equalities Committee, Published on 14 January 2016 Located at  
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf, accessed 07/01/2021, 
paragraph 143 
1169 See page 238 
1170 For an interesting example of this see the Stalled! Project at Stalled! Projects, Design, Located at 
https://www.stalled.online/design, accessed 10/01/2021 and Stalled!: Transforming Public Restrooms, Joel 
Sanders, Footprint: Delft Architecture Theory Journal. Issue 21. Delft: December 23, 2017. 
1171 No Man's Land': Non-binary Sex Identification in Australian Law and Policy, Theodore Bennett ,[2014] 
UNSWLawJl 31; (2014) 37(3) UNSW Law Journal 847 
1172 Genders that Don't Matter: Non-Binary People and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, Flora Renz, Published 
as a part of The Queer Outside in Law : Recognising LGBTIQ People in the United Kingdom, Senthorun Raj, 
Peter Dunne (eds), Palgrave Macmillan 2020, page 150 
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expressed concern regarding de-gendering, as they regard it as a threat to the ability of the 
law to protect those with specific genders, usually women1173. It has been pointed out that 
detaching gender status from law will not necessarily result in a more equal future, as it runs 
the risk of covering up existing discrimination by relying on the idea of formal equality rather 
than addressing systemic inequalities1174. However, de-gendering needs not be a process 
which removes any rights, but which detaches those rights from gender1175. For example, in 
Tasmania when introducing a gender recognition system permitting non-binary gender 
legislation was introduced which changed a number of other pieces of legislation to remove 
references to gender and replace them with more specific terminology. For example, the non-
gendered word “parent” is added to the Adoption Act 1988 which referred to “mother and 
father”1176. As such the rights are not removed, but can exist detached from gender. 
Additionally it has been pointed out that important functions for measuring discrimination or 
injustice so that it can be eliminated do not necessarily require legal involvement in gender, 
as such monitory efforts like surveys have never required a particular legal status and can be 
done on the basis of self-declaration and careful question design1177. When recognising non-
binary identities, due to the diversity inherent in the category it appears less likely that that it 
will become a category akin to the binary identities, but will rather necessitate a degree of de-
gendering, in order to ensure that people can still access relevant legal rights but still be 
recognised as their authentic identity. This of course raises practical issues, particularly with 
regards to specifically how legislation can be written to accommodate such a diversity of 
identities. One possible solution is gender neutral drafting, which can take a number of forms. 
New Zealand for example uses the gender-neutral pronoun ia, which can mean him, she, they 
or it, in the Māori Language Act1178. The gender-neutral pronoun “they” may be used in 
English, but this raises some issues regarding reluctance to use the singular they for fear of 
 
1173 Diversifying, Abolishing, Equalising Gender… Can the Law Do All Three?, Davina Cooper, The Future of 
Legal Gender, August 2018, Located at https://futureoflegalgender.kcl.ac.uk/2018/08/22/diversifying-
abolishing-equalising-gender-can-the-law-do-all-three/#more-378, accessed 10/01/2021 
1174 Genders that Don't Matter: Non-Binary People and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, Flora Renz, Published 
as a part of The Queer Outside in Law : Recognising LGBTIQ People in the United Kingdom, Senthorun Raj, 
Peter Dunne (eds), Palgrave Macmillan 2020, page 150 
1175 Abolishing gender registration: A feminist defense. Braunschweig, L, (2020) 1 International Journal of 
Gender, Sexuality and Law 76 
1176 Justice and Related Legislation (Marriage and Gender Amendments) Act 2019, Located at 
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/asmade/act-2019-007, accessed 23/08/2019, Section 6 
1177 Abolishing gender registration: A feminist defense. Braunschweig, L, (2020) 1 International Journal of 
Gender, Sexuality and Law 76, Page 93 
1178 Te Ture mōTe Reo Māori 2016/the Māori Language Act 2016 
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being confusing or “grammatically incorrect”1179. While these issues will need to be 
addressed, there are a multitude of ways in which this could happen, which can be explored 
and examined on their own merits but are beyond the scope of this thesis1180.  
To be clear, the “de gendering” discussed here is not the same as decertification of gender. 
While decertification involves the law ceasing to regulate gender in any form, de-gendering 
would involve laws being created in such a way that they no longer distinguish on the basis 
of gender, but rather on whatever basis is necessary, be that specific anatomy or a specific 
circumstance, such as having given birth to a child. This is sometimes referred to as “soft 
decertification”1181. A commonly raised concern regarding decertification is that it may s 
nothing to remedy inequalities while rendering institutional inequality invisible, with one 
person interviewed by the future of legal gender project commenting that: 
“It's like taking a number plate off a car and saying you have changed the car. You haven't 
changed the car and the car is still a car. That is not going to deal with pollution, is it?“1182. 
The process of rendering laws as gender neutral as possible allows laws to function with 
minimal confusion and complexity, while providing the benefits of having one’s gender 
recognised, while also allowing time for such inequalities to be addressed prior to any true 
decertification, should that be desired in the jurisdiction. In this way it avoids the issue of 
merely “changing the numberplate”, but rather allows for systemic issues to be addressed in 
an environment of mutual respect, self-determination and equality prior to any future 
potential decertification. 
 
While one cannot fully describe the practical implications of a non-binary gender, one can 
see from this discussion the direction in which it is likely to go, which can result in respect 
for the rights and identities of all people, provided that core principles of non-discrimination 
and autonomy are abided by.  
 
 
1179 Gender Inclusive Legislative Drafting in English: A Drafter’s Response to Emily Grabham, Xanthaki, H. 
(2020), feminists@law, 10(2), page 9 
1180 See an interesting discussion of this issue in Exploring the Textual Alchemy of Legal Gender: Experimental 
Statutes and the Message in the Medium, Grabham, E. (2020), feminists@law, 10(2). 
1181 Taking Public Responsibility for Gender: When Personal Identity and Institutional Feminist Politics Meet, 
Cooper, D. (2020), feminists@law, 10(2). 
1182 Pulling the Thread of Decertification: What Challenges are Raised by the Proposal to Reform Legal Gender 
Status?, Cooper, D., & Emerton, R, (2020), feminists@law, 10(2), page 7 
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Non-discrimination appears to be of particular importance in the case of non-binary people 
and those who wish to be recognised as intersex. This is because a person recognised as such 
will be able to be “seen” and correctly identified, but will not be able to “disappear” which 
has historically been one of the purposes of gender recognition legislation in order to protect 
against the harms of being exposed as being transgender. However, becoming legally 
indistinguishable from a cisgender person is not the only way a person may be protected from 
the harms of being known to be transgender in a society where the social / legal conditions 
exist in which discrimination or other poor treatment is possible or even likely to occur. The 
principle of non-discrimination and non-discrimination legislation can play a key role in 
ensuring that people can be “seen” without needing to disappear to avoid poor treatment. This 
can be particularly useful in situations where gender is relevant but not essential, which are 
not usually governed by gender recognition legislation, which make up most of the situations 
legal which involve gender on a day to day basis 
 
The nature of most gender recognition as occurring in the category where gender is relevant 
but not essential does minimize the usefulness of legislation such as the GRA.  However, this 
does not mean that legislation is irrelevant. The negotiations which characterise this category 
of legal interactions are regulated in a number of ways, but with regards to gender identity the 
most important way can be through their interaction with non-discrimination legislation. 
While notionally in this category of situations the recognising agent is free to set whatever 
criteria they wish for recognition. In practice this is limited by non-discrimination legislation. 
For example the owner of a business which provides bathrooms is free to decide who they 
will recognise as a man and who they will recognise as a woman in order to use these 
facilities. However, if they set these criteria in such a way that they disadvantage or cause 
harm to those possessing a protected characteristic they may run afoul of non-discrimination 
legislation. While not all jurisdictions have such legislation, a more concrete example can be 
seen in the UK. In the UK transgender people are protected by the Equality Act under the 
protected characteristic of gender reassignment1183. Because of this while a provider of a 
gendered facility, for example changing rooms, may choose whatever criteria they wish to 
recognise the gender of users of the facility, they must not use discriminatory criteria. 
Because the Equality Act prohibits direct and indirect forms of discrimination a service 
 
1183 Equality Act 2010 Section 7 
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provider must avoid creating general rules which disproportionately disadvantage those with 
a characteristic less favourably as well as directly treating those with the characteristic less 
favourably1184. The provider must justify any choice which would exclude transgender people 
from being treated in accordance with their identity as being proportionate to a legitimate 
aim1185. The Code of Practice for the Equality Act explicitly uses changing rooms as an 
example, explaining that rules which treat transgender people differently from their gender 
identity will not be valid if the “legitimate aim” of these rules can be met in other ways. In 
the case of changing rooms the example explains that curtains and barriers can be sufficient 
to ensure the decency of all users without excluding transgender individuals1186. As such one 
can see the impact of non-discrimination legislation on everyday gender recognition. Non-
discrimination legislation can also be seen as a vital accompaniment to any legislative 
attempt to protect intersex people, which, combined with protections of bodily integrity, can 
improve people’s lives and also assist in destabilizing binary notions of sex at a social 
level1187.  
 
As mentioned previously solutions similar to those in Halls case, of creating a third category, 
may not be desirable due to intersex being such a diverse category in of itself. Additionally 
many intersex people do not desire to be recognised as a third category, as it can be 
inherently othering and perpetuate the idea that intersex people are fundamentally “other”, an 
idea which has contributed to the mistreatment of and stigma surrounding intersex people1188. 
Likewise solutions which rely on determining predominance may find themselves in 
difficulty due to the inherent difficulties of that task1189. Attempting to allocate a gender / sex 
based on predominance also fundamentally undermine individual agency and cannot be 
applied to non-binary people, such a solution will also necessarily be costly, as it will require 
the use of medical witnesses. Systems based on how a person lives their life in practice 
 
1184 Equality Act 2010 Sections 13 and 19 
1185 This justification is possible due to Section 19(d) for indirect discrimination, and due to exceptions for 
particular situations such as the provision of single sex facilities as per schedule 3 para 28 
1186 Equality Act Code of Practice, Services, public functions and associations, Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, Located at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/servicescode_0.pdf, accessed 
17/01/2021, page 198 
1187 Legislating Intersex Equality: Building the Resilience of Intersex People through Law, Garland, F and 
Travis, M (2018). Legal Studies, 38 (4). pp. 587-606. 
1188 Queering the Queer/Non-Queer Binary: Problematising the "I" in LGBTI+, Fae Garland and Mitchell 
Travis, Published in The Queer Outside in Law : Recognising LGBTIQ People in the United Kingdom, 
Senthorun Raj, Peter Dunne (eds), Palgrave Macmillan 2020, page 175 
1189 See Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality, Fausto-Sterling, Anne. New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 2000. 
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appear to be much more viable. This is particularly the case given that the result of 
recognition is necessarily social. A system based on biological characteristics will impact a 
great number of social interactions where those physical characteristics are wholly irrelevant. 
A person’s genitals or ability to reproduce matter in very few situations, and those situations 
may be better regulated by direct reference to those characteristics rather than to the broad 
category which may not always include those who ought to be included. As such it appears 
that solutions relating to how a person lives their life in practice and self-declaration appear 
to be among the best available options. As mentioned previously, if implemented correctly 
this could result in one system capable of recognising the gender identities of both 
transgender and intersex people, regardless of gender identity, and affording them the 
opportunity to marry the person of their choice, a right which ought to be afforded regardless 
of sex or gender identity1190. Such a system will, of course, rely heavily on anti-
discrimination legislation, however if sufficiently robust legislation is in place it may well be 
the case that it produces better outcomes than any system requiring mandatory 
classification1191. 
 
This is only possible where as much as possible the law is “genderblind”, this is particularly 
notable with regards to marriage, as can be seen in the case of the marriage of C1192. As such, 
even if a jurisdiction does not want to pursue a similar gender recognition system to that used 
in Tasmania, certain measures, such as removing gender requirements from marriage can be 
regarded as essential for allowing a system including gender recognition to function as 
smoothly as possible. While it is possible to have gender recognition without marriage 
equality, this can dramatically increase the complexity of the system, and thus its 






1190 Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual 
orientation and gender identity, International Commission of Jurists. 2007, Located at 
yogyakartaprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/principles_en.pdf, accessed 11/01/2021 
1191 Accommodating Intersexuality in European Union Anti‐Discrimination Law, Mitchell Travis, European 
Law Journal, Vol. 21, Issue 2, pp. 180-199, 2015 
1192 In the marriage of C and D (falsely called C) (1979) 35 FLR 340 































Through examination of the relevant literature and the evolving laws in the chosen 
jurisdictions it is possible to observe a number of diverse characteristics of each jurisdictions 
gender recognition system. Through comparison of these systems it is possible to see a 
number of different options for how gender recognition systems could be developed in the 




As discussed in the paragraphs above this thesis makes a number of recommendations for the 
development of gender recognition systems in the future, particularly regarding the treatment 
of those with intersex characteristics and / or non-binary gender identities. These 
recommendations are made assuming that the goal of the jurisdiction in question is to enable 
those within their jurisdiction to access legal gender recognition, which can be regarded as a 
key aspect of their human rights, with no unjust impediment.  
 
Those recommendations in brief are: 
 
• Legal gender recognition should be accessible with as few practical barriers as 
possible.  
o Features of a gender recognition system which may pose unjust barriers 
include: 
▪ Fees 
▪ A time-consuming bureaucratic application process 
▪ Evidential requirements which may not be required. 
▪ Medical requirements, which are particularly problematic1194 
▪ A lack of public knowledge about how the process functions 
▪ A lack of a standardised process for applications. 
 
• Legal Gender recognition systems should be designed with an understanding that they 
will be applied in a wide variety of situations, where recognition is done for different 
reasons and has differing degrees of importance.  
o As such, allowing flexibility for the vast majority of situations, as seen in the 
UK law regarding situations where gender is “relevant but not essential” is 
recommended if it is also accompanied by legislation which allows for 
recognition “for all purposes” under a single set of criteria, so as to provide a 
level of certainty.  
o Because such systems can be somewhat complex, it is recommended that 
 
1194 See discussion of medical requirements at page 225 
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jurisdictions prepare comprehensive guidance and emphasise educating the 
public on the law and its function in this area.  
o Care should be taken to ensure that recognition for every purpose 
accomplishes the key objectives of gender recognition systems: 
▪ Gender recognition systems should enable a person’s gender identity to 
be recognised by the law as their experienced and lived gender identity. 
This can be thought of as the right to be seen as one’s authentic gender 
by the law. 
▪ Gender recognition system should also enable a person to render 
documentation of their gender indistinguishable from that of a cis 
person, essentially allowing their trans history to “disappear” if they so 
desire. 
 
• When recognising non-binary identities, in order to fulfil the purpose of gender 
recognition to allow people to be recognised as their authentic genders, jurisdictions 
should recognise the inherent diversity of “non-binary” as a category. 
o As such it is recommended that non-binary not be treated as a “third gender” 
with its own gender segregated facilities, instead the appropriateness of those 
identifying as non-binary participating in gendered spaces and activities 
should be decided based on the specifics of those activities and spaces on a 
case by case basis.  
 
• The construction of nongendered spaces (although not at the expense of gendered 
spaces which many still find necessary and useful) and the de-gendering of laws is 
recommended to enable the full participation of non-binary people in society on equal 
terms with those with binary gender identities.  
o Tasmania’s gender recognition law can be regarded as a positive model for 
recognising the diversity of genders that exist while also catering to the needs 
and wishes of the intersex community. 
 
• Intersex should not be regarded as a third gender. While some jurisdictions initially 
adopted this process, it appears to be being moved away from by those with the most 




• Intersex identity should not be assigned at birth. This recommendation is based on the 
guidance from intersex organisations, and the wishes of the intersex community 
should be treated as paramount when designing legal systems to address their needs. 
 
 
• The needs of intersex people regarding gender recognition can be addressed simply by 
ordinary gender recognition procedures provided they are made sufficiently 
accessible. 
 
• With regard to specific situations which can pose difficulties regarding gender 
recognition, particularly of non-binary genders the first step a jurisdiction should take 
is to seriously critically consider whether the current use of gender or sex is justified. 
Once this has been examined care should be taken to ensure that whatever the purpose 
of the use of gender played is satisfied in the least discriminatory way possible. 
o Regarding marriage a number of jurisdictions have eliminated the gender 
recognition problems posed by the models of marriage used in that jurisdiction 
by rendering legal relationship of marriage to be gender neutral.  
▪ There are varying ways of implementing gender neutrality with regards 
to marriage and jurisdictions should attempt to implement a model 
which involves as few procedural hurdles or difficulties for 
transgender people as possible.  
 
• Regarding prisons jurisdictions should very seriously consider what their prisoner 
classification system is intended to do, and whether it is being done in the least 
discriminatory way possible.  
o Due to the inherent diversity in circumstances, identities and risks posed by 
prisoners jurisdictions should avoid creating blanket rules, such as housing 
based solely on birth certificates, as these are likely to result in injustice or 
unjustified harm in a number of individual cases. Instead an individual 
approach where a number of clear, predetermined factors are considered in a 
consistent and transparent manner that may be appealed. 
o Due to the serious safety concerns inherent in discussions regarding the 
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housing of prisoner’s jurisdictions should consider safety to be paramount in 
deciding where a prisoner should be housed.  
▪ When considering safety jurisdictions should keep in mind that the 
female estate ought to be equipped to deal with women who pose a 
danger to others as a part of its normal operation, including women 
convicted of sexual offences. Therefore while a transgender prisoner 
may have a history of sexual offences it should be considered whether 
it is proportionate to treat them differently to another woman. 
▪ Jurisdictions should also consider whether the risk they seek to 
mitigate is social in nature, rather than biological. Differentiating 
transgender prisoners from cisgender prisoners who otherwise pose 
similar risks may not be justified. 
 
 
In general jurisdictions should ensure that their gender recognition systems are based in 
preserving autonomy, ensuring that they systems do not contradict their essential purpose and 
ensure that their policies are non-discriminatory. Jurisdictions should also keep in mind that 
gender recognition is a developing area of law. This thesis sought to examine diverse 
jurisdictions to identify examples of problems encountered by gender recognition systems as 
well as examples of positive and progressive practice. As such it is limited by the time in 
which it is written. Due to the constantly changing nature of the law it is recommended that 
the recommendations in this document are not treated as set in stone, but rather as 
demonstrations of general principles which should be considered. New evidence and new 
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